Rakka ryūsui : colonel Akashi's report on his secret cooperation with the Russian revolutionary parties during the Russo-Japanese war by Fält, Olavi K.. & Kujala, Antti.
AKASHI Motojirö 
Rakka ryusui 
Colonel Akashi's Report 
on His Secret Cooperation with 
the Russian Revolutionary Parties 
during the Russo-Japanese War 
Societas Historica Finlandiae 
Suomen Historiallinen Seura 
Finnish Historical Society 
Studia Historica 31 
AKASHI Motojirö 
Rakka ryusui 
Colonel Akashi's Report 
on His Secret Cooperation with 
the Russian Revolutionary Parties 
during the Russo-Japanese War 
Selected chapters translated by 
Inaba Chiharu and edited by  
Olavi K. Fält and Antti Kujala 
SHS • Helsinki • 1988 
Cover design by Rauno Endén 
Photograph: Akashi Motojirö 
ISSN 0081-6493 
ISBN 951-8915-16-4 
Vammalan Kirjapaino Oy 
Vammala 1988 
Preface 
The name of the Japanese colonel Akashi Motojirö attained fame for the first 
time when, in St Petersburg in 1906, the Russian state police published a booklet 
about his secret activities during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). The cor-
respondence between Akashi and his fellow conspirators published therein demon-
strated that the Japanese Military Attaché had overstepped the normal limits of 
his office and had, using considerable sums, funded revolutionary movements 
functioning within the Russian Empire. Akashi's unusual activities were a con-
sequence of the fact that Russia and Japan were engaged in a war in which Japan 
was forced to seek compensation for being the weaker party in regard to resources 
through the help of many diverse strategies. 
Many European newspapers published broad accounts of the Russian book-
let's disclosures. The only help proffered by Tokyo was to call Akashi back to 
Japan; he was never again sent to Europe in an official capacity. 
Akashi's cooperation with the opposition movements among Russia's minori-
ty nationalities was closer than with the revolutionary parties led by Great Rus-
sians. The representatives of the national minorities served as middlemen, and 
as a smoke screen, for his work with the latter. 
Akashi's operations against the Russian government were, for understanda-
ble reasons, greatly appreciated during the interwar years in Poland and Finland 
and were extensively described in many of the memoirs and biographies pub-
lished in these countries. Before the 1930's, when Stalin made the history of the 
revolution into biased propaganda, the historical writing of both the victorious 
and the vanquished Russian revolutionaries also mentioned the connections with 
Japan. 
After World War Two Akashi's name began to arouse interest in the western 
world because it was believed that he, like the German imperial government dur-
ing World War One, funded the Bolsheviks' revolutionary action. Because of 
this interest almost everywhere in the world Akashi's name is associated with 
Russian history. Credit for this is due above all to Michael Futrell. It is revealing 
that Futrell was interested in Lenin's and the Bolsheviks' relations with Akashi 
although the Japanese evidently had much more to do with the Russian Socialist 
Revolutionaries than with the Bolsheviks. Being a true historical scholar Futrell 
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nevertheless came to the conclusion in his study that the Bolsheviks were a very 
insignificant offshoot of Akashi's operations. 
After his death in 1919 Akashi actually became the subject of a cult in Japan. 
His relations with the Russian revolutionaries and his influence on the outcome 
of the Russian revolution of 1905 were exaggerated. 
Nevertheless, an authentic source concerning Akashi's activities did exist; it 
was Rakka ryusui, based on his official reports completed at the beginning of 
1906. The original copy of the work was destroyed at the end of World War Two. 
However, three copies of Rakka ryusui, slightly differing from one another, have 
survived. Japanese archives contain other original materials concerning Akashi's 
operations as well. 
In recent years Japanese researchers have ascertained the connections which 
their country's official representatives established with the opposition movements 
of Imperial Russia. Because of the language barrier, however, this Japanese re-
search is not known outside of the country. Likewise, in spite of its being of univer-
sal interest, Rakka ryusui has been accessible only to those who understand 
Japanese. 
During recent decades Akashi's operations have been studied from the view-
points of Russian, Polish, and Finnish history. There is a definite need to syn-
thesize the different viewpoints. One of the tasks of the present publication is 
to meet this need. 
Our book is built around Akashi's Rakka ryusui. Inaba Chiharu translated 
its principle parts. Relevant Japanese telegrams from 1904 and 1905 are pub-
lished here as an appendix to the report. The work also includes all of Akashi's 
letters found in Finland and Sweden as well as research pertinent to Inaba's, Antti 
Kujala's, and Olavi K. Fält's articles. Inaba aims to reconstruct Akashi's activi-
ty during the Russo-Japanese War in its Japanese context with particular focus 
on the contention between the country's General Staff and Foreign Ministry. Kuja-
la's study deals with the cooperative ventures among the revolutionary parties 
of the Russian Empire, 1904-1905. For his part Fält examines the significance 
of Akashi's activities in regard to the later development of Finno-Japanese rela-
tions. 
Only the principal parts of Rakka ryusui are included here. There is reason 
to emphasize, however, that the present English translation is more complete than 
all of the existing Japanese versions. Inaba's translation is based on a critical 
comparison of the three available versions. He has endeavoured to reconstruct 
the original contents of Rakka ryusui. Akashi modified the names of his Euro-
pean contacts to suit written Japanese; they therefore often differ considerably 
from their originals. With a few exceptions, all the Europeans mentioned by 
Akashi have now been identified while in the Japanese versions to whom the names 
refer remains in many cases a riddle. This work of identification was done by 
Kujala. 
We would like to thank the Finnish Historical Society which, in addition to 
funding the translation of Rakka ryusui and Inaba's and Fält's articles, accept- 
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ed our work for publication in its Studia Historica series. We would also like 
to express our gratitude to Aro-Yhtymä Oy for financially supporting the trans-
lation of Rakka ryusui and to the Finnish Academy for funding the translation 
of Kujala's study. Aro-Yhtymä Oy granted its aid before it was discovered that, 
through its own activities, this Finnish corporation has a direct connection to 
the central character of our publication, Colonel Akashi Motojirö. We believe 
that this surprising coincidence shows that, in spite of the great distance between 
them, Japan and Finland have more in common than commonly thought. 
Our special thanks go to the following archives for giving us permission to 
publish documents in their possession: 
The Archives of Constitutional and Political Papers, National Diet Library, 
Tokyo 
The Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo 
The Library of the National Institute for Defence Studies, Defence Agen- 
cy, Tokyo 
The National Archives, Helsinki 
The War Archives, Stockholm 
We owe a particular debt to Inaba Chiharu for his fruitful cooperation. Michael 
Berry, Roger Buckley, and Susan Schmidt expertly corrected the English of the 
sections written and translated by Inaba. Linda Harriet Edmondson's close reading 
of the text in its final stages resulted in numerous invaluable improvements. Peter 
Herring skillfully translated Kujala's study and Malcolm Hicks translated Fält's 
article. We would like to sincerely thank them as well as the numerous research-
ers we consulted and the staff of all the archives and libraries which we used 
in making this work. 
The book has benefited greatly from the help and advice of all the above men-
tioned. It goes without saying that solely the writers and editors are to be held 
responsible for the work's inadequacies. 
Helsinki, December 1988  
Olavi K. Fält 	 Antti Kujala 
Editors' Note 
The translator and the editors have appended, both within the original text and 
in note form, numerous corrections and clarifications to the documents pub-
lished herein. In order to prevent these revisions from becoming confused with 
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the original text they are printed in boldface and situated within the original text 
in brackets. 
Throughout the book dates are given in the Gregorian, or new style, calendar, 
unless otherwise indicated as old style (o.s.). The old style, or Julian, calendar 
was used in Russia at the beginning of this century while Finland followed the 
new style in the Western European manner. To convert dates (in the twentieth 
century) from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar, thirteen days should be ad-
ded to the former. 
Transliteration from Cyrillic to Roman characters is based on a modified Li-
brary of Congress system. Well-known proper names have been transliterated 
according to popular usage, for example Gorky instead of Gor'kii. 
In transliterating Japanese words into Roman characters we have followed the 
Hepburn system. Japanese personal names are given in this book in the order 
in which the Japanese use them; family name first, followed by the given name. 
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INABA Chiharu 
An Explanatory Note 
on Rakka ryusui 
Akashi Motojirö, a Colonel in the Japanese Army, arrived in Yokohama from 
Europe on 28 December 1905. In early 1906 he submitted to the General Staff 
several reports about the so-called Akashi kösaku, his secret activities against 
Russia in Europe during the Russo-Japanese War. Rakka ryusui is a copy of parts 
of those reports. 
The original copy of the reports was kept strictly confidential in the Army and 
was probably burned with many other records at the termination of the Second 
World War.' Fortunately, however, historians now have access to three versions 
of Rakka ryusui copied by Akashi's subordinates. 
a) Meiji 38 nen 12 gatsu 28 nichi hökoku utsushi [A Copy of the Report on 
12 December 1905], Terauchi Masatake kankeimonjo, No 43, 446-3, Kensei shiry-
öshitsu [Archives of Constitutional and Political Papers] (KS), Kokkai toshokan 
[National Diet Library], Tokyo. 
b) Gokuhi, Rokoku kösaku utsushi, Meiji 39 nen 1 gatsu kö [TOP SECRET, 
A Copy of Activities against Russia, copied in January 1906], Böeikenkyujo 
toshokan [Library of the National Institute for Defence Studies, Defence Agen-
cy] (BT), Tokyo. This version was published in 1966: "Rakka ryusui", Gaikö 
jihö, July (1966), pp. 71-102. 
' Inaba Masao, "Shiryö kaisetsu — Rakka ryusui" [Explanatory Note of Rakka ry-
usui], Gaikö jihö, No 1030, July (1966), p. 70. 
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c) Daihisho, Meiji 39 nen 1 gatsu kö, Genkin [Top Secret Papers, written in 
January 1906], Akashi Motojirö monjo [Akashi Motojirö Papers], No 91, KS. 
This translation is mainly based on the revised edition of Rakka ryusui which 
I published in 1986 (Inaba Chiharu, "Shiryö kenkyu, Rakka ryusui" [An Ex-
planatory Note on Rakka ryusui], Waseda kenkyuto jissen, No 7 (1986), pp. 
59-121). But at that time, I compared only the versions "a" and "b". I did 
not know about Akashi Motojirö Papers which Akashi Motoaki, Motojirö's 
grandson, deposited at the National Diet Library in 1985. They were made pub-
lic in 1986. Akashi Motoaki kindly gave me a permission to use this material. 
In late 1986, I found a draft of Rakka ryusui written by Motojirö himself2 and 
a clean copy of the same manuscript, version "c" above. This new material sug-
gested the necessity of modifying what I had published in 1986. The version of 
Rakka ryusui in this volume is the result of this research, which has been based 
on a detailed comparison of all the known versions of Rakka ryusui. 
The forementioned three versions differ from one another in regard to chap-
ter order, number of notes and misspellings and clerical errors. The latter arose 
when Akashi's subordinates made their copy of the original edition of Rakka 
ryusui. I think that version "c" is closest to the original Rakka ryusui, since it 
has the least misspellings and the complete notes (for example version "b" is 
missing part of the notes). 
Rakka ryusui consists of five chapters: 
I. Rokoku rekishino gaiyö [A Summary of Russian History] 
1. Rekishi [A History of Russia] 
2. Tochi oyobi nösei semusutobö shugunkai [Land Owning and Agricultural 
System and the Zemstvo, the Local Government Machinery] 
II. Kyomushugitöno gakusetsu kiln [Origination of Nihilism and Other Principles] 
1. Nihirisumu, anarishizumu, soshiarisumuno kiln gakusetsu katsudö [Origi-
nation, Doctrines, and Activities of Nihilism, Anarchism, and Socialism] 
2. Rokokunai huheitöno ruibetsu hidarinogotoshi [Classification of the Rus-
sian Opposition Parties] 
3. Konnichimade keizokuseru shoundöni kankeiaru omonarumono hidari-
nogotoshi [Important Persons Related to the Opposition Movement up to Now] 
III. Keimei kutö ki [Episodes in Europe] 
1. Kanchö oyobi chöhö kinmu [Intelligence and Spies] 
2. Kidan issoku [Some Episodes in Intelligence Work] 
IV. Fuheitö undöno tenmatsu [The Russian Opposition Movement against the 
Tsarist Regime] 
2 Akashi Motojirö monjo [Akashi Motojirö Papers], No 92, Kensei shiryöshitsu [Ar-
chives of Consitutional and Political Papers] (KS), Kokkaj toshokan [National Diet Li-
brary], Tokyo. 
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V. Ketsuron [Conclusion] 
In chapter I-1, Akashi wrote a short history of Russia from its origins to the 
period of Russification under Nicholas II. This historical account reflected a west-
ern European perspective and was probably based on a history of Russia written 
in German or French. Akashi's biographer wrote in 1928 that the Japanese Min-
ister to Russia, Kurino Shin'ichirö, considered Akashi's spoken Russian rather 
good.3 But it is quite difficult to believe that Akashi was as fluent in Russian 
as in German and French. There are no letters or cards written in Russian in 
the Akashi Motojirö Papers. Moreover, his colleagues prevented him from visit-
ing Finland because of his poor Russian.4 
Chapter 1-2 explained the Russian landowning system, especially the mir (a 
village commune or a communal organization based on joint ownership of ara-
ble and meadow) since the emancipation of the serfs in the era of Alexander II. 
Akashi discussed the zemstvo (an organ of local self-government) in detail and 
concluded that the new agricultural system sowed the seeds of disorder in Rus-
sia: the seeds cultivated in the era of Alexander III and Nicholas II produced 
disaffection among the peasantry and indignation against the government among 
the opposition parties. Akashi undoubtedly wrote this paragraph with the help 
of Konrad Viktor (Konni) Zilliacus, a leader of the Finnish opposition and 
Akashi's most important collaborator during the war. Akashi probably also re-
lied on pamphlets of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party. 
In chapter II-1, Akashi explained the origins, doctrines, and activities of ni-
hilism from a historical and philosophical point of view and threw light on differ-
ences between anarchism and socialism. He wrote that the Chaikovskii (N.V. 
Chaikovskii) group, which was central to the Socialist Revolutionary Party, adopt-
ed anarchism even though socialism was the party's ostensible principle, and that 
the Russian Social Democratic Party adopted pure socialism similar to that of 
the German Social Democratic Party. Akashi regarded the Chaikovskii group 
to be the nucleus of the Socialist Revolutionaries. This is logical, given his per-
sonal relations with Chaikovskii during the war. 
Akashi gave his views on the opposition parties and their leaders in sections 
1I-2 and II-3. Many of these views were unfounded. 
In chapter III-1, Akashi wrote about his intelligence activities in Europe. He 
criticized Russian news censorship which made news in the Russian press unreliable 
and forced him to rely on foreign newspapers. To understand Russian affairs 
better, he valued, for example, the Daily Telegraph, Russische Armee (especial-
ly for Russian military affairs), and L'Echo de Paris. To understand the opposi-
tion movement, he read Iskra, L'Europeen, Osvobozhdenie, and others. 
Akashi's intelligence network included seven spies and five assistants (some- 
3 Komori Tokuji, Akashi Motojirö, I (Tokyo, 1928), p. 152. 
See Rakka ryusui in this present yolume. 
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times the number varied) who maintained contact between him and the spies un-
til the end of war. According to this chapter, he first relied on Swedish military 
spies whom Gösta Theslöf, a former Finnish military officer, and Swedish officers 
had introduced to him at the beginning of the war, but they had their own politi-
cal goals. He sometimes got information from opposition members, but their 
information was not reliable enough as they had no grounding in military af-
fairs. He found that the best spies were those who worked for hard cash. At the 
end of this section Akashi suggested to the General Staff that the most suitable 
spy might be a correspondent, and he proposed that Japan establish a perma-
nent department for intelligence in Europe to cope with any future problems. 
Section III-2 discusses some episodes and setbacks in his activities. One point 
that deserves special mention is a report by an agent of the Russian secret police 
that letters between Akashi and opposition members had sometimes been opened 
in transit. 
Chapter IV describes Akashi's secret activities against Russia in Europe, e.g. 
intelligence, sabotage of the Trans-Siberian railway, and instigation of the op-
position to revolt. 
In section V Akashi emphasized to the General Staff the following points: 
Russia was weaker than the population of 130 million might suggest. Because 
her government had been rotten for a long time, political parties had turned their 
backs on "nationalism" and concentrated on "individualism", i.e. advancing 
narrow interests. Not only oppressed nations, such as the Poles, Finns, Caucasi-
ans, the Baltic peoples, and others, but also many Russians opposed the Tsarist 
regime, and were in conflict with each other. If the present government improved 
its political system, and became more liberal, it would collapse. Consequently, 
the regime would continue a policy of oppression. That was the reason why the 
current regime would maintain its military force for as long as it continued in 
power. Even though the Tsarist government had become corrupt, it was still strong 
militarily in the Far East. It was necessary for Japan to maintain military readi-
ness in opposition to Russia, Akashi concluded. 
Rakka ryusui has been regarded as a volume of reports about Akashi's special 
activities in Europe against Russia, which he submitted to the General Staff af-
ter his return to Japan in December 1905.5 In fact, this report consists of sever-
al different papers. 
First, only those sections entitled "Intelligence and Spies" and "The Russian 
Opposition Movement against the Tsarist Regime" can be substantially regarded 
as reports on these activities. It would be inappropriate to include "A Summary 
of Russian History" and "Some Episodes in Intelligence Work" in the contents 
of this report. Secondly, even though there is a travel record6 in Akashi's pri-
vate papers, dates are seldom included in this service report. 
Thirdly, there is hardly any reference to when, where, and how he had spent 
5 Inaba M. 1966, p. 70. 
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the huge sum of secret funds, though a textbook of the War College published 
in 1925 claimed that one million yen (nowadays almost five milliard yen or thirty-
five million US dollars) had been spent during the war.' If he submitted a spe-
cial service report, exact dates and a bill of expenditures ought to have been at-
tached to it. In fact, there are several references in Akashi's biography to sub-
mitting a bill to the General Staff.8 Moreover, a part of the bill was left in his 
private papers.9 Because the three versions are incomplete and differ from one 
another, Rakka ryusui can hardly be regarded as a volume of the report. It is 
more likely that Akashi selected those papers that put his career in a favourable 
light and excluded top secret records such as the secret funds. 
Rakka ryusui is actually a quotation from an old Chinese poem by Gåo Pián 
(who died in 887). Directly translated, it means "fallen blossoms (probably peach) 
and the flow of water" (along a brooklet in spring), metaphorically "being in 
love with each other".1° From the very nature of things, this title is unsuitable 
for the name of a special service report. No copy of the report was titled Rakka 
ryusui. 
The origins of this title are puzzling. The British historian Michael Futrell sug-
gested that "probably it emerged from the head of some admirer after Akashi's 
death."" Presumably it was Inaba Masao who gave Futrell this idea. It hardly 
seems likely that Akashi used this title when he submitted the report to the General 
Staff at the beginning of 1906. When and by whom was this title adopted for 
the first time? The oldest known copy of the report with this title was typed in 
May 1938 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.?2 Takase Jirö, Chief Secretary at 
Section III (Information on the Soviet Union) of the Investigation Department 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time, recollected, "When the pam-
phlet was typed, this title was probably added by Section I (General Informa-
tion). It is most probable that Andö Giryö, Chief of Section I, gave the name 
Rakka ryusui to the report."13 
6 Akashi Motojirö monjo, No 94, KS. 
Tani Toshio, Kimitsu nichirosenshi [A Secret History of the Russo-Japanese War], 
(Tokyo, 1966), p. 268. 
s Komori 1928, II, part 5, p. 58, 69. 
9 Akashi Motojirö monjo, No 94, KS. 
10 Morohashi Tetsuji, Daikanwa jiten [Great Chinese-Japanese Dictionary], Vol. 9 
(Tokyo, 1985), p. 763. 
11 Michael Futrell, "Colonel Akashi and Japanese Contacts with Russian Reyolution-
aries in 1904-5", St Antony's Papers 20, Far Eastern Affairs 4, (London, 1967), pp. 11-12. 
12 Rakka ryusui (Akashi Motojirö taishö ikö [General Akashi Motojirö's posthumous 
work]), Gaimushö chösabu dai'ikka [typed by Section I, Investigation Department, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs], May 1938, Gaikö shiryökan [Archives of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs] (GS), Tokyo. This pamphlet was typed from the copy owned by Akashi 
Motoyoshi, Motojirö's eldest son. 
1;  Interview with Takase Jirö in Tokyo on 23 December 1985. Takase also explained 
that a copy of Rakka ryusui was typed by order of Andö apparently with a view to dis-
tributing it to the highranking officials in the Ministry. Perhaps he thought that it would 
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Today, Rakka ryusui, especially the section "The Russian Opposition Move-
ment against the Tsarist Regime" is the one and only detailed report about 
Akashi's own activities in Europe just before and during the Russo-Japanese War. 
As this material was a service report submitted to the General Staff, it hardly 
lacks authenticity. It is useful for understanding Japanese activities, because the 
names of persons and places and the contents of activities were written concrete-
ly and in detail. But it is difficult to use it to throw light on Japanese monetary 
aid to the opposition parties, or for information on discord among the parties 
and Akashi's correspondence with them, or on differences of intention between 
the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Some of the information in this material is incorrect. Some mistakes are based 
on secondhand information, others on errors of Akashi's memory, and others 
on his misinterpretation. The reports also omit reference to his failure to sabo-
tage the Trans-Siberian railway after the expenditure of considerable funds.14 
And Akashi scarcely notes the fact that he built up an intelligence network in 
cooperation with Japanese ministers in Europe during the war,15 probably be-
cause he wanted to emphasize his work in intelligence and downplay the achieve-
ments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
be a useful textbook for Japanese strategy against Russia in the latter half of the 1930s. 
But Takase, who had the final say on the matter, opposed the idea. Plans based on Akashi's 
activities would not meet future exigencies. The Chang-ku-féng incident, a clash between 
Japanese and Russian forces at the junction of the Manchurian, Korean, and Siberian borders 
in July 1938 had demonstrated the superiority of Soviet mechanized units. Moreover, an 
updated version of Akashi's activities in the early 1900s might put Japan at a great politi-
cal disadvantage. First, it would be very expensive. Secondly, normal diplomacy would 
be less risky. Thirdly, there was probably no group in Russia capable of overthrowing the 
Soviet government. In agreement with Section lI (Intelligence) of the General Staff, Takase 
favoured giving some aid to exiled Belorussians in cooperation with the Germans. In fact, 
the General Staff formed a special group of undercover agents led by Manaki Yoshinobu 
in 1937. Suzuki Kenji, Chudokutaishi, Oshima Hiroshi [Biography of Oshima Hiroshi, 
Ambassador to Germany], (Tokyo, 1979), pp. 92-93. 
14 The General Staff sent Akashi 30,000 yen to help hard-liners of the Polish National 
League sabotage the Trans-Siberian Railway in March 1904, and sent 40,000 yen to help 
a certain party, probably the Socialist Revolutionaries, do so at the beginning of February 
1905. Inaba Chiharu, "Nichirosensökino yöroppaniokeru nipponno tairoshiakösaku" [Jap-
anese Activities against Russia in Europe during the Russo-Japanese War], Hokuöshi kenkyil, 
No 3 (1984), pp. 19-21. 
15 Generally speaking, the General Staff used military spies to obtain information on 
Russian military affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs relied on published Russian, 
German, and French sources for political and economic information about Russia. But 
the General Staff requested the cooperation of the Ministry in order to build an intelli-
gence network for tactical intelligence at the beginning of the war. Inaba C. 1984, pp. 16-17. 
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INABA Chiharu 
Akashi's Career 
Akashi Motojirö was born in Hukuoka, northern Kyushu, in 1864. An undis-
ciplined child, he was, nevertheless, the best student in his elementary school. 
At the age of thirteen, he went to Tokyo where he entered a military preparatory 
school in 1877, the Military Academy in 1881, and the Military Staff College 
in 1887.' One of his schoolmates said that he always ranked second or third, was 
the "cock of the walk", and was indifferent to his appearance in the Military 
Academy years. His academic record at the Military Staff College was excellent, 
especially in tactics and mathematics.2 
After graduation in I889 Akashi was assigned to the General Staff, though 
a graduate officer was usually attached to a corps. He had a talent for languages 
and was sent to study in Germany in February 1894 but recalled in less than one 
year to serve in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). He saw little action and 
only went to Formosa as a staff member of the Imperial Guard Division to sup-
press the opposition movement against Japan. In 1896, he was reassigned to the 
General Staff, and went with a group of inspectors to Formosa and French In-
dochina. In 1898, he studied the American annexation of the Philippines. In 1900, 
he was dispatched to China to negotiate the termination of the Boxer Uprising 
with Russia. 
In January 1901, Akashi was sent as Military Attaché to France and went to 
Paris; thereafter he stayed in Europe for five years.3 On 15 August 1902, he was 
appointed Military Attaché to Russia and arrived in St Petersburg on 1 Novem-
ber.4 From this career, it is quite clear that Akashi was a member of the mili- 
' Komori 1928, I, pp. 37-68. 
2 Komori 1928, II, chapter 5, pp. 16-17. 
3 Komori 1928, I, pp. 69-79. 
° Terauchi Masatake, Minister of War, to Komura Jutarö, Foreign Minister, telegram 
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tary elite and had been trained as an expert in foreign affairs. 
On 10 February 1904, when Japan declared war against Russia, Akashi was 
assigned to a position at the newly-established Japanese legation in Stockholm. 
This exceptional post, which was under the direct control of the General Staff, 
was created to establish the Japanese intelligence network in Russia, to sabotage 
the Trans-Siberian Railway, and to support the widespread opposition movements 
within Russia. 
Both the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the General Staff considered Stock-
holm the best location for collecting general information about Russia and for 
establishing a military intelligence network. In addition to his previous function 
as Military Attaché in Russia related to establishing an intelligence network, 
Akashi also had to carry out his routine duties as Military Attaché to the lega-
tion. Because this new duty interfered with his secret activities, he asked the Gener-
al Staff to relieve him of the official duties in the Stockholm legation. 
In June 1904 Major Nagao Tsunekichi (Lieutenant Colonel in 1905) was ap-
pointed Military Attache to Sweden.5 Akashi could now move freely through-
out Europe with adequate funds for secret activities.6 
On 11 September 1905, soon after the conclusion of peace between Japan and 
Russia, Akashi was ordered to return home, probably because the General Staff 
regarded him as the man who would hinder the normalization of future Russo-
Japanese relations. He left Europe on 18 November and arrived in Tokyo on 
28 December. In recognition of his wartime activities Akashi was awarded the 
Third Order of the Golden Kite. The same decoration was also conferred on Major 
Tanaka Giichi, later General and Prime Minister, for distinguished services as 
a staff member in the army dispatched to Manchuria, and on Colonel Utsunomiya 
Tarö, later General, who had collected important information in London as Mili-
tary Attaché. This suggests how valuable the General Staff considered Akashi's 
services in Europe. 
Soon after returning to Japan, Akashi was appointed Military Attaché to Ger-
many responsible for reporting on the postwar Russian situation. But the Russi-
an government published a pamphlet in St Petersburg about his secret activities 
during the war entitled "The Seamy Side of the Revolution: An Armed Uprising 
Funded by Japanese Money in Russia".' This exposé was reported in German 
newspapers.8 The Russian government apparently feared a continuation of his 
espionage activities and sought to keep him out of Europe. As a result of these 
No 470 on 9 August 1902, Kakkokuchuzai tai(kö)shikantsukibukan ninmen zakken [Papers 
Related to the Appointment and Dismissal of Military Attachés], 6.1.5.10, GS. 
5 Komori 1928, I, p. 89. 
6 Inaba C. 1984, p. 28. 
lznanka revoliutsii: Vooruzhennoe vozstanie v Rossii na iaponskiia sredstva (S.-Peter-
burg, 1906). 
For example, Berliner Tageblatt, 21 June 1906, and Berliner Morgenpost, 22 June 
1906. See Akashi Motojirö monjo, No 126, KS. 
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Akashi as the Governor-General of Formosa in 1918 or 1919. 
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difficulties, he was called home after less than one year. 
Back in Japan, Akashi soon became a Major General and on 7 October 1907 
Head of Military Police in Korea. This was the most important post in the Residen-
cy-General of Korea established in 1904. Japan annexed Korea by military force 
in August 1910. Akashi became the Provost Marshal in Korea, responsible for 
maintaining law and order there. Why was Akashi appointed to the most impor-
tant post in Korea? Futrell suggests: "It seems that Akashi was very effective 
in suppressing Korean nationalism. It is indeed likely that his exceptional ex-
perience in Europe had given him unusual qualifications.s9 In fact, Akashi 
thoroughly suppressed Korean opposition movements against Japan by more skill-
ful and cruel means than those employed by authorities in Russia.10 
His meritorious service in Korea earned him the rank of Lieutenant General 
in December 1913. In April 1914 Akashi became Deputy Chief of the General 
Staff. When the First World War broke out in the summer of 1914, he advocated 
the occupation of Tsingtao and Kiaochow Bay, the Chinese territory governed 
by Germany, and insisted on the Twenty-one Demands, which also called for 
the transfer of former German rights to Japan and demanded other privileges 
in China." Akashi's goal was a "koreanized" China — an objective he shared 
with Terauchi Masatake, the Minister of War and the Governor-General of Korea, 
and Hasegawa Yoshimichi, the Chief of the General Staff who had been the Com-
mander of the Korean Corps during the Russo-Japanese War. This ambitious 
scheme led nowhere, however. In October 19I5 Akashi became Commander of 
the Sixth Division in Kumamoto in central Kyushu. In June 1918 he was appointed 
Governor-General of Formosa. The following month, he became General. In Au-
gust 1919 he also became Commander-in-Chief in Formosa and endeavoured to 
strengthen Japanese rule there through the reform of the educational system. On 
October 1919 Akashi was designated Baron, but he died on 24 October.'2 
9 Futrell 1967, p. 14. 
1° Komori 1928, I, pp. 437-500; Yamanobe Kentarö, Nihon töchikano chosen [Korea 
under Japanese Rule], (Tokyo, 1971), pp. 14-22. 
11 Komori 1928, II, pp. 1-10. 
12 Komori 1928, II, pp. 10-238. 
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Translator's Note 
It is difficult today for a Japanese person to read and understand Rakka ryusui 
because the system for writing the Japanese language was considerably revised 
after World War Two. Akashi's intricate expressions, with their multiple mean-
ings, make the interpretation of his text problematic. 
The distinctive features of the Japanese language create special problems for 
translation. For example in Japanese many passive sentences are used with the 
subject of the sentence remaining unspecified. In such cases it is not easy to de-
termine the subject's identity, especially when it must be ascertained within the 
context of inadequately known past events. Because of the difference between 
languages and cultures translation is never merely repetition, it is also interpre-
tation; this is particularly so in the translation of Japanese. 
In Rakka ryusui Akashi modified European names to conform with Japanese 
pronunciation. Furthermore, he had difficulties in remembering with even ap-
proximate correctness the names of many with whom he cooperated. Here are 
some examples, retransliterated into the western alphabet, of the form names 
acquired in Rakka ryusui: 
Volkhovskii — Wanhovusukii or Vanbovusuki 
Varandian — Waranchan 
Balogh de Galántha — Barogugaranta 
Becker Bey — Blokkobei 
Heftye — Hefuchii or Hehuti 
Madame Roland — Madame Röran 
Le Gil Blas — Jiruburå or Giruburå 
Sakartvelo — Sakarutoveru 
Antti Kujala has identified the problematic European names on the basis of 
the Japanese forms which I informed him of. We have provided both forms in 
the text when the variation between them is exceptionally great. Unfortunately, 
a few names remained unidentified. 
I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Japanese archives possessing 
the documents which I edited. I express my special thanks to Akashi Motoaki, 
Motojirö's grandson who gave me permission to use the Akashi Motojirö Papers 
in the Archives of Constitutional and Political Papers. Just as important was 
the advice I received in my translation work from the following people: Anzai 
Kazuo, Hamaguchi Manabu, Momose Hiroshi, Mural Makoto, Satö Eiichi, and 
Yamamoto Toshirö. 
Inaba Chiharu 
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by Inaba Chiharu and annotated 
by Inaba Chiharu and Antti Kuj ala 
Classification of the Russian Opposition Parties 
[Chapter II-2 in Rakka ryusui] 
THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARY PARTY'', S.R.: 
This party is an embodiment of the Narodnaia Volia, one wing of the Nihilist 
Party. What distinguishes the party from the other socialists in Europe is the 
fact that the one basically employs violence while the others limit themselves to 
speeches and demonstrations against the Tsarist regime. In order to carry out 
violence, the party organizes a group prepared, if necessary, to die, called the 
Boevaia Druzhina"-- [ its real name was Boevaia Organizatsiia, which means the 
Fighting Organization]. The tactics of the party are to intimidate the government 
by the use of this organization. 
The purposes of this party have remained unchanged until now. It intends to 
set up a permanent parliament to supervise the affairs of state; to elect govern-
ment officials by popular vote; to recognize the complete autonomy of the mfrs 
'' 800,000 members are said to have joined this party. 
The Boevaia Druzhina uses extreme direct measures as a combat strategy. 
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[village communes or communal organizations based on joint ownership of arable 
land and meadows] as an economic and executive unit; to establish freedom of 
speech, the press, and assembly, as well as universal suffrage; to abolish the regular 
army and establish a popular militia system; to nationalize all land; to gradually 
socialize property related to production. 
That which distinguishes this party's programme from the others is the great 
importance members attach to peasant and agricultural land combined with their 
wish to postpone the socialization of property for workers. They believe the Rus-
sian peasant has sufficient experience of autonomy through the use of the mir 
as a system of common cultivated land, but that because Russian manufacturing 
industry is still in its infancy emphasis should not be placed upon it yet. 
Therefore, most of the party's members are naturally peasants; workers are 
not particularly interested in the party. 
To accomplish its purposes, this party aims to abolish imperial rule as quickly 
as possible. It is the most radical of all opposition parties. 
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY [the Russian Social Democratic Work-
ers' Party]*3, S.D.: 
This party, which is an embodiment of the Peredel, the other wing of the Ni-
hilist Party, is quite influential. Its principles and purposes are almost the same 
as those of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, but what distinguishes this party 
from the above is the fact that it upholds the basic principle of the socialists, 
dislikes using terrorism and extreme measures, and tries to protect mainly work-
ers without caring very much about agrarian affairs. 
This party did not take part in the Paris conference of the autumn of 1904, 
left the Geneva conference in the middle of the discussions, and acted indepen-
dently. The basic reason for this is that it adheres to pure socialist principles and 
dislikes violence. Moreover, the party was particularly jealous of the Socialist 
Revolutionaries who used violence as a tactic. Because of this, it was obliged to 
emulate the psychology but not the actions of its competitor, if it wanted to main-
tain its image. The radical wing of this party, Lenin's group, pronounced its sup-
port for the revolutionary movement against the Russian government wherever 
possible, though it did not join the united opposition movement. In fact, not 
a few members of the faction purchased revolvers and armed themselves. In the 
revolt of 22 January 1905 [Bloody Sunday in St Petersburg], this party's indirect 
aid largely made Gapon famous. 
Jealousy made cooperation between the Socialist Revolutionaries and the So-
cial Democrats very difficult. There is an anecdote: an officer of a certain corps 
was once on patrol and saw by chance a few privates reading a pamphlet. When 
he approached them, one of them concealed it in his clothes. The officer confis-
cated the pamphlet. It was a written appeal of the Social Democrats. He left with- 
'3 One million members are said to have joined this party. 
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out a word. They were very worried. A few days later, a leader of the Social 
Democrats told the privates, "I know how anxious you were about the confisca-
tion of the pamphlet. But you need not be alarmed. The officer, your senior in 
rank, is a member of the Socialist Revolutionaries. After he confiscated it, he 
communicated this matter to the headquarters of his party. So, today I under-
stand that both parties have made propaganda in the corps." 
THE LIBERAL PARTY [the Union of Liberation], which later changed its name 
to the Constitutional Democratic Party' [Kadets], K.D.: 
This party includes many groups, like the hard- and soft-liners, though it is 
known as the Liberals. The Shipov [D.N. Shipov] faction, for example, supports 
the Tsarist regime and tries to reform her governmental system. There are also 
some less sanguine groups, including the Constitutionalists, who hope to estab-
lish a complete constitution. 
The progressive wing of the party (the Union of Unions) is very different from 
the above groups. This is led by Struve, Miliukov, and Prince Dolgorukov, and 
publishes Osvobozhdenie as its organ. This group wants to establish democracy 
in Russia, so it proposes to introduce universal suffrage. Although this party has 
not yet decided to start a revolution and to achieve its goals, some members of 
the radical group are conspiring with the Boevaia Druzhina of the Socialist Revolu-
tionaries. The progressives give at least indirect aid to the general revolutionary 
movement. This group increasingly antagonizes the Russian government, above 
all in speech and writing, as in the zemstvo (the local institution) [an organ of 
local self-government] campaigns. Generally speaking, members of this party be-
long to the upper and middle class, and are nobles and scholars. It is, therefore, 
impossible for the party to go on strike and to adopt violent measures. 
THE BUND PARTY [the General Union of Jewish Workers in Lithuania, Poland, 
and Russia]: 
This party is the secret society of Jewish workers. Its party line is socialism 
and its purpose is to improve the lot of the Jews. It always goes with the tide 
of the revolutionary movement. Lately, it has been cooperating with the Social 
Democrats. 
THE ARMENIAN PARTY [the Armenian Revolutionary Federation or the Dash-
naktsutiun (Federation)]: 
This party is called the Droshak Party', the Armenian local socialist party. 
Its goal is to acquire complete autonomy and to establish an independent regional 
government. But it has not yet decided whether Armenia should separate from 
Russia completely or join hands with Russia through a federal system, after ac- 
'4 One million members are said to haye joined this party. There is a great differ-
ence between the hard- and soft-liners. 
' The party's organ was named Droshak, which means "flag." Members have been 
called the Dashnaks or Droshaks. 
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complishing its goal. If Armenia, situated between Russia and Turkey, left the 
former, there would be a risk of its being intimidated and mistreated by the lat-
ter. It will not be easy for Armenia to be freed from today's tensions and acquire 
local autonomy. There are no methods to accomplish this goal without violence 
and the aid of the revolutionary movement. This party, therefore, decided to 
join the revolutionary movement in order to accomplish its objectives when the 
Russian opposition parties rise to power. It is said that Armenia was divided among 
Russia, Turkey, and Persia in the same manner as Poland was carved up by Rus-
sia, Germany, and Austria. Russian Armenia is prosperous commercially, par-
ticularly the Baku region. 
THE GEORGIAN PARTY [The Georgian Party of Socialists-Federalists-
Revolutionaries], the Batum region: 
This party is called the Sakartvelo Party', the Georgian local socialist party. 
Georgia is generally a backward civilization, and the Georgians are ferocious and 
brave. Consequently this party is not as moderate as other socialist groups, and 
frequently uses explosives. Its raison d'etre is virtually the same as that of the 
Armenian Party. Tiflis [Tbilisi] and Batum are the main bases of the party. 
THE LETTISH PARTY [the Latvian Social Democratic Union]: 
This party is a local socialist and radical party situated in the Livonian and 
Lithuanian region, called also German Russia or the Baltic Provinces. Although 
this party did not show any remarkable activity before the outbreak of the war, 
it has become increasingly radical since that time and is currently one of the most 
active revolutionary parties. Its activities, especially after 16 August 19043, are 
noteworthy. 
THE FINNISH CONSTITUTIONALIST PARTY: 
This party is a genuine nationalist party in Finland. It has sometimes taken 
extreme measures, but generally has displayed self-restraint. The party's fear that 
it will suffer defeat has made it hesitant about taking decisive measures. Although 
the party is quite eager to establish a completely autonomous government in Fin-
land and, if possible, even to acquire independence, it is not yet willing to use 
violence. The party explains that violence cannot accomplish its purpose and might 
endanger the whole nation. Finland has the greatest autonomy of all the oppressed 
nations in the Russian Empire and is the second oldest constitutional state in Eu-
rope, following England. The Tsar is nothing but the legislative head of the na-
tion as the Grand Duke of Finland. Executive decisions are made by the sena-
tors, who are Finns and hold positions as ministers of Finland. In principle Fin-
land could govern herself in accordance with her own constitution. The Finnish 
political situation under Russian rule is, therefore, similar to that of the Hun-
garians in Austria and the Norwegians in Sweden. However, the current Russifi- 
2 The party's organ was named Sakartvelo, which means Georgia. 
3 This reference is to disorders that took place in Riga on 28 August 1904. 
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cation policy has trampled on the Finnish constitution and earned the Finnish 
people's contempt. This party has moved away from a previous policy of cooper-
ation with Russian authorities in order to defend the constitution by many kinds 
of measures. It currently cultivates good relations with the radical group of the 
Russian Liberals. 
THE FINNISH ACTIVE RESISTANCE PARTY'S: 
This party is quite similar to the above party from a nationalistic viewpoint, 
but its party line is exactly the same as that of the Russian Socialist Revolution-
aries. Its members think that Finns, Poles, or Caucasians alone cannot change 
the political system of Russia. Only the Russian people, especially the revolu-
tionaries, can bring about change. The party, therefore, believes that its goal 
should be to acquire and maintain the liberty of all nationalities in the Russian 
Empire by allying with the Russian revolutionaries. Consequently, it advocates 
strong cooperation with the Socialist Revolutionaries (preferably the hard-liners 
of the former Nihilist Party) to accomplish its purpose. Although a political party 
tends to stick to either a liberal or a revolutionary line, the Activist Party occa-
sionally joins hands with the Finnish Constitutionalist Party and sometimes with 
the Socialist Revolutionaries. 
THE POLISH NATIONALIST PARTY [the Polish National League]: 
This party is quite similar to the Finnish Constitutionalist Party in its self-
respect and reluctance to employ violence. Although the party displays hatred 
for Russia, it remains inactive out of fear of Russia and Germany: Russia could 
inflict major damage on Poland were the uprising unsuccessful or Germany could 
take Russia by surprise and annex Poland. Its party line is nothing less than 
unrealistic. Both the upper class and the farmers belong to this party. 
THE POLISH SOCIALIST PARTY: 
This party is one of the most radical opposition parties and is mainly com-
posed of workers. Its short-term goal is to establish a Polish state which can detach 
itself from Russia at will (the autonomous system). It is very influential. 
THE POLISH PROGRESSIVE° PARTY: 
This party is composed of members of the Polish Nationalist and Socialist Par- 
ties. 
THE UKRAINIAN PARTY: 
This party's objective is restoration of the Ukrainian nation, but because the 
people are numerous and the region is very large, the party organization is not 
yet complete. In the Ukraine there are many Socialist Revolutionary bases, espe- 
'5 Zilliacus, Secretary of the union of opposition parties against the Tsarist regime, 
withdrew from the Constitutionalist Party and established this party. 
Akashi probably used "Progressive" when he should have used "Proletariat". 
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cially in the main cities, such as Botorii [Poltava], Kiev, Odessa, Sevastopol, and 
Kursk. The Socialist Revolutionaries are quite influential in the Ukraine. 
THE BELORUSSIAN PARTY [the Belorussian Socialist Hramada]: 
This is also a socialist party and aims to acquire local autonomy. 
THE GAPON PARTY: 
This party, the Gaponovites, was founded by Father Gapon and organized by 
many workers in the Russian capital. It acted as the nucleus of the revolt on 22 
January 1905. Its goal is almost the same as that of the Socialist Revolution-
aries, and it cooperates with the latter in opposition activities. It differs from 
the latter only in that it is named after its leader. 
Groups which oppose the Tsarist regime include not only the above parties, 
but also Tatars, Muslims, Staroobriadtsy [Old Believers, "splitters"  of the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church], and other parties. Alhough I have had no time to pro-
vide details on small parties and nationalities, these organizations appear quite 
defective. 
Important Persons Related to the Opposition 
Movement up to Now 
[Chapter II-3 in Rakka ryusut'] 
CHAIKOVSKII [N.V. Chaikovskii] (he was called C. for short in telegrams), 
Russian, is a senior member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, and leader of 
the Chaikovskii group which was the most radical of all in the Nihilist Party, 
though he is an anarchist rather than a nihilist. Zheliabov [A.I. Zheliabov], who 
blew up a part of the Winter Palace, is a central figure; Hartman [Lev Hartman 
or Gartman], who had a leading role in damaging the Tsar's [Alexander II] car-
riage in Moscow; Sofiia Perovskaia, who assassinated Alexander II [1881], and 
others were his disciples. Chaikovskii is well-known for his philosophical writ-
ings, and he is also a veteran and leader of the Socialist Revolutionaries. It is 
well-known in his party and in other parties that the creation of the joint opposi-
tion movement was at his suggestion. 
KROPOTKIN [Prince P.A. Kropotkin], Russian, is one of the leaders of the 
former Chaikovskii group and a philosopher. He has written extensively on 
theoretical anarchism. He has criticized religious intolerance and cooperated in 
campaigning for social improvements with Count Tolstoy [Leo Tolstoy]. During 
negotiations leading up to the Franco-Russian Alliance, French Foreign Minis-
ter Freycinet [Prime Minister Charles de Freycinet] sheltered Kropotkin who was 
hiding in the country. This annoyed the Tsar [Alexander III, 1881-1894] and 
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delayed conclusion of the treaty. Although Kropotkin did not directly take part 
in the opposition movement because of his distaste for violence, he helped it in-
directly, as a friend of Chaikovskii, in cooperation with Cherkezov. His com-
ments on current Russian domestic policy, which a few European journalists 
reported this spring, gave encouragement to the revolutionary movement. 
CHERKEZOV [Varlaam Cherkezov, a Georgian Prince and anarchist], Cauca-
sian, is an old comrade of the above two figures. His writings are substantial, 
and his theory is quoted in many kinds of political philosophy. He has limited 
his help to assisting Chaikovskii indirectly. 
BRESHKOVSKAIA [Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaia], Russian, is a member 
of the former Chaikovskii group, now the Socialist Revolutionaries. Last April 
she chaired the Geneva conference on the recommendation of the Socialist Revolu-
tionary Party. She is a hard-liner. 
VOLKHOVSKII [F.V. Volkhovskii]', Russian, is an old member of the former 
Chaikovskii group. Now he is one of the leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries.  
GOTS [M.R. Gots], Russian, is one of the leading Socialist Revolutionaries. As 
soon as there was a rumour that the Tsar [Nicholas II, 1894-1917] would visit 
the King of Italy in the autumn of 1903, Gots encouraged the Italian Socialist 
Party to prevent the Tsar's entry into the country. The press reported that his 
activities in Italy forced the Tsar to return to the north from Darmstadt. 
DIKANSKII [his real name was E.F. Azef; Dikanskii was one of Azef's names 
in the party], Russian, is one of leaders of the Socialist Revolutionaries and the 
chief of the Fighting Organization of the party. Few people know whether his 
name is a pseudonym or not. Only the leaders know. As chief of that group it 
is necessary for him to be in Russia. Dikanskii is fat and composed, and the most 
powerful leader smuggled into Russia by the party. He was also a ringleader in 
the plot to assassinate the Minister of Interior [V.K. von Plehwe, who was assas-
sinated on 28 July 1904] and the Grand Duke of Moscow [Grand Duke Sergei 
Aleksandrovich, assassinated on 17 February 1905], and an originator of the revolt 
of the Black Sea Fleet.2 
SOSKIS [D.V. Soskis] is one of the main figures of the Socialist Revolutionaries 
and an assistant to Chaikovskii. 
RUBANOVICH [I.A. or Eli Rubanovich] is a member of the Socialist Revolu-
tionary Party. He lives in Paris. 
PLEKHANOV [G.V. Plekhanov], Russian, is a leader of the Social Democratic 
Party and the chief of Iskra. 
' Akashi wrote Wanhovusukii, but he must have meant F.V. Volkhovskii. 
2 Here Akashi was mistaken. Azef had nothing to do with the Potemkin mutiny. 
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Azef and his friend Madame N. in Ostend in 1909 after Azef was exposed as a secret agent 
of the Russian police. 
LENIN [VI. Lenin, whose real name was UI'ianov], Russian, is a leader of the 
Social Democratic Party. 
Prince DOLGORUKOV [Petr D. Dolgorukov], Russian, is a leader of the radi-
cal wing of the Liberal Party, and attended the Paris conference as a delegate 
of the party. His family is descended from the ancient princely clan of [Iurii] 
Dolgorukii, the founder of Moscow. The Dolgorukovs are one of the most dis-
tinguished families in Russia, and hold prominent positions in the Russian Court. 
Professor MILIUKOV [P.N. Miliukov], Russian, is a former professor of Moscow 
University, a sympathizer of the Fighting Organization of the Socialist Revolu-
tionaries, and a radical member of the Liberal Party. He attended the Paris con-
ference as a delegate of the party. 
STRUVE [P.B. Struve], Russian, is a leader of the radical wing of the Liberals 
and the editor of Osvobozhdenie. 
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Maxim GORKY [his real name was A.M. Peshkov], Russian, is a famous writ-
er. He does not belong to any party and is active among the Liberals, the So-
cialist Revolutionaries, and the Social Democrats. 
Father GAPON [G.A. Gapon], Russian, became famous after the incident of 
22 January. He has his labour union, named the Gaponovites, and is a sympathizer 
of the Socialist Revolutionaries. 
SEMENOV [E. Semenov], naturalized Russian in France, is a former member 
of the Socialist Revolutionaries. He has French citizenship and is a secretary of 
the Friends of Russia [Sociéte des amin du peuple russe et des peuples annexés] 
which was founded in Paris to oppose the Russian government.  
ZILLIACUS [Konrad Viktor or Konni Zilliacus] (called Secretary in my report), 
Finn, is a former lawyer, but now a writer. He is the head of the Finnish Active 
Resistance Party which was organized as a separate unit of the Socialist Revolu-
tionaries. He was the chairman of the Paris conference. 
Victor FURUHJELM, Finn, is a former lawyer. He is an exile like Zilliacus and 
a leader in the Finnish Active Resistance Party.  
WOLFF [Eugen Wolff], Finn, is the former English honorary consul in Helsing-
fors [Helsinki; Wolff had in fact been the British Vice Consul in Viborg]. He 
is a leader in the Finnish Active Resistance Party and an owner of a French paper 
company named Bonflue. 
JODKO [Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz], Bachelor of Law, Pole, is a leader of the 
Polish Socialist Party. 
MALINOWSKI [Aleksander Malinowski], Pole, is a former railway engineer and 
a leader of the Polish Socialists. 
PAUL, Pole, is a member of the Polish Socialists in London. I do not know 
his real name. 
DMOWSKI [Roman Dmowski], is a leader of the Polish Nationalist Party. 
BALICKI [Zygmunt Balicki], is a leader of the Polish Nationalist Party. 
Prince LORIS-MELIKOV [Jean Loris-Melikov or Hovhannes Loris-Melikian in 
Armenian], Armenian, is one of the main figures of the Armenian Party. He 
is a nephew of General Loris-Melikov [General M.T. Loris-Melikov, Minister 
of Interior] who was the chancellor of Alexander II. 
MARMIYAN is a leader of the Armenian Party and the chief editor of Droshak. 
VARANDIAN [Mikayel Varandian, whose real surname was Hovhannisian], is 
the same3 as the above individual. 
3 Marmiyan alias Marmilov probably is the same person as Varandian who was the edi- 
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DEKANOZI [Georgii Dekanozi or Dekanozishvili], Caucasian from Batum, is 
a leader of the Georgian Party. He once worked as a secretary in the Imperial 
Ministry of Finance. 
BAUD [Eugene Baud], Swiss, is an anarchist in Switzerland and the proprietor 
of a motorcar shop. 
DICKENSON [Robert Richard Dickenson], Englishman, is an accountant for 
the Socialist Revolutionaries. He is a wine merchant by profession. 
MORTON, American, is an American anarchist. 
QUILLARD [Pierre Quillard], Frenchman, is a French anarchist, a journalist 
of L'Europeen and a pro-Armenian journal, and a member of the Friends of 
Russia. 
MINKE [Ernests Minkel' is a leader of the Lettish Socialist Party. I do not know 
whether or not this is his real name. 
STRAUTMAN [Jånis Strautmanis alias Jånis Kruuslan] is a member of the Let-
tish Socialist Party and a harbour master of Windau [Ventspils].  
HARTMAN is a member of the Socialist Revolutionaries and a bomb expert. 
BAUMAN is a member of the Lettish Socialist Party. 
CASTREN [Jonas Castren] is a leader of the Finnish Constitutionalist Party. 
THESLÖF [Gösta Theslöf] is a former Russian staff officer, Captain, and a 
revolutionary member of the Finnish Constitutionalists.  
IGNATIUS [Hannes Ignatius] is a member of the same party. 
Professor REUTER [Julio Reuter] is a member of the same party. He is a professor 
at Helsingfors [Helsinki] University. 
BLOKKOBEI [probably E.G.W. Becker-Reuterskiöld, whose nickname was 
Becker Bey] is a member of the same party. He is a lawyer. 
tor of Droshak. Akashi's text makes it difficult to determine whether "same" means that 
the same person used both names or that both persons took part in the same party. 
He was one of the organizers of the plan for shipping arms to St Petersburg in 1905. 
— We wish to thank Uldis (jermanis and Seppo Zetterberg for helping to clarify the 
orthography of Latvian names in this work. 
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The Russian Opposition Movement against 
the Tsarist Regime 
[Chapter IV in Rakka ryusui] 
No one acknowledges it, but there are dark tides of dissension on the Russian 
political scene. However, if we try looking for clues and inquire into the actual 
situation, we discern only a vague shore. All of the so-called opposition parties 
are secret societies, where no one can distinguish opponents of the regime from 
Russian agents, or even find out the names and addresses of the opposition's 
leaders. It is difficult for us to identify the real opposition activists, because they 
have a series of false names which they often change for yet other names. Rus-
sian agents have known only some of the leaders and followed them up: it has 
been impossible to continue such activity in Europe, outside Russia and Germany, 
because, with the lack of restrictions on political exiles in Europe, each leader 
has had access to the private establishments of ladies and gentlemen and has often 
been patronized by scholars or gentlemen. 
For example, Zilliacus' wife, whose husband has been secretary of the opposi-
tion movement to be described below, was so welcome in society that I have seen 
her by chance at the party of Count von Leyden, the former German Minister 
to Japan. In those places, there were many other opposition leaders: Baron 
Gripenberg [Lennart Gripenberg, Finnish Senator], brother-in-law of Russian 
Vera Zasulich when seventeen years old. 
3 
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General Gripenberg [Oskar Gripenberg]', who was the commander at the bat-
tle of Sandepu [26-29 January 1905], Baron Gripenberg was one of the leaders 
of the Finnish Constitutionalist Party and an exile; Prince Khilkov [D.A. Khilkov], 
who was a younger brother of the Minister of Communication, Khilkov [M.I. 
Khil'kov]2 , Prince Khilkov was a leading member of the Russian Socialist 
Revolutionary Party; Vera Zasulich (whose younger brother Lieutenant General 
Zasulich [M.I. Zasulich] was defeated at the battle of Yalu [1 May 1904]), at-
tempted to assassinate the city governor of St Petersburg [General F.F. Trepov, 
1878] and is currently a leading member of the Russian Social Democratic Party; 
and so on. 
Count Mannerheim [Carl Mannerheim], an exile friend of mine, heaved a sigh 
and said to me, "My younger brother [Baron Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim who 
later became the Marshal of Finland and President of the Republic], now a Rus-
sian Colonel, has gone with General Mishchenko to fight against your army." 
He hoped that his brother would not be injured. Because of these complications, 
it was very difficult for me to form and retain close ties with opposition leaders. 
The relations between Japan and the opposition parties are as follows. I asked 
Ueda Sentarö, a Japanese student in the Russian capital, to gather information 
about the opposition parties from university students, and also discussed this with 
a student named Braun3, whom I employed as a language teacher. I could not 
get contacts with opposition leaders from these sources, even though there were 
probably many students and zemstvo representatives. Around March or April 
1903, there was news that the opposition leaders had been sent into exile and 
some disturbances had commenced in the provinces in Finland. I would have 
liked to have gone there and established contact with them at the first opportu-
nity. But when I told Ueda of the plan, he prevented me from visiting Finland 
because my Russian was very poor at that time. I decided not to visit Finland, 
although I remembered a few of opposition leaders' names. 
Later (the report at the end of 1903 or beginning of 1904), when Balogh de 
Galántha" [Miklos (Nicolas) Balogh de Galánthal4 gave me the addresses of 
', Balogh de Galåntha is an Austrian living in St Petersburg. He came to the Japa-
nese legation and asked for a meeting with the Minister [Kurino Shin'ichirö] just be-
fore the war. Though the Minister refused to see him without any letters of introduc-
tion, both Secretary Akizuki and Mr. Maruge saw him, but they gave up because Balogh 
de Galåntha could not speak either German or Russian. After I told him that I was 
the Military Attaché, he was willing to talk with me, and, briefly, his views accorded 
with those of the revolutionary parties. Thereafter I started eorresponding with him, 
though his character was unreliable. Later, although it was apparent that he was not 
a revolutionary, I was able to contact genuine revolutionaries with his help. This is the 
same as making a seemingly worthless investment. 
I Lennart and Oskar Gripenberg were not brothers-in-law, but distant relatives. 
2 D.A. Khilkov was actually not M.I. Khil'kov's brother. 
3 Braun was employed by the Japanese General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. He wrote a letter from Libau to the Japanese Consul in Copenhagen on 7 January 
1905 that he had an interview with Admiral A.A. Birilev about the dispatch of the Third 
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Finnish opposition leaders in Stockholm, I intended to see them, because their 
names coincided with the above-mentioned exiles' names. Once relations between 
Japan and Russia deteriorated, it was impossible for me to leave the capital for 
even one day. I could not do anything under existing conditions. A few days be-
fore the outbreak of the war, Akizuki [Akizuki Sachio], who is currently the Jap-
anese Minister to Sweden, and I went to a public house where we met someone 
by chance. A man who called himself a professor and a supporter of Young Russia, 
in reality a Nihilist as I realized, came to our table and we drank together. There 
was no way to determine whether he was really a revolutionary or a Russian agent. 
Nevertheless, I was inwardly pleased, because he called himself a real follower 
of Young Russia, which meant that he was a friend of Japan fighting against 
Russia, even though he may have been an agent. These contacts gave me refer-
ence data about the condition of the opposition groups in Russia. Once the war 
began, I left St Petersburg and arrived in Stockholm via Berlin on 22 February 
1904, unless my memory is at fault. 
As soon as I arrived in Stockholm, I was visited by Lieutenant Colonel 
Heftye'2 [Thomas Thomassen Heftye]5, an old friend since the time when we 
were Military Attachés in France. On that occasion, it was necessary for me offi-
cially to refer to myself as the Japanese Military Attaché to Sweden. 
Using a messenger on the day of arrival [in Stockholm], I sent a secret letter 
to agent Castrén, the leader of the Finnish Constitutionalist Party. I had known 
"Z Thereafter, he became the War Minister of the Twin Kingdom of Sweden- 
Norway. Recently he was appointed to the position of Chief-Aide-de-Camp to the King. 
Baltic Fleet to the Far East. See the Japanese Consul in Copenhagen to the Minister in 
The Hague 11 January 1905 (extract of the note), Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan 
(rokokunobu) [Inner Affairs of Russia] 4, 1.6.3.2-9, GS. 
4 Akashi's description of Balogh de Galåntha in footnote 1 is not correct. This Hun-
garian was not an agent for the Russian government. He had a very good command of 
German and Russian. At the beginning of the war he organized, at Akashi's request, a 
spy network in Russia. Balogh de Galåntha was Akashi's middleman when he was estab-
lishing relations with the Finnish constitutionalists in February 1904. The Finns did not 
completely trust Balogh de Galåntha and they made Akashi suspicious of him. Akashi ter-
minated cooperation with Balogh de Galåntha sometime between May 1904 and the begin-
ning of the following year. From spring 1904 a few officers in the Swedish General Staff 
helped Akashi and his assistant, Nagao, to obtain Russian military intelligence. See Antti 
Kujala, "Japanin, Englannin ja Ruotsin yhteydet Suomen perustuslailliseen oppositioon 
Venäjän-Japanin sodan aikana"  [The Finnish Constitutionalist Opposition's Contacts with 
Japan, England, and Sweden during the Russo-Japanese War], Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 
(1988), pp. 3-23 — a Japanese translation:  Antti Kujala, "Nichirosensöjiniokeru finran-
dorikkenshugiteiköhato nihon, igirisu, suweedenno kyöryoku", translated by Inaba Chi-
haru, Hokuöshi kenkyu, No 5 (1987), pp. 36-51 and No 6 (1988), pp. 40-53. 
5 Heftye was a Norwegian technical officer. He had been a Military Attaché to the le-
gation of Sweden-Norway 1899-1902 or —1903 in Paris, at the same time Akashi had 
been there in a similar post. Heftye became a military adviser to the department of the 
Norwegian Cabinet in Stockholm in 1903 and Lieutenant Colonel on 22 October 1903. In 
1905, he was appointed the chief of the Administration of the Telegraph Service in Nor-
way. Compare Akashi's second footnote in which the reference to Heftye's career is incorrect. 
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Kurino, Japanese Minister to Russia, in Ber-
lin in 1904. 
his name for some time, and requested a meeting. My messenger came back and 
said, "Mr. Casual said that he had no reason to receive a letter from you and that 
you have probably mistaken him for someone else." He returned my letter. 
I was greatly disappointed, but then a gentleman with a white beard and a silk 
hat visited me and gave me an envelope containing a card from a person named 
Konni Zilliacus". The text read "Castrén's best friend." Zilliacus said, "We 
returned your letter earlier, because it was impossible to know whether you had 
sent the messenger. I beg your forgiveness. Both Castrén and I greatly favour 
your offer of discussions. However, this hotel is dangerous. Please stand in front 
of the hotel tomorrow morning at eleven o'clock. I will be sitting in the coach, 
which will come past you at that time, and you should get into it. If you pull 
down the folding top against the snow, it will be almost impossible for anyone 
to see you. So you will be able to come to the meeting point in secret." 
As planned, I met them at Castrén's house the next morning. On entering, 
I thought it very strange that he had hung his banishment order signed by the 
Russian Emperor on the middle wall, with the portrait of His Majesty [Japanese 
Emperor Meiji] on one side and a signed photograph of the Danish Prince [King 
Frederick VIII, 1906-1912] (the elder brother of the Russian Dowager Empress 
'3 It was my first meeting with him. 
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[Maria Fedorovna]*4) on the other. Later, I heard that this Prince was not par-
ticularly intelligent but was sincerely opposed to the oppression of the people, 
and often admonished the Russian Emperor through his sister. The Prince some-
times enjoyed meeting with Zilliacus and Casual. Last summer they presented 
a statement of their views to him. 
Incidentally, I asked them at the meeting to inform me of the policies of the 
opposition parties and of Russian domestic affairs. With respect to these mat-
ters, Zilliacus said, "I am willing to give you as much information about politi-
cal affairs as possible, but can hardly commit our party to work as a Japanese 
agent because this work would cast reflection upon the party." Castrén said, "Wait 
a moment, I will ask my friend to do the work." Soon he called and invited a 
Swedish Staff officer, Captain Aminoff [Iwan Tönnes Edward Aminoff], who 
now frequents the Japanese legation as Minister Akizuki's language teacher. 
Later, I was able to send Second Lieutenant Bergen to Russia, thanks to the 
efforts of Aminoff and another Staff officer, Lieutenant Klingenstierna [Klas 
Axel Klingenstierna]. At that time, when I required a reliable person to send money 
orders to agents and receive their acknowledgments, I was also able to employ 
the rich merchant Lindberg [Sven Gunnar Lindberg], a friend of Aminoff's. 
Lindberg subsequently became Japanese Honorary Consul in Gothenburg. 
I shall now end my description of the intelligence work, and begin to com-
ment on the opposition parties. At the beginning of March 1904, as I recall, Zil-
liacus returned from Europe [Akashi used the term "Southern Europe"] and 
showed me a letter from Chaikovskii*S.  Zilliacus said to me, "I quite agree with 
him that the opposition parties should unite with the Socialist Revolutionary 
Party as the focal point. You would doubtless feel it disgraceful that patriots, 
who have their own political opinions and hope to promote the public welfare, 
make plans for disruption at home during a national crisis, but this is not the 
correct way to understand Russian domestic affairs. On the one hand, no one 
needs convincing that the Russo-Japanese War will lead to the overthrow of the 
imperial regime. On the other, the so-called Nihilists, who call both the Emperor 
and government officials devils pillaging the country and causing distress, be-
lieve that they are destined to destroy those devils and let people live peacefully. 
So, it is appropriate that activist parties like Chaikovskii's group should con-
sider the outbreak of the war as a favourable opportunity for their activities." 
'4 It may be said in passing that she always listened to what her adviser Sheryashidze 
had to say about the Russian situation when she visited her birthplace. [G.D.] Sher-
yashidze [he was Prince and Chamberlain] is a Caucasian and commented freely on 
Russian affairs outside the country. The Georgian socialist Dekanozi is also his great 
friend. Berendsen [Ivar Berendsen], the Superintendent of the Danish Customs6, is Zil-
liacus' best friend and always helped him. 
"5 He had been a leader of the left wing of the Nihilist Party in the past. At present 
the Socialist Revolutionary Party is a secret society with Chaikovskii's group as the 
central force. 
6 He was a high-ranking official of the Danish Customs, not the superintendent. 
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When Zilliacus returned to Stockholm, Roman Dmowski'6, leader of the Pol-
ish Nationalist Party, proposed to me that Polish soldiers in Manchuria might 
surrender to the Japanese army. In order to carry out this plan, Dmowski finally 
went to Japan. 
It was so important to give aid to the Russian opposition movement that I need-
ed a senior Japanese figure first to give support to my plan. But a mere secretary 
was charge d'affaires in those days in the Japanese legation in Stockholm. So 
I visited Germany, Austria, France, and England, partly to find spies, to see 
Dmowski, and to talk with other opposition groups in Paris, but mainly, to con-
fer with Hayashi Tadasu, the Minister to Britain, who held the most important 
post in Europe. I met him in London through Colonel Utsunomiya [Lieutenant 
Colonel Utsunomiya Tarö, Military Attache to Britain, who became Colonel in 
March 1905] and gained approval for most of my plan. 
At the end of June, relations between Zilliacus and well-known opposition par-
ties matured. He and I went to Paris at almost the same time and consulted with 
Dekanozi of the Sakartvelo Party and Prince Loris-Melikov of the Droshak Party 
about the plan for creating disturbances in Russia. Thereafter, Zilliacus went to 
London and consulted with Chaikovskii. Then Zilliacus, with an introduction 
from me, met Utsunomiya as a first step toward meeting Hayashi. As soon as 
the Deputy Chief of the General Staff [Nagaoka Gaishi] sent an answer to Ut-
sunomiya, I promised Zilliacus that I would pay 3,000 yen" for written appeals. 
At almost the same time, I organized a meeting of the opposition members 
and had Lieutenant Colonel Tanaka Hirotarö teach them how to sabotage rail-
way lines. Later they tried to blow up a track in a few places, but the results 
were inadequate: they stopped trains for only one day even in the most effective 
instance. That was the reason why we finally gave up the venture. 
I felt it would be necessary to coordinate the opposition's views more exactly, 
and had Zilliacus ask Loris-Melikov's opinion. Loris-Melikov feared, however, 
that a union among opposition parties would prompt the Russian government 
.6 I knew him through Castrén's introduction. When I urged Castrén to stage an 
uprising, he answered, "It would be impossible for only our party to do so." I said, 
"I would like to visit your friend in Cracow, Austria-Hungary, and persuade him to 
join the revolt." "That is a fine idea. I will introduce Dmowski to you," Castrén said, 
and gave me a letter of introduction. Then I left by train and travelled the whole day. 
When I arrived in Cracow at night and met Dmowski, I gave him introductions to both 
General Kodama [Kodama Gentarö, Deputy Chief of the General Staff before June 
1904] and Major General Hukushima [Hukushima Yasumasa, Chief of Section II (In-
telligence)]. 
''  Zilliacus said, "As your country is very familiar with Russian affairs, Japan need 
not gamble much money just now. Pay just 3,000 yen to finance the printing of written 
appeals for a start. You will be able to trace its influence. If arid when good results 
are evident, you might consider how much to pay afterwards. If you simply give us 
3,000 yen, it will make it easier for us to operate quickly. If we have to make a plan 
for spending even a sum of 3,000 yen from our own account, we will only quarrel with 
each other." 
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to become more reactionary, though he did not himself oppose cooperation. More-
over, he doubted whether any manifesto could ever totally satisfy every party. 
The Socialist Revolutionaries, the Social Democrats, the Polish Nationalists and 
Socialists, the Finnish parties, and other parties had different doctrines and pur-
poses, and also different hopes. 
Dekanozi, delegate of the Sakartvelo Party in Paris, spoke of the party's ap-
proval of a united front in principle without reference to methods, if I were to 
give them some subsidies. They were short of funds. 
There were dozens of [Russian] opposition parties in Switzerland. Of course, 
it was difficult to locate each of their leaders since they had to conceal them-
selves. However, I learned their addresses by dint of Zilliacus', Loris-Melikov's, 
Dekanozi's and the French anarchist Quillard's connections. 
I went to Switzerland in July at almost the same time as Zilliacus. Present there 
were Marmilov7, head of the Droshak Party; Plekhanov, head of the Russian 
Social Democrats; Breshkovskaia, the elderly leader of the Socialist Revolution-
aries; Shshukov [probably Isakov, who was better known as Mark Liber in his 
party; his real name was Mikhel Goldman], a certain member of the Bund; and 
so on. Most of the opposition leaders' homes were in Chemin de Roseraie, an 
out-of-the-way place near Geneva, where they were engaged in literary work in 
the setting of snow-covered mountains and a big lake. 
The greatest obstacle to making a plan for uniting the opposition parties was 
the frictions and jealousies among these parties. Even though they had the same 
goal of creating unity among themselves, it was always impossible for them to 
stop suspecting each other: the Socialist Revolutionary Party competed with the 
Social Democratic Party; enmity between the Polish Nationalist Party and the 
Polish Socialist Party was unavoidable as a matter of principle; and it was im-
possible to circumvent the influence of history on relations between nations, as 
in the case of Russians and Poles. The mediator among these parties was Zilliacus.  
As a Finn, he had not been involved in conflicts over principles and over territory 
and had also had a lot of friends among members of the former Nihilist Party; 
he not only maintained good relations with both the Socialist Revolutionaries 
and the Social Democrats, but had some friends among the Finnish Constitu-
tionalists and the Russian Liberal Party. For these reasons Zilliacus was the most 
competent person to mediate relations among the parties. In the summer of 1904, 
however, the Armenians, the Bund, and the Social Democrats had yet to send him 
their replies concerning participation. Under existing conditions, Zilliacus stressed 
to me, "As I am planning to hold a joint conference among the opposition par-
ties in October 1904, whatever happens, I intend to ask each party to send a few 
members to the conference. Each delegation will explain their party's views on 
how to deal with the Russian government. If possible, I will induce them to make 
The Japanese characters for Marmilov were different from those for Marmiyan, but 
the person called by both names was probably Varandian. 
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a joint written appeal and then to hold demonstrations." 
At the end of July, I left Zilliacus and went to Rapperswil, near Zurich, Swit-
zerland, to see Balicki of the Polish Nationalist Party and to ask his opinion. 
He said, "I also doubt whether the joint conference can be a success, but will 
try to attend it if members of the party permit." 
Thereafter I went to Berlin, and waited for the end of the international so-
cialist congress in Amsterdam [14-20 August 1904]. When it was over, I went 
to Hamburg, Germany where I met Zilliacus at the end of August. He invited 
Jodko, the leader of the Polish Socialist Party, from London and explained to 
him the current views of the opposition leaders living in Switzerland in my pres-
ence. Zilliacus asked Jodko to have his party attend the conference. Jodko agreed. 
On the very day that I arrived in Stockholm, at the end of August, I received 
a telegram from Utsunomiya. It said, "Come soon if you want." 
I left there and went to London: this was the third trip to Europe. Utsunomiya 
arranged a meeting with Jodko and some other members of the Polish Socialist 
Party.'8 The majority of those present argued that the party should not attend 
the conference in October because it would not produce any results. This view 
was the complete opposite of the one Jodko had given Zilliacus and me at the 
Hamburg meeting. One member said, "In the Bund (the Jewish Socialist Party 
in Russia), there is a man who says that Finnish leader Zilliacus is working for 
Colonel A. As I doubt whether such a conference will be a success, I am hesitant 
about attending it." I said in company with Utsunomiya, "The promoter of the 
united movement is Zilliacus. I only want to help the movement, if that is neces-
sary. If you do not agree, there is no alternative. I am not asking your party 
to attend the conference. I would rather not participate in this matter. You should 
be free to change the alignment of the opposition parties." Jodko said, "While 
there are various conflicts between members, I want them to consider the issue 
carefully and am going to take all possible steps to attend the conference." 
By mid-September the other parties announced that they would attend the con-
ference. Before then, Zilliacus and I disagreed over whether to send an invita-
tion to the Russian Liberal Party'. I was afraid that the danger would be in-
creased by inviting the Liberals, because the party had always included both hard-
and soft-liners in opposition to each other. A stubborn Zilliacus rejected my views 
and eventually asked the party to attend. The hard-liners accepted his request 
on condition that the conference be convened in Paris. 
This demand was opposed by the Russian Social Democrats, who stood firm 
foi holding it in Switzerland. Apparently this conflict originated in great differ-
ences over the scope of each party's influence and means at their disposal. Rus-
sians, whose vice is to insist on trifling matters and to refuse to cooperate, could 
'" The Polish Socialist Party had a branch in London. 
.9 
 Later, the Liberal Party changed its name to the Constitutional Democrats, the 
so-called K.D. [the Kadets]. 
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not compromise on this matter. Plekhanov answered, "To my regret, first, I can-
not enter Paris, because I was expelled from France. Secondly, the Social 
Democrats, who stick to socialist principles, cannot attend any conference not 
based on them." This second explanation reflected the jealousy of his group's 
powerful competitor, the Socialist Revolutionaries. Though the latter called it-
self socialist, it is actually anarchist, and has always been refused permission to 
participate in the Socialist International. 
After the above affair, the Liberals, the Socialist Revolutionaries, the Finnish 
Constitutionalists, the Polish Nationalists, the Polish Socialists, the Droshak 
Party, the Sakartvelo Party and other parties, except for the Social Democrats 
and the Bund, met in Paris on 1 October. 
This conference lasted for 5 days. Zilliacus was nominated as chairman, thanks 
to his central role in convening the conference. Those present at the conference 
were very much surprised to find out that the opinion of the Liberals was keener 
than was expected: the party insisted upon giving universal suffrage to the peo-
ple; adopted many previously opposed measures; wanted to undermine the power 
of the Russian government; advocated establishing the conditions in which each 
party would be easily able to achieve its goal; and so on. The delegation of the 
Liberals included Prince Dolgorukov, a descendant from an ancient ruling dy-
nasty, which is one of the most reputable families in Russia, Professor Miliukov, 
the notable Struve, and some others. 
The contents of the resolutions of this conference are the same as reported 
in the telegrams which I sent to the General Staff. Motono [Motono Ichirö], the 
Minister to France, forwarded them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that 
time. Though there were differences among the parties, the conference ended 
in success, thanks to Zilliacus' strenuous endeavour. 
It was decided at this conference that each party could demonstrate in its own 
way: the Liberals would rally the zemstvos and attack the government in press 
campaigns; the Socialist Revolutionaries and other parties would make extreme 
measures their speciality; the Caucasians would use their skill in assassination; 
the Polish Socialists would use their experience in organizing demonstrations. 
Inside the Finnish Party, a difference of opinion arose, though Zilliacus,  
who was one of the leaders of the party, acted as chairman and promoter of the 
conference. Former Senator [Leo] Mechelin's faction did not consent to the 
resolutions of the conference. Getting to the bottom of the matter, Mechelin be-
lieved the Russian government to be still so powerful that it would be dangerous 
for Finland to have recourse to reckless violence, and he stressed the need for 
military preparation, which meant that nothing should be begun until his fac-
tion had 50,000 rifles. This matter is discussed in his proposal included in the 
envelope labeled "Somuku" [Disobey], which I shelved because it irritated 
me. 1`' That was the reason why Zilliacus organized a party and named it the 
"0 Zilliacus' opinion was excellent. He said, "It is impossible to weaken and to over- 
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Finnish Active Resistance Party. As I said before, this party entered into an 
alliance and acted with the Socialist Revolutionaries. 
After the conference, those parties which used extraordinary measures got to-
gether without the Liberals to draw up plans for active opposition against the 
Russian government. It was decided to obstruct the army's mobilization. After 
the resolution, I promised the parties that were short of funds that I would give 
them a subsidy and departed for Stockholm; each party also left Paris in the middle 
of October. Shortly afterwards, the Polish Socialists initiated strike action and 
engaged in armed conflict with the gendarmerie; reports in the newspapers of 
those days of the party's forceful activity showed how zealous its active resistance 
was. 
At the same time, Zilliacus talked with influential figures on how to resist the 
Russian government after the demonstrations. I proposed this subject to the Gener-
al Staff, and the Staff called my attention to it by telegram.8 In fact, I was not 
involved in the matter at all, but Zilliacus himself took part in it: he contacted 
and got support from Jean Jaures, Vice Chairman of the French National As-
sembly and head of the Socialist Party, who had influence on the French govern-
ment, and he gained support from the distinguished Doctor Anatole France, Sen-
ator Pressensé [Francis de Pressense] and Clemenceau [Georges Clemenceau] to 
organize a group named the Friends of Russia (this means an enemy of the Rus-
sian government) who wrote against the Russian government in newspapers close 
to the group such as L'Humanite, Le Gil Blas9, L Aurore, L'Europeen, Pro 
Armenia, and La Georgie. 
Simultaneously the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries tried to hold demonstra-
tions in Kiev, Odessa, and Moscow, and to instigate agitation among university 
students. The Liberals held meetings of provincial and district assemblymen and 
doctors in the zemstvos in order to speak frequently against the government, and 
they attempted to organize press campaigns. The Caucasians assassinated about 
ten government officials every day. As the above matters were reported daily 
in detail in the international press, I need only refer to them here. 
Such activities continued from November 1904 to January 1905. The Social 
Democrats struggled on single-handed, and their unaligned group tried to or-
ganize workers' demonstrations. 
throw the Russian goyernment, if only the subjugated nations would rise in revolt. The 
uprising had better be led mainly by genuine Russian groups. Subjugated nationalities 
must act in subordination to the Russians, who have the capacity for oyerthrowing the 
goyernment. When the aim is achieyed, the unity of the groups will be broken and they 
will be opposed to each other. At that time, Poland, the Caucasus, and Finland will 
naturally become independent of Russia. Despite my arguments, Senator Mechelin re-
fused to enter the union of the opposition, unless the subjugated nations can acquire 
50,000 rifles in order to begin an uprising." Zilliacus inveighed against a man who had 
made such a roundabout and foolish plan. 
S See telegram 6 in the Appendix to Rakka ryusui, in the present volume. 
" Jirubura in the Japanese original. 
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Father Gapon. The Finnish Active Resi-
stance Party spread this picture in 1905. 
The cross hanging on his chest was erased 
from the picture. 
On the day of Epiphany, [19] January 1905, a single bombardment [an inci-
dent in which live shells were fired at the Winter Palace] made the Emperor's 
blood run cold. Father Gapon became famous for the events of 22 January. 
As a priest among the workers he was faithful to revolutionary principles; he 
belonged to neither the Socialist Revolutionaries nor the Social Democrats, but 
took a middle position between the two parties and had close connections with 
both of them. While both parties were conducting propaganda, Gapon led the 
workers to the Winter Palace for a peaceful protest in cooperation with both 
groups. Gapon became famous for this affair; as a matter of fact, he was spon-
taneously chosen to lead the demonstration as a result of the confrontation and 
the competition between the two parties. To tell the truth, no one had carefully 
considered on an earlier occasion what all this would lead to. It far exceeded 
my expectations that a priest, who had merely gained the workers' confidence, 
could assume the leadership of tens of thousands of workers belonging to sepa-
rate parties and shake the Russian capital after all.11 
Though Gapon's protest demonstration was crushed by force, the Russian 
government lost prestige throughout Europe. The Friends of Russia actively sup- 
'" As the proverb goes, a rotten thing becomes verminous. If political conditions 
are too churned up, disturbances must occur. 
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ported the opposition movement in France, which was Russia's ally. The famous 
professor Doctor Seignobos [Charles Seignobos] said to his students, "In no cir-
cumstances should you underwrite a Russian loan and you should make my 
opinion known to your parents. I am not only afraid that your families will lose 
their wealth but am also worried about economic upheaval in France." 
A foreign correspondent who had watched Gapon's demonstration reported, 
"A worker fell wounded from the gunfire and said, `If only a Japanese battalion 
had helped us, I would not be dying here."' Perhaps to give another example, 
you can understand that the opposition parties bore a grudge against the Rus-
sian government: one day, the veteran fighter Breshkovskaia said to a certain 
individual, "Though I have fought a holy war against the devil in the cause of 
the people for years, I have not succeeded yet. Now, our enemy Japan has given 
us the opportunity to exterminate the devil. It is iniquitous that we have so little 
power to destroy him. The only enemy people have in their hearts are the Rus-
sian government and the Tsar." 
After Gapon's protest, demonstrations were continuously held in many places. 
The revolutionaries severely obstructed the mobilization of the Tsar's troops in 
the eastern, central, and western parts of Russia as well as in Poland and the 
Caucasus. In Georgia especially, some infantry companies which arrived to sup-
press the anti-mobilization movement were besieged, and then the mobilization 
orders of the First Caucasian Corps were completely withdrawn. Conditions de-
teriorated to the point that the permanent corps could not move from one region 
to another in Poland. During the same period, some officials were assassinated 
in Finland. 
I left Stockholm and travelled south during Gapon's protest. This was my fourth 
trip to Europe. I was interested in changes occurring in Paris and elsewhere. 
On this trip I heard of a plan to assassinate a member of the imperial royal family. 
A few weeks later, an assassin killed Grand Duke Sergei, the extreme reactionary, 
with a gelatine bomb. 
At that time, Zilliacus also came to Paris. After the Gapon massacre [Bloody 
Sunday], we met Volkhovskii of the Socialist Revolutionary Party and other op-
position members. It became necessary to discuss with Chaikovskii the move-
ment following the affair, because he was a veteran activist. As the result of this 
discussion, we decided to make good use of Gapon's famous name in order to 
invite each opposition party to a conference, and to make mutual plans for more 
intensive action in the summer. 
This conference was held at Simon's house in Geneva at the beginning of April 
1905. The extremist parties, such as the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the Polish 
Socialist Party, the Finnish Active Resistance Party, the Droshak Party (of Arme-
nia), the Sakartvelo Party (of Georgia), the Belorussian Party [the Belorussian 
Socialist Hramada], the Lettish Party [the Latvian Social Democratic Union] and 
others, attended the conference. Though the Social Democratic Party and the 
Bund attended, they left without making a commitment to cooperate. They con-
sidered small groups such as the Lettish Party (the Letts live on the coast of the 
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Baltic Sea) too insignificant to be given equal voting rights. Later reports on the 
Letts' activities permitted outsiders to understand that the party had played an 
important role. 
At this conference, in fact, Chaikovskii and Zilliacus had assumed that the 
opposition groups would continue their activities and take desperate risks in the 
summer. I handed the resolution to Ueda Sentarö in Berlin, and he seems to have 
kept it. The aims of this resolution were as follows: that both the Poles and the 
Finns would become independent of Russia but federate with her; the Socialist 
Revolutionaries would overthrow the present government and establish a liberal 
system of government and a federation with the subjugated nationalities; the 
Belorussians and the Letts would acquire complete autonomy. Later, the aims 
of the last two parties were advanced much more, and each tried to make a plan 
for building up its own independent government. I° Though the Liberal Party did 
not attend this conference, Prince Shakhovskoi [D.I. Shakhovskoi], Prince Dol-
gorukov and others later agreed to the resolution. The resolution was proclaimed 
in a paper named Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia. 
While this conference ended satisfactorily, the other plan of the Socialist Revolu-
tionaries failed completely. A young lady named Leont'eva [Tat'iana Leont'e-
va], who was smuggled into the Court to assassinate an unnamed individual (no 
one said who, but it was supposedly the Tsar), was arrested and many of her 
fellow members were also arrested as a result of a search of her house. When 
I arrived from Stockholm in Paris at the end of April, the activists had been dis-
couraged by this reversal. But the requested money had already arrived there, 
so I decided on its distribution and tried to restore their spirits. 
Before then, the chief of the Polish Intransigent Party, Suddeniki [Wojciech 
Dzieduszycki] who waited for me in Vienna during my fourth trip to Europe, 
told me that there were some tens of thousands of inexpensive rifles in Switzer-
land. During my fifth trip, I arranged with a few men in Paris to buy those arms. 
While the Armenians were buying French rifles of the old style in Saint-Cha-
mond, they told Dekanozi of the Georgian Party (in the Caucasus) of their wish 
to obtain Swiss Vetterli rifles and asked how to buy them. Dekanozi asked Baud, 
the wealthy Swiss anarchist, about this, using the famous philosopher Cherkezov 
as his middleman. Cherkezov was also an anarchist and Dekanozi's old friend 
from the same province. Baud made a purchasing contact with one of his former 
schoolmates who is now employed as a Colonel at an artillery arsenal. 
During this time, each opposition party was busy buying arms. The parties 
that did not take part in the alliance, such as the Social Democrats and the Bund, 
were also particularly busy buying pistols. 
Dikanskii [Azef], the most powerful leader of the Socialist Revolutionaries, 
reported that he had gone to Odessa with 40,000 yen to canvass and to seek ways 
lo Neither the Belorussian Socialist Hramada nor the Latvian Social Democratic Un-
ion advocated the complete separation of their country from Russia. 
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to obtain arms. In June he provoked a disturbance there and escaped to Moscow. 
Vakulinchuk [Grigorii Vakulinchuk] and Feldmann [Konstantin Feldmann], both 
of whom were Dikanskii's disciples and Caucasians, organized a mutiny on the 
Potemkin which started the Black Sea Revolt; Vakulinchuk was killed and Feld-
mann was arrested: it is said that Feldmann broke out of prison and went into 
hiding until peace could be restored, but was arrested in Poland when he tried 
to smuggle himself back into Russia again." This disturbance [the Potemkin 
mutiny] was not sufficiently prepared: the authorities knew in advance of the 
party's plans. However, the Russian government's prestige was impaired, and 
the disturbance undermined the confidence of the Tsar in the military. 
Before this disturbance, the arrest of members of the Socialist Revolutionaries 
[29-30 March 1905] temporarily discouraged the opposition parties. In order 
to restore their spirits, it became necessary to take measures to encourage the 
opposition at large. Chaikovskii, the extreme hard-liner of the Socialist Revolu-
tionaries, was the central figure in the plan, and Zilliacus, Gapon, Soskis, and 
others were actively involved. Thereafter, it was decided that if the Socialist 
Revolutionaries took a leading role, the other parties would follow, and activi-
ties to implement the plan would then begin. They therefore set about buying 
arms. 
In regard to buying arms, I decided to give the Poles money in advance and 
a free hand, but the other parties received money only after they had found arms 
for sale. 
It was hard to buy arms. This was particularly because each party wanted differ-
ent kinds of arms. Parties composed mainly of workers, such as the Socialist 
Revolutionaries and the Polish Socialists, did not like rifles. In contrast, the Finns 
and Caucasians, who were mainly peasants, preferred rifles. 
Toward May, while Zilliacus set about buying revolvers and Mauser-action 
cavalry rifles in Hamburg, Germany, Dekanozi, Cherkezov, and the Swiss anar-
chist Baud purchased Vetterli rifles. 
Chaikovskii, Father Gapon, Soskis, and others made efforts to restore the 
strength of the opposition parties in the interior of Russia. Before then, the Cys-
ne and the Cecil, small steamers, were bought by the above persons in order to 
land arms on the coast of the Baltic Sea. The American lady Hull [Mrs. Vernam 
Hull] became the owner of both steamers, and members of the Finnish, Lithua-
nian, and Lettish parties worked as their crews, including Schauman [Frans Mikael 
Schauman], whose elder brother [Eugen Schauman] had assassinated the former 
Governor-General of Finland [N.I. Bobrikov, 16 June 1904]. 
The rifles and other equipment purchased in Switzerland amounted to 16,000 
rifles and 3 million bullets to be sent to the Baltic regions and 8,500 rifles and 
" Feldmann was a Social Democratic agitator in Odessa and Vakulinchuk was a rebel-
lious sailor killed on the Potemkin. Neither was Caucasian nor did they take part in Azef's 
activities. 
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1.2 million bullets to be sent to regions of the Black Sea. 
As it happens, it was impossible for small landing steamers to transport these 
arms. It was, therefore, necessary to buy a transport ship of almost 700 tons. 
Later, this ship became famous in the international press as the John Grafton. 
It was so complicated to transport these arms loaded on eight wagons from 
Switzerland by train, to follow the necessary procedure for purchasing the trans-
port ship, and to take all possible steps for her to leave port that I cannot men-
tion everything here. I entrusted Takada & Company as agent to look after all 
the necessary details, after I had applied to the General Staff for the purchase 
of the ship at that time. Yanagidani Minokichi, Branch Manager of this com-
pany, and Scott from England made the following plan. 
In order to overcome any difficulty and legal complications, and to avoid in 
any way indicating the source of the arms, they ordered a certain store, as an 
agency of Takada & Company in Rotterdam, to receive the arms which Baud 
would send from Switzerland and to ship them to London. When the arms ar-
rived there, Watt, a business connection of Takada, would load a large ship with 
these arms and send them to the English Channel under pretence of transporting 
them to Manila. The arms would be transferred onto the John Grafton off the 
Channel and sent northward to the Baltic Sea. There were also great difficulties 
in buying the John Grafton. 
Baud appears to have set about the purchase toward the middle of June, with 
his friend serving at an artillery arsenal in Switzerland. Though it was not so 
easy for the friend to make boxes needed for packing these rifles and bullets, 
to clean them and so on, the preparation was completed in mid-July. The boxes 
were addressed and sent from Basle in Switzerland to Cordonnerie & Company 
in Rotterdam in Holland. But their transport to England was stopped for a while 
by the customs. Takada & Company and Watt made great efforts to find a solu-
tion, and the arms could finally be brought to England. 
Before then, I was in England in order to make preparations for the united 
opposition movement and stayed at the Charing Cross Hotel for a while. The 
opposition groups could only be met in secret. The Secretary in this matter [Zil-
liacus] 
 and I, therefore, stayed at the northern and the southern corners of the 
same floor of the big hotel. We needed to avoid public attention in spite of both 
of us going in and out very frequently. But to add to the complications of the 
opposition visiting there frequently, Gapon also stayed at the same hotel under 
a false name. On the day after the priest's first visit and as soon as I had delegat-
ed responsibility to Zilliacus, I changed hotels and hid myself completely. 
This new dwelling was a small hotel named Craven in Craven Street. No one 
except Colonel Utsunomiya knew this address. 
However, a letter addressed to "Monsieur Colonel Akashi" was sent to the 
address of this hotel (I still have this letter in my sack). It said, "Would you wait 
for me at the entrance to the metro in Avenue des Champs-Elysées, Paris, France, 
at 11:00 a.m. next Thursday? Though you do not know me, I know you. It is 
not difficult to look for you. I have something to tell you. Do not be afraid, 
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it is necessary for you to talk with me. Madame Roland."92 As I had business 
in Paris to discuss the arms transport to the Black Sea at that time, I decided 
to go there even though this letter was extraordinary. To locate my secret where-
abouts was so strange that I thought, for better or worse, such a person could 
become useful, if circumstances permitted. So I was waiting for her at the meet-
ing place at the appointed time. 
A lady in her forties approached me and later came to the hotel that I chose. 
She said, "I am the French wife of an Okhrana agent [Okhrana = Russian secret 
police]. I am now separated from my husband. If you give me £ 400, I shall tell 
you about the Okhrana's secrets." 
I said, "I spend money to obtain information. I only hope you will tell me 
as much as you know." 
"Do you not know you have been closely watched by the Okhrana? They 
have never taken their eyes off you wherever you have been. Manuilov [I.F. 
Manasevich-Manuilov], Chief of the Okhrana, has already seen you walking near 
the Arc de Triomphe at eight o'clock this morning, and reported that Akashi has 
come. You are cooperating with Nihilist leaders, such as Zilliacus and Dekanozi. 
The Russian government considers the Nihilists its most bitter enemy. As far as 
I know, you have been partly unsuccessful in buying arms from a person named 
Franck in Hamburg. Do you remember the person whom you met on the stair-
case of Hotel Streit where Zilliacus stayed, when you came from Berlin to Ham-
burg by a night train on a particular day? He was an agent named Springer and 
waited for your arrival there when you came to discuss matters with Zilliacus.  
After you came, Zilliacus hurriedly left the hotel with his luggage. I suppose your 
arrival at the hotel allowed Zilliacus to get away. Do you not know that the let-
ter which you sent, under the pseudonym of George, to Dekanozi on a particu-
lar day was opened by the Okhrana? If you need, I can prove what was written 
in the letter. We know that you have been busily engaged in buying arms, but 
are now debating whether to buy them in Hamburg or elsewhere. It is so easy 
to follow a man on foot that I ask you not to walk. It is simpler to find you 
when you use your real name at a hotel. Will you use a false name there? Please 
stay at a big hotel, because it is easier for the secret police to keep track of a 
person staying at a small hotel than a big one. From now on I will warn you 
from time to time." 
Though all of this was true, I said, for fear of her outwitting me, "I am busy 
searching for agents who could smuggle themselves into Russia and collect in-
formation. If you know some suitable candidates, please introduce me. I am not 
so much interested in what the Nihilist parties do. Please give me information 
about conditions in the Russian army." 
"No one knows about the Nihilist parties better than you. I ask you to believe 
'l2  Madame Roland [Jeanne Manon Roland de la Platiere] was famous as a fighter 
in the French Reyolution. 
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me. Without my help, it would be impossible for you to advance the opposition 
movement in Russia. But do not talk about me. If you do, I will stop helping 
you. You must not forget to be extremely careful of the Okhrana during the arms 
purchase. What I would like to tell you is that the Japanese code has already 
been deciphered by the Russians." (This was ascertained later. But I referred 
all of this top-secret information to Minister Motono after I had entrusted the 
affair to Suwa Hidesaburö.) 
As stated above, I knew the Okhrana were paying more attention to smug-
gling arms into Russia than before. So it became important to be very careful 
in buying and transporting them. 
I had Watt, a business connection of Takada & Company, buy the John 
Grafton. Watt, as a mediator, sold her to a wine merchant in London named 
Dickenson (also called Den Bey). Dickenson, acting as a treasurer of the Russian 
Socialist Revolutionary Party, was recommended for the task by Chaikovskii. 
Dickenson became her owner in consideration of his occupation as a wine mer-
chant, and lent her to Morton, an American anarchist, as a matter of form. It 
was an urgent question under whose national flag the ship would sail. Unless 
the John Grafton sailed under the Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, or English flag, 
she might attract public attention on the Baltic Sea. It was not safe to use either 
the Swedish or Norwegian flag at that time, because the Norwegian struggle for 
independence from Sweden could lead to a war. It was also impossible to find 
a suitable owner at short notice. Therefore we decided, on Chaikovskii's recom-
mendation, that Dickenson would become owner of the ship and that she would 
sail under the English flag. 
At the time when the John Grafton set sail from England, it was necessary 
to report her destination and the crew's full names and nationalities, including 
the captain's, and to get its certification. As all the crew were Russian, including 
Captain Strautman [Strautmanis] and Helmsman Bauman, there was great 
difficulty obtaining a master's certificate of competence and a clearance certifi-
cate. 
When the preparations were complete, the John Grafton, joined by her former 
crew, was sent to Flushing [Vlissingen], Holland. She could avoid English cus-
toms law by making transfer contract at that port. Her captain and crew went 
there and boarded her after the temporary crew went ashore. 
Before this, a captain who was associated with Takada & Company as the re-
cipient of the John Grafton came on board. She set sail from Flushing as soon 
as the Russian crew boarded. Again there was a difficulty with a clearance cer-
tificate, which was almost insoluble. 
Obeying orders, the John Grafton sailed south through the English Channel 
at the end of July. She trans-shipped almost 16,000 rifles, 3,000,000 bullets, 3,000 
revolvers, and 3 tons of explosive from Watt's own ship off Guernsey. The sea 
was so rough that it took almost three days, working night and day, to trans-
ship. Then the John Grafton sailed toward the north with only her Russian crew. 
The command given to her was to sail through the Danish Sound and War- 
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nemiinde on the night of 14 August; to unload the arms for the Letts (who live 
on the coast of the Baltic Sea) and to send them to Moscow on 18 August; to 
sail toward a small island to the south of Viborg [Vyborg] on the night of 19 
August in order to wait for a boat off the island, to transfer arms onto a small 
ship, and to unload near the Russian capital. A little earlier, the Cecil, a small 
steamer, departed from London bound for the waiting point. 
Branch Manager Yanagidani of Takada & Company painstakingly prepared 
this plan with Scott from England. The John Grafton set sail on 1 August. 
Each of us chose a different route: Zilliacus departed for Denmark and made 
a plan for transporting 8,500 rifles from Switzerland, because carrying out the 
first plan for sending these rifles to the Black Sea became so difficult that it was 
thought better to direct them via the Baltic Sea rather than the Black Sea. 
At the end of May and the beginning of June, Caucasian revolutionaries robbed 
the National Bank in the Caucasus and the Polish Socialist Party stole 30,000 
yen from the National Bank in Poland. The Letts took 27,000 yen using the same 
methods.;13  
I left London at the beginning of August and met with the Caucasian parties 
in Paris. We agreed to start activities as soon as revolts had broken out in the 
Baltic region. Thereafter, when I went to Berlin, the Russo-Japanese peace con-
ference had already begun in the United States. As far as I can remember, I in-
vited Jodko to Berlin, and heard his opinion on 18 or 19 August. 
I knew from a German paper that the Lettish Party had started its activities 
in Kurland. I arrived in Stockholm on 20 August. Then, Lieutenant Colonel Na-
gao [Nagao Tsunekichi] told me that Furuhjelm had come from Finland and said, 
"Conditions are quite promising, but the activities in Kurland were too prema-
ture to succeed. As a watch house was discovered to the south of Viborg at the 
point where the John Grafton was supposed to arrive, I went to Denmark and 
gave her notice to change the former rendezvous to the coast of the Gulf of 
Bothnia, near the border with Sweden." I felt very apprehensive whether or not 
she would know for certain about the change of unloading point. 
Probably on 25 or 26 August, Zilliacus came to Stockholm with a passport 
in the name of Long from England and said, "I am really puzzled by the John 
Grafton business. She unloaded arms for the Lettish Party to the north of Win-
dau on 18 August. But no boat was waiting for her at the arrival point to the 
south of Viborg on the I9th. The crew were so apprehensive that they sailed her 
back to Denmark and begged me to give new orders. So I made her set sail for 
the new unloading points yesterday: her new plan was to unload some arms in 
the district of Kemi and Tornio, on the Russian border with Sweden, and to sail 
south to unload the remainder. I altered the original plan as soon as I heard of 
These socialists thought that the robbery of the National Banks was not a crime 
but a méans to divide the people's property equally. They had done this without con-
sulting me. 
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The wreck of the John Grafton. 
the discovery of a watch house. In fact, I received this report about a watch house 
at the beginning of this month, and sailed right round Warnemünde by moon-
light on the night of 14 August so that I could give her the changed order. But 
I could not find even a shadow of the John Grafton. At last, I was able to give 
the order yesterday." 
The John Grafton unloaded arms in Tornio and another point, and ran aground 
when she arrived at the third point off the Ratan district.12 She did not have 
good charts, because ships had not, of course, sailed near there. That is the rea-
son why she ran onto an uncharted shoal at the beginning of September. This 
affair was written up as "The Mysterious Ship" or "The John Grafton Affair" 
in all the European papers. 
As soon as the ship was stranded, the governor sent officers and ordered them 
to investigate. The crew seized the officers and shut them in a cabin. After they 
had finished unloading the arms, they released the officers. I angrily criticized 
12 Ratan is situated on the northeastern coast of Sweden. As a matter of fact, the John 
Grafton unloaded arms near Kemi and Jakobstad (Pietarsaari), not at Tornio, Finland. 
or at Ratan, Sweden. 
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the crew for having released the officers. They answered, "The officers were only 
doing their duty. It would have been inhumane to kill them." The European at-
titude of "mistaken benevolence toward one's enemy" sometimes allows such 
things to happen. For example, an opposition member behaved in almost the 
same way when he tried to assassinate the Governor-General of Moscow [Grand 
Duke Sergei]. Though the murderer had a good chance of assassinating the Grand 
Duke, he abandoned the attempt, because in his opinion it was inhumane also 
to assassinate an innocent child who happened to be riding in the same carriage, 
even though it was Grand Duke Paul's child. I have heard of similar situations 
in which the life of an individual is placed above one's duty. I regard this atti-
tude as little more than ridiculous. 
The officers reported the grounding to the Russian capital as soon as they were 
released. Then the Aziia, a converted cruiser, was dispatched to the scene)3 
Prior to this, three machine guns and 15,000 bullets which the Cysne had on 
board were discovered by the English authorities, just before the ship left Lon-
don. Morton from the United States, the nominal owner of these arms, was ar-
rested and fined. 
From the middle of August the Lettish revolt grew stronger and spread, so 
that the Russian government had to dispatch the Twentieth Corps. A part of the 
Eighteenth Corps was dispatched to Finland soon after the John Grafton affair 
took place. 
Father Gapon came to Stockholm on the very day [30 August 1905] following 
the conclusion of a peace agreement [the settlement of the Sakhalin and indem-
nity issues on 29 August]. He was greatly discouraged but departed for Russia. 
As soon as news that the John Grafton had run aground was published in the 
newspapers, Chaikovskii came to Stockholm, and devised remedial measures. 
During this time, the conflict between Tatars, incited by the Russians, and 
Armenians began in Baku in the Caucasus and Shusha in Georgia, and both 
provinces dissolved into total disorder. 
I note that opposition activities occurred in various places between the begin-
ning of October and 18 November when I left Europe. The most violent of these 
were the following: the Socialist Revolutionary Party led the demonstrations in 
Moscow; the Finns adopted a declaration of independence from Russia and hoisted 
the Finnish flag over the residence of the Governor-General of Finland;14 the 
Letts declared independence in Kurland; the Poles organized revolts and an end-
less series of extreme actions and demonstrations in various places, and these 
13 The governor of Vaasa did not know anything about the John Grafton, before she 
was blown up on 8 September 1905. The officers Akashi referred to in Rakka ryusui were 
Finnish customhouse officers. 
" During the General Strike in the autumn of 1905, the Finns did not adopt a declara-
tion of independence from Russia nor did they hoist the Finnish flag over the residence 
of the Governor-General of Finland. The Finnish flag flew over several other public buildings 
during the strike. 
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events triggered a six-week uprising in Kiev, Odessa, and the Caucasus. 
I surmise that opposition activities did not grow larger in St Petersburg be-
cause quite a few Socialist Revolutionaries were arrested in mid-August. A dis-
satisfied Gapon returned to Geneva after visiting the capital. When I left Paris 
on 6 August, I had a certain person ask Rubanovich a question. He answered, 
"An uprising may need so much money that it is difficult to continue it. That 
is the reason why I would discourage the opposition groups from going on strike 
for a while. The activity must be started at another time. Now it is difficult to 
anticipate when agrarian movements might arise, but I expect they will be able 
to start next spring.`14 
A few days before I left Paris, I received information that a plan had been 
completed to transport arms to the Caucasus and the Black Sea provinces, and 
a ship transporting 8,500 Swiss rifles and 1.2 million bullets had arrived in Malta 
in the Mediterranean Sea. After I returned to Japan, I received [from an un-
known person] a letter dated 24 December 1905: 
"Our movement has a bright future. We were not able to overthrow the Rus-
sian government at a stroke, but will try to do it step by step. No one doubts 
that the authority of the Tsarist government will collapse. The arms transported 
to the Black Sea arrived there safely. We were able to buy back the arms confis-
cated by the Aziia, a converted cruiser. They number 8,400 rifles." 
'14 The Socialist Reyolutionaries' use of the French phrase "mouvement agraire" 
means using the most violent measures such as inciting peasants to rise up and throw 
Russia into disorder. If an opposition leader teaches ignorant peasants how to use ex-
treme measures and how to oppose the authorities, he would not be able to stop their 
actiyities once the short-term goal was achieved. That is the reason why the leaders 
hesitate to instigate a full-scale rebellion. 
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Appendix 
Important Japanese Telegrams 
Concerning the Russian 
Opposition Movement 
selected, translated, and annotated 
by Inaba Chiharu 
1) Nagaoka Gaishi, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, to Iguchi Shögo, the Chief of the 
General Affairs Department of the General Staff, 6 June 1904, Home Paper (not telegram), 
Hukuringö shoruitsuduri [Extraordinary Home Papers of the Adjutants' Office] June 1904, 
(Daihon'ei, Nichirosen'eki, M37-13), BT. 
The draft of the telegram to Colonel Akashi is as follows: I have sent you the 
enclosed money for the period up to March. Later, I will send funds covering 
your travel expenses for April to September, and the overseas allowance (1,626 
yen) for 10 February to 31 December. 
Nagaoka 
(P.S., 9,000 yen as a reserve fund will be sent on 17 June, but the travel and 
overseas allowance later.) 
2) Hayashi Tadasu, Minister to Britain, London, to Komura Jutarö, Foreign Minister, 
Tokyo, 18 July 1904, Nichirosen'ekiniokeru finrandojin oyobi pörandojinno taidokankei 
zassan [Affairs Related to Finns and Poles during the Russo-Japanese War], 5.2.15.13, 
GS. [This is the original English text of the telegram.] 
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Akashi (middle) as Military Attaché in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Komura, Tokyo 
202. Utsunomiya to Sanböhonbu. Transmit to Kirski: Witold has negotiated 
with some Finn. The latter supplied S.R. with arms. Witold proposed that he 
may supply and us with some quantity. Finn has made that dependent on agree-
ment with his friend A. Two weeks after Finn has seen myself in London. It turned 
out that he wants to obtain for us from Japanese, and in his last report to the 
Colonel, he demanded 4,000 pounds sterling for this purpose. He settled this de-
mand without our knowledge and agreement. During visit at the Colonel with 
Finn, I have granted and this money to be serviceable not only for arms. Howev-
er I cannot resolve upon this affair, because at present only you are vested with 
full power. At the request of Colonel, I inform you about this affair. W. 
Hayashi 
[The Sanböhonbu is the Japanese General Staff. Tytus Filipowicz, known as Kar-
ski (not Kirski), and Jozef Pilsudski of the Polish Socialist Party went to Tokyo 
in July 1904 to make an alliance with Japan. Witold is Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz, 
a leader of the Polish Socialists, who had connections with Utsunomiya in Lon-
don. Finn should be Zilliacus. A. refers to Finnish constitutionalists. Colonel 
is Akashi.] 
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3) Nagaoka, Tokyo, to Akashi Motojirö, Military Attaché, Stockholm, 31 August 1904, 
Santsutsuduri [Communication Papers of the General Staff] August 1904, (Daihon'ei, 
Nichirosen'eki, M37-1), BT. 
Colonel Akashi, Stockholm 
100,000 yen would be quite cheap, if the purpose can be achieved with cer-
tainty. The Staff has confidence in your ability to succeed. But obtaining cooper-
ation among all the opposition parties is so difficult that you must take care not 
to spend the money on only a few parties. 
Nagaoka 
4) Nagaoka, Tokyo, to Utsunomiya Tarö, Military Attaché to Britain, London, 31 August 
1904, Santsutsuduri August 1904, BT. 
Colonel Utsunomiya, London 
You are allowed to help only on condition that the Finnish plan (as the result of 
the conference, obtaining cooperation among all opposition parties) can be ac- 
complished. You should discuss this affair with Akashi. 
Nagaoka 
5) Nagaoka, Tokyo, to Akashi, Stockholm, 29 October 1904, Santsutsuduri October and 
Noyember 1904, (Daihon'ei, Nichirosen'eki, M37-3), BT. 
Colonel Akashi, Stockholm 
Your request, 100,000 yen, in the telegram of 29 August was barely approved 
by the Minister of War [Terauchi Masatake]. Do not forget my directive order 
of 18 October that you must not pay the opposition parties more than 100,000 
yen. Two or three million yen for the second measure is not approved. If those 
parties do not start demonstrations because the General Staff refuses this finan-
cial help, you must not use the rest of the money. 
Nagaoka 
6) Nagaoka, Tokyo, to Kodama Gentarö, Chief of the Staff of the Manchurian Army, 
Manchuria, 14 November 1904, Santsutsuduri October and Noyember 1904, BT. 
The Chief of the Staff of the Manchurian Army, Manchuria 
Akashi telegraphed back as follows: 
"The cause of the reserve soldiers' revolt [in his telegram to Akashi on 12 
November, Nagaoka asked about the circumstances of the reserve soldiers' revolt 
in Russia and the dissatisfied soldiers in Poland] is as follows: 
When a leader of the party from the mobilized district returned to his home-
land after the Paris conference, he acted on the recommendations of the confer-
ence and made anti-Tsarist speeches and organized a demonstration against the 
authorities. But this ill-prepared attempt, in which only revolvers and rifles were 
used, could not prevent the Russian government from forcing the people into 
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the army. However, public opinion is so critical of the authorities and so elevated 
that the party can plan to issue a declaration and to organize a new demonstra-
tion at the beginning of next month." 
I gave Akashi 100,000 yen as a subsidy for the opposition movement. His report 
is as follows: 
"At present disturbances in Russia are caused by the united opposition con-
ference which was held in Paris at the beginning of October by the Polish So-
cialist Party, the Russian Liberal Party, the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party, 
and other opposition parties (except the Russian Social Democratic Party). At 
this conference, the following decisions were made: 
1. to publish the joint declaration of all opposition parties on 8 November; 
2. to start demonstrations at the end of November or in December. Each party 
can use its own tactics; 3. to establish a coordinating body to help maintain inter-
party contacts. 
I received letters from some parties around 5 November. The contents of those 
letters are as follows: A few parties published small declarations and delivered 
addresses in many places. The disturbance in central Russia was instigated by 
the Socialist Revolutionaries or the Polish Socialists. There were many conflicts 
between reserve soldiers and the gendarmerie, and the reserve soldiers in the bor-
derlands have been deserting. As the Liberals called for the promulgation of a 
constitution, the students began to waiver. In Poland, there are many people who 
are not responding to the draft call." 
Deputy Chief of the General Staff 
[We do not know which party and leader Akashi referred to in this telegram.] 
7) Akizuki Sachio, Minister to Sweden, Stockholm, to Komura, Tokyo, 21 November 1904, 
Nichirosen'ekikankei teikokunioite mitteishashiyö zakken [Affairs Related to the Usage 
of Spies during the Russo-Japanese War], 5.2.7.3, GS. 
Komura, Tokyo 
94. If giving money to destroy railways, to agitate, and to instigate rebellions 
in Russia is not contrary to Japanese governmental policy, I will cooperate with 
Mr. Akashi. If he is not suitable, please select another person. Akashi is now 
contacting opposition leaders, but I think it will be impossible for him to carry 
out future activities. Of course, we do not get involved with any assassinations. 
Akizuki 
8) Akizuki, Stockholm, to Komura, Tokyo, 3 January 1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei tei-
kokunioite mitteishashiyö zakken, GS. 
Komura, Tokyo 
2. Public excitement in Russia so far increasing. I think however that the 
Government is not much surprised thereby and very determined to destroy anti- 
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autocratic movement by all means. Therefore there will fatally (finally?) come 
day when the opposition parties will be put into dilemma to stop their campaign 
or to take arms. I am sure that two or three parties are very determined but not 
sufficiently equipped. Due allowance being made, if they get up, they will be likely 
followed by some others. Nothing has yet been heard about the impressions caused 
in Russia by the latest event at Port Arthur but I anticipate it will not fail to 
cause general demoralization, while to greatly encourage anti-autocratic move-
ment. As it is wise to hammer iron whilst still heated now, it is very good mo-
ment to do something according to my telegram 94. [This is the original English 
text of the section above. The section below is a translation from the Japanese 
original.] 
So, I earnestly desire about 200,000 yen to be paid now. When prospects be-
come clearer, an enormous additional sum will be required. In any case, please 
send me 10,000 yen by telegraphic transfer so that I will be able to investigate 
the internal conditions of Russia. Japan should have no scruples about conspiring 
with the Liberal Party, which is organized by men of wealth and the intelligent-
sia, because even that party conspires with the socialist parties. We Japanese should 
not hesitate, because sooner or later the existence of this conspiracy will be made 
public and it will conform to similar patterns of European history. So far the 
Liberals have been effective publicly and behind the scenes. I firmly believe that 
the conspiracy will be more effective and less expensive than before. 
Akizuki 
9) Komura, Tokyo, to Akizuki, Stockholm, 7 January 1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei tei-
kokunioite mitteishashiyö zakken, GS. 
Akizuki, Stockholm 
2. According to the measures which you requested in your telegram No 2, it 
is necessary firstly to make an accurate estimate of the effect those measures will 
have not only on Russian domestic affairs, but also on the great powers bordering 
on Russia, such as Germany and Austria. Then Japan should take the necessary 
measures. Dispatch as soon as possible a suitable person to Russia to investigate 
conditions there. I remit 10,000 yen by telegraphic transfer to cover the expendi-
ture. 
Komura 
10) Akizuki, Stockholm, to Komura, Tokyo, 25 January 1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei tei-
kokunioite mitteishashiyö zakken, GS. 
Komura, Tokyo 
8. The autocratic law was withdrawn, and some of the Finnish exiles were 
pardoned. The incident of live-shell firing at the Winter Palace on the 19th was 
linked with the Liberal Party and the Socialist Revolutionaries, but not to the 
Fighting Organization, though I cannot confirm this in detail. The strike planned 
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by the Social Democratic Party was premature, but, according to my informa-
tion, it obliged the Liberal Party to become more radical. Contrary to my predic-
tions, the Russian government suppressed the demonstration [Bloody Sunday on 
22 January] firmly without hesitation. Concerning the domestic conditions, the 
government must take drastic measures. On the other hand, the rioters can do 
little to oppose the government because they are so inadequately prepared. There-
fore, please consider my request for the following subsidy as soon as possible. 
I hope you will not later regret having missed an opportunity. Send me 400,000 
yen immediately, 250,000 yen after one month. In the end, you should make al-
lowance for up to one million yen. If the affair is successful, I think it would 
not be unreasonable to pay more money. There is no deceit at all. I am certain 
that the partner cannot be a person who would deceive us. I have discussed the 
substance of the affair with Mr. Akashi and have considered it constantly since 
I arrived at my minister's post. It is not necessary to consider the views of Ger-
many and Austria. There are signs of sailors' unrest and mutiny in Sevastopol. 
Akizuki 
11) Komura, Tokyo, to Akizuki, Stockholm, 26 January 1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei tei-
kokunioite mitteishashiyö zakken, GS. 
Akizuki, Stockholm 
3. According to your telegram No 8, there has not been any evaluation yet 
on whether these subsidies had an effect or not, though I collect different infor-
mation about Russian domestic conditions from all quarters. You must, there-
fore, do as much as you can to collect information about Russia in accordance 
with my telegram No 2, until I give you further orders. 
Komura 
12) Akizuki, Stockholm, to Komura, Tokyo, 10 February 1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei tei-
kokunioite mitteishasiyö zakken, GS. 
Komura, Tokyo 
17. Though it was not easy to find men who are willing to investigate Russian 
internal affairs, I have entrusted men living in Russia with the investigation. One 
will investigate the current strikes and the other research the domestic affairs of 
the Russian government. But we can no longer expect them to do additional duties. 
The details of the opposition plan were known only to Utsunomiya and Akashi. 
But we need not communicate directly with the underground opposition in Rus-
sia; we can clarify most of the plan with opposition leaders living in France and 
Germany, such as Poles, Finns, and Armenians. I believe it is hardly necessary 
to know more details, and it has been difficult to get complete information about 
the plan because of communication problems. However, if the Imperial govern-
ment wants to know more, I will try to do what I can. As to Russian domestic 
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Akashi (second from the left) and other Military Attachés. 
affairs, please indicate what the Imperial government would particularly like to 
know. 
Akizuki 
13) Akashi, Paris, to Yamagata Aritomo, Chief of the General Staff, Tokyo, 12 February 
1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei teikokunioite mitteishashiyö zakken, GS. [The Imperial Head-
quarters copied and sent this telegram as a top secret message to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.] 
The Chief of the General Staff, Tokyo 
The Secretary of the opposition parties [Zilliacus] proposed the following: 
conditions in Russia are unexpectedly deteriorating. So there is no doubt that 
our goal, to overthrow the Russian government, will be accomplished, if the 
scheduled demonstration can be effectively delayed. It cannot be started until 
June because the peasants, workers, and some other parties are not yet prepared. 
However, this is still not too late, because, even if the Russian government were 
to start preparing peace negotiations with Japan, it is certain that she would re-
quire much time for such preparations. Therefore we continuously support the 
present opposition activities in order to exhaust the government, and we will try 
6I 
to instigate a major movement [uprising] led by the Socialist Revolutionaries in 
June. This movement should determine the fate of the opposition parties. That 
is the reason why we ask Japan to increase the subsidy, in order to ensure com-
plete success. 
It is necessary to spend 440,000-450,000 yen, by my reckoning, and to pay 
it at the beginning of May; it is possible to pay in two installments. I will discuss 
the details with Akizuki and report to the Imperial Headquarters, but I ask the 
General Staff to pay the subsidy before then. As the parties are expected to de-
stroy railway electric wire factories and other factories, may I postpone the negoti-
ation with them about sabotaging the railways? 
Akashi 
14) Motono Ichirö, Minister to France, Paris, to Komura, Tokyo, 13 February 1905, 
Nichirosen'ekikankei teikokunioite mitteishashiyö zakken, GS. 
(SECRET, This telegram was shown to the Emperor, all Ministers, the Four Genrö, Army, 
Navy and others.) [This is the original English text of the telegram.] 
Komura, Tokyo 
48. (calendar) the following is strictly confidential: (...) 
Internal situation in Russia seems to aggravate from day to day. In spite of 
relative calm of these last days, there is at bottom profound agitation in all parts 
of Russia. Several of my French friends who six months ago still did not believe 
about a serious influence of internal events upon the issue of actual war, have 
now changed their opinions and begin to be persuaded that if Russia does not 
conclude peace as early as possible, there would be very grave internal perturba-
tion. This opinion is confirmed by letter dated Feb. 1st and received by one of 
my informants from a French engineer residing at Moscow since many years. 
Colonel Akashi who arrived here a few days ago has had an interview with 
representative of revolutionary parties mentioned in my Kimitsu [diplomatic 
papers] No 34 dated Oct. 23rd. It results from conferences they had that the in-
terior events of Russia having marched very much quicker than revolutionists 
themselves could have hoped, it was absolutely necessary to avail of the present 
circumstances with view of attaining our object. In consequence, Akashi 
telegraphed central headquarters asking subsidy of 450,000 yen. I earnestly ad-
vise you to take necessary measures as quickly as possible so that the demand 
of Akashi be complied with. 
Motono 
[The Tennö (Emperor) Meiji (1852-1912, reigned 1868-1912) was, in theory, 
the holder of sovereign power, commander of the armed forces, and center of 
national morality. The name of Genrö applied to a group of senior statesmen 
who advised the Emperor and exercised considerable influence in political af-
fairs even when no longer holding high office.] 
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15) Makino Nobuaki, Minister to Austria, Vienna, to Komura, Tokyo, March 1905, Ni-
hon gaikö monjo [Japanese Diplomatic Papers], 1905, No 2 (Tokyo, 1959), p. 628. 
Komura, Tokyo 
75. My agent living in Cracow informed me as follows: 
Though the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist Revolutionaries are end-
lessly instigating revolution, their activities have suffered chronic setbacks. The 
Socialist Revolutionary Party, which is the most organized of all opposition par-
ties, is the leading force within the opposition movement. Other opposition groups 
are satisfied to follow the lead of that party. 
The plan for mobilizing reservists in Lodz and Warsaw was postponed. 
Commerce and industries are completely stagnant all over Russia and economic 
problems are almost inevitable. 
All troops are busily occupied guarding railways and cities under martial law. 
It is quite unlikely that the Russian government will continue the war. I think 
domestic disturbances ought to be continued despite government retaliation and 
doubt whether the people will much value the "political reform" of the govern-
ment. 
Makino 
16) Akizuki, Stockholm, to Komura, Tokyo, 3 March 1905, Nihon gaikö monjo, 1905, 
No 2 (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 630-631. 
(SECRET, This telegram was shown to the Prime Minister, the Minister of War, and the 
Chief of the General Staff.) 
Komura, Tokyo 
25. At the beginning of February, a member of the Finnish anti-Russian party 
(whom I have indirectly known for some months and who appeared to be a per-
son of high birth) requested as follows: 
"We have a plan for an armed uprising and ask that you persuade the Japanese 
government to give us 50,000 rifles and some explosives, or the money equiva-
lent to these arms. When you need to know the details, we will call a former 
staff officer from Finland and have him explain our plans." 
I answered immediately that Japan will consider his proposal though she is 
correctly determined to carry out her aims mainly by military means. However, 
disorders will continue for the time being in Russia. The Russian army is so busy 
putting down these disorders and guarding railways, public buildings, and other 
important public services, that decisive action along the lines above will bring 
a chance of peace. If this scheme will make peace, does the Imperial government 
intend to agree to it? Unless it is acceptable, detailed consideration would be un-
desirable. I request instructions. 
Akizuki 
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17) Komura, Tokyo, to Akizuki, Stockholm, 7 March 1905, Nihon gaikö monjo, 1905, 
No 2 (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 633-634. 
Akizuki, Stockholm 
6. According to your telegram No 25, disorders in Russia can be predicted to 
continue, even though Japan gives nothing to encourage them. Moreover, I think 
present Japanese aid would produce few practical results, regardless of whether 
the outcome is favourable. The home government has decided to adopt a policy 
of nonintervention so long as conditions in Russia do not change. Bearing my 
order in mind, you should tread carefully. Will you endeavour to report the ac-
tual situation? 
Komura 
18) Akizuki, Stockholm, to Komura, Tokyo, 9 March 1905, Nihon gaikö monjo, 1905, 
No 2 (Tokyo, 1959), p. 634. 
Komura, Tokyo 
28. According to your telegram No 6, there should be little disorder in Fin-
land, because Finns possess self-restraint. Therefore, the question related to pos-
sible continuity of disorders is irrelevant. I suppose that disorder in other regions 
will continue without let-up. While some points have not yet been clarified, the 
leaders of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (Gapon exerts a favourable influence 
upon this party), which played a central role in throwing Russia into disorder, 
are expected to make arrangements about future activities sometime in the near 
future. Since it has been reported that some other opposition parties plan to gather 
at the same time, the details of their plan will become clear then. It is a matter 
of course that the great military victory on land will exert a favourable influence 
upon European affairs and that the help which I requested in the previous tele-
gram will be obtained through devious means. Though I believe this help would 
have a not insignificant effect, I will tell the Finn something just to please him. 
Akizuki 
19) Makino, Vienna, to Komura, Tokyo, 14 March 1905, Nihon gaikö monjo, 1905, No 
2 (Tokyo, 1959), p. 639. 
(SECRET, This telegram was shown to the Emperor, all Ministers, the Four Genrö, the 
Chief of the General Staff, and the Minister of War.) 
Komura, Tokyo 
95. Lebedev wrote to me in a letter of 23 February as follows: 
I have become acquainted with higher officials and members of the Red Cross. 
They gave me the following information: those supporting the war insisted upon 
fresh mobilization, but the Minister of Interior emphasized that the Ministry could 
not guarantee calm within the country, if the government were to dispatch any 
more soldiers to the battlefield. 
Makino 
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[In June 1904 Makino employed Friedrich L. Landy to get secret information 
about Russian affairs. This Austrian was reported to have good connections in 
Vladivostok and Mukden. Makino dispatched him to St Petersburg and Moscow 
after consultation with Jöhbji Gorö, Military Attache to Austria, in mid-January 
1905. Lebedev was probably one of Landy's agents. See Makino, Vienna, to 
Komura, Tokyo, 22 June 1904 and I1 January 1905, Nichirosen'ekikankei tei-
kokunioite mitteishashiyö zakken, GS.] 
20) Inoue Junnosuke, Minister to Germany, Berlin, to Komura, Tokyo, 14 March 1905, 
Nihon gaikö monjo, 1905, No 2 (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 639-640. 
Komura, Tokyo 
110. Putting all the telegrams from St Petersburg to Berlin together, it appears 
to have gradually become difficult to contain the peasants' resistance to the 
bureaucracy. Peasants began a revolt in Chernigov and Orel provinces and plun-
dered imperial property. The extent of the damage was some million rubles. It 
is known that there are also revolts of peasants in Nizhnii Novgorod and other 
regions. Government circles in Berlin regard this movement as the most serious 
to date. They appear to think that conditions in Russia will become chaotic, and 
the government might be overthrown, unless it can quickly quell the disturbances. 
Inoue 
21) Utsunomiya, London, to Yamagata, Tokyo, 20 April (1905), Zaigaibukan hökoku 
[Reports from Military and Naval Officers in Foreign Countries], No 1, 5.1.10.7, GS. 
(TOP SECRET) 
The Chief of the General Staff, Tokyo 
275. Report by a Pole: Nine parties, the Russian Social Democratic Party; the 
Socialist Revolutionary Party; the Polish Socialist Party; the Lettish Socialist 
Party; the Lettish Democratic Party; the White Russian Entry Party; the Finn-
ish (except for a section of Zilliacus' Party), Georgian, and Armenian Socialist 
parties, in addition to Gapon's own party, attended the joint conference con-
vened by Gapon (the Bund and twelve other parties were absent). It was resolved 
that southern Russia, Poland, and Finland would be independent and each have 
its own diet with full powers, and that the Caucasus would establish a diet with 
limited power. This resolution will be announced on 25 April. In order to achieve 
all this, an armed revolt must first break out in St Petersburg in June (the day 
is not yet determined). 
Colonel Utsunomiya 
22) Akashi, (Stockholm,) to Yamagata, Tokyo, 12 April (1905), Zaigaibukan hökoku, No 
1, GS. 
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(TOP SECRET) 
The Chief of the General Staff, Tokyo 
142. The message in cipher written by the Secretary of the united opposition 
parties [Zilliacus]  is not very clear, but the outline is as follows: 
The Geneva conference decided to hold the Russian Tsar responsible for past 
and future bloodshed. The new declaration was drafted by three people, the great 
b., Father g., and my agent f. The great revolt ought to begin in June, so the 
opposition is making more and more effort to acquire arms and explosives. The 
day of the revolt is still undecided, but it will be safe enough to transport the 
arms by sea. I learned from a reliable source that the government has decided 
in principle to pay an indemnity to Japan in exchange for prisoners of war. Prince 
Tunagusuko, who still expected the victory of the Baltic Fleet, got the decision 
deferred until the success of the fleet became obvious. People expect a public 
incident in Russia to set off the revolution. As the army is greatly influenced 
by the opposition, the troops in the capital are not inclined to shoot at the people 
on command. The peasant movement is making satisfactory progress. The de-
tails will probably be available in a week when I meet my source. 
Colonel Akashi 
[b. was Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaia, g. was G.A. Capon, and f. was Vic-
tor Furuhjelm. Prince Tunagusuko cannot be identified with certainty.] 
23) Akashi, (Paris,) to Yamagata, Tokyo, 7 May (1905), Zaigaibukan hökoku, No 1, GS. 
(TOP SECRET) 
The Chief of the General Staff, Tokyo 
The content of meetings with various parties is as follows: 
The chaotic conditions in the Caucasus continue. Peasants plunder government-
owned farmlands and do not pay taxes. Assassinations continue; the government 
can do little to prevent this anarchy. There are no measures other than future 
revolts. Poland follows the Caucasus. The Social Democratic Party is eager to 
stage an uprising this summer. If many small parties have arms, nothing can pre-
vent continuation of the strife. There is some hope that the Finnish Moderate 
Party will split and new hard-liners will emerge. After I return, I shall submit 
a detailed report. The Socialist Revolutionary Party reported that a Russian officer 
group composed of 140 members offered to cooperate with the party. This move 
could bring troops over to the revolutionary side. People are encouraged to plunder 
government-owned farmlands. Each party has started buying arms in Switzer-
land, Hamburg, and other places. It is expected that we will be able to buy old 
rifles for about seven yen each. As I reported, the leaders are convinced that the 
uprising planned for the summer will succeed. But the Polish Socialist Party, 
the Caucasian Party, and I are worried about the prospects for success. Please 
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make it your policy to give them as many arms as possible. The Secretary [Zillia-
cus] ought to come to London soon to make arrangements for smuggling the 
arms. Though preparations are as described above, I realize it may be a little 
difficult to carry them through. The best Russian military correspondent, named 
n.d. [V.I. Nemirovich-Danchenko], who is a military officer and stayed here un-
til yesterday, is influenced by revolutionary ideas. Now, everything goes against 
Morisaijo (whom I employed cheaply as an agent on condition that I would sup-
port her until the end of the war), because an agent risks being sent to the scaffold 
in Russia. If she can be useful in Japan, please help her. 
Colonel Akashi 
[The Secretary referred to in telegrams of 12 April and 7 May was Zilliacus, since 
Akashi wrote in Rakka ryusui that the Secretary meant Zilliacus. The telegram 
of 12 April must have been sent from Stockholm, and that of 7 May from Paris.] 
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INABA Chiharu  
The Politics of Subversion 
Japanese Aid to Opposition 
Groups in Russia during 
the Russo-Japanese War 
The Russian Revolution of 1905: 
a Japanese Perspective 
The defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, especially beginning with the 
fall of Port Arthur, is generally considered one of the primary contributing fac-
tors to the Russian Revolution of 1905. In this article, I wish to draw attention 
to a somewhat neglected aspect of Japanese wartime policy. During the war Akashi 
Motojirö advocated and eventually won support for monetary aid to anti-Tsarist 
political and ethnic groups to assist them in fomenting unrest and weakening the 
Russian regime from within. 
According to Tani Toshio, a lecturer at the Military College in the 1920s, the 
Japanese General Staff paid one million yen (nowadays almost five milliard yen, 
thirty-five million US dollars) to Akashi in order to assist the opposition parties 
in fomenting an armed uprising in St Petersburg and in creating disturbances 
throughout Russian Empire. Although this scheme failed and Japan did not reap 
any concrete benefits, Japanese monetary aid lent support to the activities of the 
Russian opposition between the spring and summer 1905, and therefore the Rus-
sian Revolution of 1905. 
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The significance of this aid has been overlooked, in part, because Japanese 
scholars have believed that the pertinent archival material were destroyed at the 
end of the Pacific War.' Yet, during the past two decades other scholars have 
uncovered evidence of extensive Japanese subversive activities in Russia. When 
Michael Futrell visited Japan in the 1960s, he discovered only a part of the Japa-
nese archival materials on monetary aid. Nevertheless, by using this material and 
non-Japanese sources, he succeeded in clarifying the existence of Japanese aid 
to the opposition parties.2 
Research by Jerzy J. Lerski and Alvin M. Fountain II on the Polish resistance 
and by William R. Copeland, Olavi K. Fält, and Antti Kujala on the Finnish 
and Russian opposition movements during the Russo-Japanese War have thrown 
additional light on Akashi's activities. Research on the activities of Konrad Vic-
tor (Konni) Zilliacus, one of the leaders of the Finnish opposition, who later be-
came Akashi's close collaborator, has been important in this respect.3 By build-
ing on the results of this research, I was able to discover substantial archives of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Defence Agency. A detailed examina-
tion of this material helps to clarify how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the General Staff formulated their policies for giving aid to the opposition groups. 
The Origins of a Subversive Policy 
Akashi's activity originated in a strategy: Japan would encourage the political 
and ethnic opposition groups to revolt against the Russian regime with the inten-
tion of interfering with the mobilization of troops dispatched to Manchuria in 
European Russia and weakening Russian military power in the Far East. Major 
Tanaka Giichi, later Prime Minister, who had been assigned to the Japanese 
legation in St Petersburg as an assistant to the Military Attaché until 1902, thought 
at one point that he would retire from the service and throw himself into the 
revolutionary movement in order to carry out the above aim. He soon recognized 
' Inaba M. 1966, p. 70. 
2 Futrell 1967, pp. 7-22. 
3 Jerzy J. Lerski, "A Polish Chapter of the Russo-Japanese War", in: The Transac-
tions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Third Series VII (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 69-97; Alvin 
M. Fountain II, Roman Dmowski: Party, Tactics, Ideology 1895-1907, (New York, 1980); 
William R. Copeland, The Uneasy Alliance: Collaboration between the Finnish Opposition 
and the Russian Underground, 1899-1904 (Helsinki, 1973); Olavi K. Fält, "Collaboration 
between Japanese Intelligence and the Finnish Underground during the Russo-Japanese 
War", Asian Profile, Vol. 4 (1976), pp. 205-238; Olavi K. Fält, "Nichirosensöjiniokeru 
nihonchöhökatsudöto finrando akutivisutino kyöryoku" [Japanese Stratagems against the 
Russian Empire and Cooperation with the Finnish Activists during the Russo-Japanese War], 
translated by Momose Hiroshi, Shichö, No 7 (1980), pp. 73-89; Antti Kujala, "The Rus-
sian Revolutionary Movement and the Finnish Opposition, 1905: The John Grafton Af-
fair and the Plans for an Uprising in St Petersburg", Scandinavian Journal of History 5 
(1980), pp. 257-275; Kujala 1988, pp. 3-23. 
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that developments in Poland could also be important for Japan. He believed 
that the movement of revolutionaries and minority nationalities could create shock 
waves throughout the Tsarist regime. After his return to Japan Tanaka became 
a staff officer and continued to advocate these views within the General Staff 
prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. 
As soon as preparations for the war commenced at the beginning of January 
1904 the General Staff exchanged telegrams over intelligence activity with the 
Military Attaché to Russia, Akashi.5 Despite this exchange of telegrams no mili-
tary archival material concerning a plan to instigate subversive activities has been 
found in Japan. It is possible that the Staff considered such activities at that time, 
but it is improbable that such ideas were judged sufficiently realistic to be in-
cluded in the General Staff's budget. In any case, a subversive policy only began 
to take concrete form when Akashi established contact with Konni Zilliacus in 
the winter of 1904. 
Polish Initiatives, Japanese Caution 
When Akashi arrived in Stockholm in February 1904, he established relations 
with a Finnish group in exile which had played a leading role in the Finnish op-
position movement against the Russian regime, especially with Zilliacus.6 As this 
group had been in contact with the Polish National League since 1903, Zilliacus  
proposed to Akashi a plan whereby Polish soldiers in the Russian army might 
surrender to Japan.' Apparently Akashi judged this plan a practical way to dis-
turb and weaken the Russian army in the Far East and informed the General 
Staff of his views. In any case, he obtained approval to proceed. Meanwhile, 
Akashi asked Zilliacus to arrange a meeting with the Polish National League. 
At the beginning of March, Akashi and Roman Dmowski, leader of the League, 
met in Cracow. As a result of this meeting Dmowski went to Japan with pamph-
lets appealing to Poles and the soldiers of the other minority nationalities to sur-
render to Japan without a fight. 
Dmowski arrived in Japan in mid-May, and saw the Chief of Section II (Intel-
ligence), Major General Hukushima Yasumasa, and the Deputy Chief of the 
General Staff, General Kodama Gentaro, responsible for operational decisions.8 
Kodama's meeting with Dmowski in the frantic period just before the Manchu- 
4 Tanaka Giichi denki [A Biography of Tanaka Giichi], 1 (Tokyo, 1958), pp. 171-178. 
5 Inaba C. 1984, pp. 16-17. 
Konni Zilliacus, Sortovuosilta, Poliittisia muistelmia [Political Memoirs from the 
Years of Oppression] (Helsinki, 1920), p. 97; Rakka ryusui in this volume; Kujala 1988, 
pp. 6-8. 
Copeland 1973, pp. 141-146; Fountain 1980, pp. 114-115; Zilliacus 1920, pp. 
96-98.  
Zilliacus 1920, pp. 121-127; Lerski 1959, p. 73, 82; Fountain 1980, pp. 115-127; 
Rakka ryusui in this volume. 
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rian Army's departure on 10 June suggests the importance that the General Staff 
placed on the Polish plan. 
In mid-March the Polish Socialist Party submitted a similar plan to the Japa-
nese Minister to Britain, Hayashi Tadasu, in London. The Polish Socialists' plan 
differed, however, in that it also proposed an armed uprising by the party in 
cooperation with revolutionary parties of other minority nationalities. The party 
therefore asked that Japan provide Poles with arms or subsidies until June 
1904.9 That both Hayashi and the Military Attaché to Britain, Utsunomiya Tarö, 
reported the request of the Polish Socialists to Japan implies that they tried to 
obtain funds from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff in ord-
er to respond to the Polish request. But the Foreign Minister, Komura Jutarö, 
failed to reply to Hayashi's request. Nevertheless, it was decided that Jozef Pilsud-
ski, leader of the Polish Socialist Party, would visit Japan in July. 
The Polish National League later emphasized that Pilsudski's voyage was 
financed by the Japanese General Staff, while Dmowski's travelling expenses were 
paid by a Polish industrialist.10 The General Staff was apparently interested in 
the Polish Socialists' plan, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which postponed 
an answer to Hayashi, probably opposed the scheme. 
When Pilsudski arrived in Japan, he submitted a memorandum to the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, in which he requested that Tokyo enter into an alliance 
with Poland (i.e. the Polish Socialists).11 The Polish Socialist Party asked that 
Japan provide a subsidy for an armed uprising. The same proposal was proba-
bly submitted to the General Staff. 
Dmowski, who feared the adverse consequences of an armed uprising, informed 
the Ministry on 20 July that any uprising in Poland would be easily suppressed. 
The Polish opposition forces would suffer a serious, long-term setback, and the 
Russian government would be free to transfer the military forces stationed in 
Poland to the Far East. The current unsettled situation in Poland would thus 
be better for Japan. Dmowski's views were sent to the General Staff and Genrö 
(elder statesmen).12 
Japanese authorities decided against giving the Polish Socialists any aid.13 This 
9 The Poles initially requested the subsidy for sabotaging the Trans-Siberian railway, 
but this could haye been only a pretext for receiving money from Japan. See Nihon gaikö 
monjo [Japanese Diplomatic Papers], 1904, No 2 (Tokyo, 1957), pp. 526-29, 531-33; 
Hayashi, London, to Komura, Tokyo, 6 June 1904 (telegram No 173), Nichirosen'ekiniokeru 
finrandojin oyobi pörandojinno taidokankei zassan [Affairs Related to Finns and Poles 
during the Russo-Japanese War], 5.2.15.13, GS. Also see telegram 2 in the appendix to 
Rakka ryusui, in this present volume. 
10 Kazimiera J. Cottam, Boleslaw Limanowski: A Study in Socialism and Nationalism 
(New York, 1978), pp. 295-296; Fountain 1980, pp. 119-120. Fountain's account of 
Dmowski's expenses is somewhat perplexing. It is unlikely that Akashi would have given 
Dmowski a letter of introduction to Kodama but not provided any funds for his voyage. 
" Lerski 1959, pp. 85-87. 
12 Nihon gaikö monjo, 1904, No 2, pp. 576-579. 
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Jozef Pilsudski (middle). 
'3 From K. (no date), Nichirosen'ekiniokeru finrandojin oyobi pörandojinno 
taidokankei zassan, 5.2.15.13, GS. 
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decision reflected an element of Japanese diplomatic and strategic caution. There 
were some basic obstacles to an alliance between the Poles and Japan: Japan 
required the quickest possible termination of the war, while the Poles would be 
glad to see it prolonged; both nations were remote from each other geographi-
cally and politically, and they had no direct economic relations.14 Moreover, 
Poland had been partitioned into three parts and had no official diplomatic 
channels. 
In August 1904 the General Staff ordered Akashi not to give the Russian op-
position groups any aid for an armed uprising. In October it repeated those ord-
ers. t5 In July 1904 the General Staff wanted to support only those local activi-
ties that could directly influence military developments in Manchuria: disrup-
tion of the Russian army in the Far East by encouraging the surrender of Poles 
and sabotaging the Trans-Siberian railway. At this point in time Dmowski's plan 
dovetailed with the views of the General Staff, which became greatly interested 
in the prospect of armed uprisings and the revolutionary movement in Russia 
only after the Battle of Mukden (March 1905) demonstrated that Japan could 
no longer maintain military superiority in Manchuria. 
An Ambivalent Response from the General Staff  
Zilliacus wrote in his memoirs that he suggested to Akashi that cooperation among 
the opposition parties against the Tsarist regime was feasible and proposed holding 
a joint conference. Akashi considered Zilliacus' proposal interesting but imprac-
ticable. He promised Zilliacus, however, that he would write to Tokyo and urged 
him to establish secret connections with opposition leaders. Akashi later obtained 
authority to give all kind of aid including money.16 According to Rakka ryusui,  
Zilliacus showed Akashi a plan for uniting the opposition parties at the begin-
ning of March, then made contact with well-known opposition parties, and re-
quested money to print written appeals.' 
It can be inferred from both these sources that the General Staff received in-
formation from Akashi and became interested in a plan for the united opposi-
tion movement in March. It is unlikely that the General Staff gave its whole-
hearted support to this plan at the time when it received the information from 
Akashi. Probably it permitted him to ascertain to what extent the possibility of 
realization existed. On 17 June 1904, 9,000 yen was remitted to Akashi as a re- 
16 Lerski 1959, pp. 86-87. 
15 Vice Chief of the General Staff, Nagaoka Gaishi, Tokyo, to the Military Attaché to 
Germany, Oi Kikutarö, Berlin, 15 August 1904, Santsutsuduri [Communication Papers 
of the General Staff] August 1904, Daihon'ei, Nichirosen'eki, M37-1, BT; Telegram 5 in 
this volume. 
16 
 Zilliacus 1920, pp. 101-108. 
'' See Rakka ryusui in this volume. 
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serve fund.18 Apparently the cost of written appeals was paid to Zilliacus and 
the rest of it was spent as research expenses. Akashi and Zilliacus travelled around 
Europe and met many opposition leaders after late June.19 This visit proved im-
portant to Akashi's efforts to promote cooperation between Japan and opposi-
tion groups. 
Akashi was now convinced of the possibility of successful cooperation among 
the opposition parties. On 21 August he requested 100,000 yen to subsidy Zillia-
cus'  plan. The General Staff approved his request on 31 August, but ordered 
Utsunomiya to assist Akashi only to the extent that he was sure Zilliacus' plan 
would be carried out.20 The General Staff wanted more than mere cooperation 
among the opposition groups. Violent demonstrations and other disturbances 
should follow from this new cooperation. 
The joint conference among the opposition parties against the Tsarist regime 
was held in Paris from 30 September to 5 October 1904. But little progress was 
made from the Japanese point of view. It was decided only to publish a joint 
declaration and to establish communication centres among these parties in St 
Petersburg and Copenhagen. Each party promised to hold demonstrations, but 
the conference produced no united action. Nevertheless, the parties closely relat-
ed to the Socialist Revolutionary Party as well as the left wing of the Russian 
liberals participated in the declaration and small-scale armed demonstrations oc-
curred in Poland and Georgia in November.21  
However, these results certainly fell short of the General Staff's expectations.  
Zilliacus stressed in his report on the Paris conference that arms would be neces-
sary for protection against retaliation by the Tsarist government following demon-
strations.22 Akashi appealed to the General Staff for two or three million yen, 
probably at Zilliacus' request. But the Staff refused, and even prohibited him 
from spending the remainder of the 100,000 yen which had been remitted, stipulat-
ing that he might spend it only for raising demonstrations in Russia.23  
As had been the case prior to the Paris conference, the General Staff wanted 
to subsidy only the united front and opposed support to a few parties.24 Given 
its point of departure it is no wonder that the Staff stopped giving any aid as 
soon as it concluded that there was no possibility of instigating demonstrations. 
This was especially logical, given the cutback in the military budget. Despite the 
18 See telegram 1 in this volume. 
19 See Rakka ryfisui in this volume. 
20 See telegrams 3 and 4 in this volume. 
21 Zilliacus' report on the Paris conference, enclosed in: Motono Ichirö, Minister to 
Franee, Paris, to Komura, Tokyo, 23 November 1904 (diplomatic report No 34), and Moto-
no, Paris, to Komura, Tokyo, 14 October 1904 (telegram No 213), Kakkoku naisei kankei 
zassan (rokokunobu) [Inner Affairs of Russia], 1.6.3.2-9, GS; Zilliacus, 1920, pp. 129-141. 
See Rakka ryusui and telegram 6 in this volume. 
22 See Zilliacus' report (Note 21). 
23 See telegram 5 in this volume. 
24 See telegram 3 in this volume. 
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Staff's directive, Akashi continued to give some subsidies for activities of oppo-
sition parties after the Paris Conference. In fact, there were armed demonstra-
tions in Poland and in Georgia, though only on a small scale.25 
A Reluctant Foreign Ministry 
On 21 November 1904, the Japanese Minister to Sweden, Akizuki Sachio, re-
quested that Komura remit a subsidy for sabotaging the Trans-Siberian railway 
and instigating revolts in cooperation with Akashi.26 This request suggests that 
Akashi tried to change the General Staff's policy by working through Akizuki 
and Komura, i.e. through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But before this ap-
proach could succeed, it was necessary for the opposition groups to widen their 
appeal in order to play a more active role. With the fall of the Port Arthur on 
2 January and Bloody Sunday, the massacre in St Petersburg on 22 January 1905, 
as turning points, the Russian Revolution of 1905 burst into flames. 
On 3 January, Akizuki notified Komura that the opportunity for a positive 
decision on aid had presented itself. He requested about 200,000 yen at once and 
an enormous extra sum to use once the situation became clear.27 On 25 Janu-
ary, soon after Bloody Sunday, Akizuki again asked Komura to remit 400,000 
yen immediately and 250,000 yen after one month. He also wrote that the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs should make allowance for as much as one million yen.2s 
According to Akizuki and Akashi (a) the Russian people's dissatisfaction was 
increasing. The loss of Port Arthur had contributed to the anti-war and anti-
Tsarist movement, and there were strikes and demonstrations. (b) The Russian 
government suppressed a peaceful demonstration by arms (Bloody Sunday). (c) 
The opposition parties intended to take up arms, but a lack of money, arms, 
and equipment prevented them from taking advantage of the current situation. 
(d) Stability might return and Japan could miss an opportunity unless the oppo-
sition groups could take action. (e) Japan should quickly give aid to initiate an 
uprising. (f) Those parties which would receive Japanese aid were reliable. 
In response to Akizuki's and Akashi's assesment of the situation, Komura or-
dered every Japanese minister in Europe to collect information about the Rus-
sian revolutionary movement after the fall of Port Arthur.29 In the telegram of 
25 See Note 21. Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray (Stan-
ford, 1988), pp. 153-154, 157. 
26 See telegram 7 in this volume. 
27 See telegram 8 in this volume; Futrell 1967, p. 17. 
28 See telegram 10 in this volume; Futrell 1967, p. 17. 
29 Komura, Tokyo, to Makino, Vienna, 4 January 1905, (telegram No I), Komura, 
Tokyo, to Mihashi Nobukata, Minister to Holland, The Hague, 9 January 1905 (telegram 
No 9), Nichirosen'ekikankei teikokunioite mitteishashiyö zakken [Affairs Related to the 
Usage of Spies during the Russo-Japanese War], 5.2.7.3, GS. Also see telegram 9 in this 
volume. 
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7 January, Komura replied to Akizuki that it was not clear what would happen 
in Russia following an armed uprising and its influence on Germany and Austria 
had to be taken into account.30 On 26 January, Komura posed the question of 
whether or not an armed uprising resulting from Japanese aid would grow into 
a large-scale revolt or a revolution.31 The fact that he sent these telegrams to 
Sweden means that Komura was not yet willing to make a decision on Akizuki's 
request. 
By March 1905 all ministers to Europe had sent their replies to Komura. Ac-
cording to them the opposition movements had rapidly grown in strength.32 But 
there was a difference of opinion over the prospect of the development of revo-
lution, and over the question of whether the opposition groups could create con-
ditions without Japanese aid that would prevent the Russian government from 
continuing the war. 
On the one hand, Akizuki stressed to Komura that, without Japanese aid, the 
opposition groups could not organize an armed uprising or that it would be on 
a small scale even if they could.33 The Japanese Minister to France, Motono 
Ichirö, who probably had close relations to Akashi since the latter had served 
in the Japanese legation in Paris as Military Attache, also stressed on 13 February 
that it was necessary to make the most of unrest in Russia, and recommended 
that Komura permit the subsidy of 450,000 yen which Akashi requested of the 
General Staff on 12 February as quickly as possible.34 
On the other hand, the Minister to Austria, Makino Nobuaki, who would later 
play an active role as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Home Minister, 
and would hold other important posts up to the Second World War, estimated 
that a revolution would break out in Russia soon because strikes and demonstra-
tions had occurred continuously in various regions after Bloody Sunday. Con-
sequently, he doubted whether the Russian government would be able to con-
tinue the war in the Far East.35 
Makino's reasoning apparently carried weight with Komura. On 7 March, 
Komura notified Akizuki that "The home government has decided to adopt a 
policy of nonintervention so long as conditions in Russia do not change. s36 In 
short, he refused to grant the aid. 
3° See telegram 9 in this volume; John Albert White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Jap-
anese War (Princeton, 1964), p. 140. 
31 See telegram 11 in this yolume. 
32 Nihon gaikö monjo, 1905, No 2, pp. 575-633. 
33 Nihon gaikö monjo, 1905, No 2, pp. 602-603, 605-606, 628-629. See telegrams 
12 and 16 in this volume. 
34 
 See telegram 13 in this volume. 
3s Nihon gaikö monjo, 1905, No 2, pp. 598-600, 607-608, 613-614; Makino, Vien-
na, to Komura, Tokyo, 5 February 1905, (diplomatic report No 3), Kakkoku naisei kankei 
zassan (rokokunobu), 1.6.3.2-9, GS; Roshia oyobi pörandono kakumeiundöno genjö [The 
Present Revolutionary Movement in Russia and Poland], Makino Nobuaki monjo (shorui) 
[Makino Nobuaki Papers], 273-14, KS; Telegram 15 in this volume. 
36 See telegram 17 in this volume. 
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One possible explanation for Komura's opposition to monetary aid and the 
plan for sabotaging the Trans-Siberian railway37 was Japan's weak position in 
international politics. Komura was probably anxious about the Great Powers' 
attitude toward Japan if the aid were disclosed. The root of this anxiety was 
the Japanese declaration at the beginning of the war that the war zone had to 
be restricted to the Chinese territory occupied by Russia and the sea area between 
Japan and China.38 To give aid to the opposition parties in Europe would be 
a violation of this declaration of intent and of international law. If the monetary 
aid were to come to light, Russia could easily spread anti-Japanese propaganda. 
This might antagonize not only Germany and Austria, who were concerned with 
Polish affairs, but also the other Great Powers, who were fearful of a socialist 
revolution. It is not surprising that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opposed such 
risky involvement, especially when there was the possibility of revolution in Russia 
without Japanese assistance. 
The General Staff Decides for Aid 
After the Paris Conference of October 1904, Akashi encouraged the opposition 
parties to begin armed uprisings in Russia and requested huge subsidies from 
the General Staff, but his request was quickly rejected. Thereafter, Akashi ap-
proached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through Akizuki and Motono. Con-
comitantly, he requested reconsideration by the General Staff by having Japa-
nese ministers and military attachés in Europe send information about the oppo-
sition movement. The General Staff seems to have maintained interest in these 
opposition groups, even if it refused to respond to the request. 
In the Far East, the loss of manpower and material resources during the bat-
tles for Port Arthur was much greater than the Japanese General Staff had an-
ticipated. Consequently, it had to restrict military operations in Manchuria. A 
shortage of soldiers and ammunition after the Battle of Sandepu (26-29 Janu-
ary 1905) posed a more serious problem prior to the Battle of Mukden.39 Against 
this background, the General Staff must have seriously considered ways to weaken 
the Russian military capacity. In fact, the Staff attempted to demoralize Russian 
soldiers by distributing pamphlets written about disturbances in European Rus-
sia.40 
Inaba C. 1984, p. 20.  
Koraura gaiköshi [A History of Komura's Diplomacy], Vol. 1, edited by the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo, 1953), pp. 389-393. 
39 Coe Shinobu, Nichirosensöno gunjishiteki kenkyll [Studies of the Military History of 
the Russo-Japanese War], (Tokyo, 1976), pp. 401-449; Nichirosensöshino kenkyll [Studies 
of the History of the Russo-Japanese War], edited by Shinobu Seizaburö and Nakayama 
Jiichi (Tokyo, 1972), p. 275, 284. 
4° Nagaoka to Chinda Sutemi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, 14 February 1905 
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Yamagata, Chief of the Japanese General 
Staff. 
More importantly, the Staff ordered Akashi to get one of the opposition par-
ties to sabotage bridges of the Trans-Siberian railway at the end of January. During 
1904 the General Staff had restricted aid and had required Akashi to report over-
head expenses for the sabotage. Yet when he requested 40,000 yen on 6 February 
1905, the Staff gave its ready consent.41 It is not clear which opposition party 
Akashi commissioned to undertake this activity, but the Socialist Revolutionary 
Party seems the logical choice. On 12 February Akashi telegraphed that the plan 
to sabotage the Trans-Siberian railway had been postponed temporarily in order 
to destroy factories producing railway parts in various places.' Given the high 
cost of recent military campaigns it is not surprising that the General Staff decided 
to adopt Akashi's proposal to finance the Russian revolutionary movement even 
if this strategy might cause diplomatic problems if detected. 
Akashi's telegram of 12 February to the Chief of the General Staff, Yamagata 
Aritomo, in which he requested 440,000-450,000 yen in aid for the opposition 
parties, was immediately forwarded to Komura by the General Staff.43  
(Home paper of the General Staff No 423-2), and 7 pamphlets written in Russian, Kak-
koku naisei kankei zassan (rokokunobu), 1.6.3.2-9, GS. 
41 Nagaoka to Nagao Tsunekichi, 27 January 1905, Nagaoka to Akashi, 5, 6, and 8 
February, Akashi to Nagaoka, 6 February 1905, Santsutsuduri, Daihon'ei, Nichirosen'eki, 
M38-1, BT. 
42 See telegram 13 in this volume. 
47 See telegram 13 in this yolume. 
79 
Why did the Staff send this telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? The 
Staff could pay that amount from its own secret funds if it considered the situa-
tion desperate enough. It was not necessary to send the telegram to the Ministry. 
The telegram was probably sent because the Staff was pessimistic about the risks 
involved in giving such aid and wanted the agreement of the Ministry. Also, Akashi 
had requested support for the aid from the Ministry through Akizuki and Moto-
no. This could be interpreted to mean that the aid was, in Akashi's thinking, 
such a serious matter that the Staff would not be able to act by itself. 
Futrell emphasizes that the monetary aid was approved at the end of April, 
since Rakka ryusui describes the subsidy as having arrived in Paris at the end 
of April 44 But his assertion that the granting of permission for the aid coincided 
with that of the arrival of the subsidy is unfounded. There are three facts that 
cast doubt on Futrell's interpretation: first, a second joint opposition confer-
ence was held in Geneva from 2 to 9 April. The conference decided to organize 
an armed uprising in Russia, and the concrete preparations for an uprising in 
June were begun.45 One can assume that Akashi had been informed of a posi-
tive General Staff response by the Geneva conference and had promised Zillia-
cus to pay reserve funds. Secondly, one can read between the lines of Akashi's 
telegram of 12 April that the preparation for purchasing arms and explosives 
had already begun.' 
Thirdly, there is a letter from Zilliacus in Copenhagen to Akashi in Paris on 
25 April, published in a pamphlet in which Akashi's activities were exposed by 
the Russian government, saying that Zilliacus had used up all the funds Akashi 
had granted.47 Zilliacus also wrote in his memoirs that he entered into a busi-
ness relation with a Jewish merchant in Hamburg to purchase armaments.' One 
can conclude that Akashi received permission from the Staff to give aid, and 
that Zilliacus started to purchase arms in Hamburg secretly and had spent all 
the money by 25 April. Since all of this required time, it is reasonable to assume 
that Staff permission was granted before the beginning of April. 
The outcome of the Battle of Mukden probably influenced the decision to give 
aid. One day after the occupation of Mukden on 10 March, a policy operational 
plan, of which the primary object was to hasten peace and to establish a strong 
position for the peace conference, was submitted to the Chief of the General Staff 
by his staff. The headquarters of the Manchurian Army also sent a similar pro-
posal on 13 March. 
As a result of discussions of the plan, Yamagata submitted, with the consent 
of Minister of War Terauchi Masatake, a memorandum entitled Seisen ryöryaku 
gairon [A Joint Outline of Governmental and Military Strategy] to Prime Minis- 
44 Futrell 1967, pp. 18-19. 
45 Kujala 1980, pp. 260-261. 
46 See telegram 22 in this volume. 
47 Iznanka revoliutsii 1906, pp. 10-11. 
48 
 Zilliacus 1920, pp. 146-147. 
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ter Katsura Tarö, Finance Minister Sone Arasuke, and Komura. The memoran-
dum emphasized that it would be impossible to weaken Russia militarily. Conse-
quently, the government should take diplomatic steps to hasten peace and the 
army should conduct the necessary operations to this end. Significantly, the sug-
gestion in the memorandum that the Russian government would be interested 
in peace was based on the assumption that it could not continue the war because 
of extensive domestic unrest. The memorandum then emphasized that Japan 
would not have to wait long for such conditions in Russia.49 The General Staff 
apparently anticipated disorder there. 
An operational policy based on achieving peace by nonmilitary means was 
decided on by the Imperial Headquarters, the liaison.organ between the General 
Staff and the Naval General Staff, on 30 March, and by the Cabinet Council 
on 8 April.50 When one looks at the roles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the General Staff in the granting of permission, it is important to point out that 
some of Akashi's and Utsunomiya's telegrams after 30 March to the Staff about 
an armed uprising are contained in the archives of the Ministry.$' These tele-
grams were sent to the Ministry by the General Staff. Whether or not the Staff 
needed the consent of the Ministry, an understanding had emerged in favour of 
the policy that Akashi had previously advocated in vain. On 28 March, the Chief 
of the Staff of Manchurian Army at that time, Kodama, visited Tokyo secretly. 
The decision-making process cannot be reconstructed in full, but probably Koda-
ma made the proposal and the aid for an armed uprising was permitted tacitly 
by Katsura and Komura. 
A letter from Zilliacus to T. (maybe Th. Homén) on 19 March 1905 implies 
that Zilliacus had already received Japanese approval of aid from Akashi at that 
time.52 This suggests that the aid had already been approved in the middle of 
March. However, telegrams from Makino and Inoue Junnosuke, Minister to Ger-
many, dated 14 March 1905,53 stated that disturbances were spreading in Rus-
sia and, therefore, the Russian government could not dispatch troops to the Far 
East. Makino's telegram was forwarded to the Emperor, the Genrö, and the army 
leadership. 
By sending this telegram to them Komura perhaps wanted to emphasize that 
current disturbances in Russia rendered the aid unnecessary. In other words, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs still remained opposed to aid in mid-March. Yet ap- 
49 Furuya Tetsuo, Nichirosensö [The Russo-Japanese War], (Tokyo, 1966), pp. 
160-165; Shinobu and Nakayama 1972, p. 385; Seisen ryoryaku gairon, Katsura Tarö 
kankei monjo [Katsura Tarö Papers], Vol. 19, 109-3, KS. 
5° Furuya 1%6, pp. 164-165. 
51 See telegrams 21, 22, and 23 in this volume. 
52 Zilliacus to T. (perhaps Th. Homén), 19 March 1905, J.N. Reuter Letter Collection 
XXIII, Åbo Akademis Bibliotek, Turku/Abo. I am indebted to Antti Kujala for bringing 
this letter to my attention. 
53 See telegrams 19 and 20 in this volume. 
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6 
proval for substantial aid had already been given to Akashi around 13 March. 
If the army, which had the right of direct appeal to the Emperor, really wanted 
to grant the aid, it did not necessarily have to obtain permission from the govern-
ment before acting. Perhaps it decided to act and to get the permission later. 
On the basis of available archival material one can conclude that the practical 
decision on aid was probably made in mid-March but that a consensus among 
Japanese policymakers emerged only at the end of the month. 
Prospects for Peace 
The plan for an armed uprising in Russia began in March 1905. Akashi, Zillia-
cus, and some other opposition leaders started purchasing huge arms supplies 
and transport ships, and the Socialist Revolutionary Party began preparing for 
receipt of those arms and an armed uprising in St Petersburg. But the purchase 
and receipt of arms made slow progress.54 Akashi telegraphed on 7 May that it 
would be difficult to meet the June deadline for the uprising.55  Thereafter the 
plan was changed. At the end of July Akashi telegraphed Komura, who was visit-
ing the United States to conduct peace negotiations with Russia at that time, that 
the arms unloading would be completed on 25 August.' But this episode end-
ed in disaster when the John Grafton, the arms transport ship, ran ashore near 
Jakobstad (Pietarsaari), a small Finnish town situated on the Gulf of Bothnia. 
The crew blew her up on 8 September.57 
There is no known record of how Japanese policymakers evaluated the plan 
for an armed uprising in St Petersburg after making the decision to grant aid. 
The General Staff probably anticipated success after sending subsidies to Akashi 
for direct action.58 Nevertheless, Japan cut off the flow of aid in the middle of 
August, immediately before peace was agreed upon.59 As the prospects for peace 
grew, the General Staff must have decided to discontinue Akashi's activities in 
order to prevent possible detection. On 11 September, soon after the conclusion 
54 Kujala 1980, pp. 261-262; Inaba Chiharu, "1905 nen, peteruburuku busöhöki kei-
kaku" IA Plan for an Uprising in St Petersburg in 1905], Waseda, kenkviito jissen, No 
6 (1985), pp. 59-64. 
55 See telegram 23 in this volume. 
Tachibana Koichirö, Military Attache to the United States, Washington D.C., to 
Komura, New York, 31 July 1905 (A note written at the Arlington [hotel]), Kakkoku naisei 
kankei zassan (rokokunobu), 1.6.3.2-9, GS. 
5' Michael Futrell, Northern Underground: Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Trans-
port and Communications through Scandinavia and Finland 1863-1917 (London, 1963), 
p. 77; Fält 1976, p. 233: Kujala 1980, p. 273; Rakka ryusui in this volume. 
58 The General Staff forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs many telegrams 
describing conditions in the Russian Empire. See Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan 
(rokokunobu), 1.6.3.2-9, GS. 
Kujala 1980, p. 272. 
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of the peace negotiations, the General Staff ordered Akashi to return home.6°  
The Foreign Ministry, which was responsible for negotiating peace, had sec-
ond thoughts about subversive activities in Russia. In short, the Ministry became 
interested in supporting the Russian opposition movement following the Battle 
of Mukden, but it remained uneasy about the attitude of the Russian govern-
ment towards the opposition and the trend among the other powers and cau-
tiously waited for an opportunity to make peace.' Victory at the Battle of the 
Tsushima Strait (27 and 28 May 1905) brought this opportunity. The Foreign 
Ministry judged it inadvisable to wait any longer for the Russian peace proposals 
and asked President Theodore Roosevelt to use his influence to mediate with Rus-
sia,62 
Conclusion 
Despite the initial opposition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Staff 
provided opposition groups with extensive monetary aid for disturbances in Russia. 
Nevertheless, the plan for an armed uprising in St Petersburg ended in failure. 
Viewed from a Japanese perspective, the General Staff's decision did not pay 
off and the subsidy failed to affect the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. It 
is probable, however, that Japanese aid influenced the activities of the opposi-
tion parties in the Russian Empire. Armed demonstrations in Poland and Geor-
gia soon after the Paris conference as well as demonstrations and strikes by the 
workers and revolts by the peasants within the Russian Empire through 1905 can 
perhaps be attributed in part to Japanese aid even if all the Russian revolution-
ary movements themselves were prompted by domestic considerations. 
Historically, the Akashi-inspired scheme to defeat Russia from within represents 
the first and the most ambitious Japanese attempt to intervene in the domestic 
affairs of a European country. The Japanese goal was limited, however, to win-
ning the war. Neither the government nor the army cared about the fate of the 
opposition groups. The army used them as one uses mercenaries, providing eco-
nomic support for the sake of military victory. It broke off relations with the 
opposition groups and stopped giving them subsidies when the war drew to a 
close, and called Akashi home soon after the peace was concluded. 
It is hardly surprising that Japan cut off aid on the eve of a peace settlement. 
Japan had no desire to continue the military conflict in Manchuria after its mili-
tary weaknesses had become apparent. Once the peace treaty was concluded, Japan 
adopted a more cordial policy towards Russia. Both parties sought to maintain 
60 Komori 1928, I, p. 203. 
6  Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan (rokokunobu), 1.6.3.2-9, GS; Nihon gaikö monjo, 
Nichirosensö, V (Tokyo, 1960), p. 266, 268, 272. 
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 Shinobu and Nakayama 1972, pp. 384-389. 
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the new status quo in East Asia, and the Russo-Japanese convention of 1907 con-
firmed a new identity of interests of the two powers. The next time Japan be-
came closely involved in Russian opposition policies was prior to and during the 
Second World War.63  
63 Japan, particularly the army, considered the Soviet Union the most dangerous poten-
tial enemy before and during the Second World War. The General Staff, therefore, em-
ployed Polish intelligence officers in Manchuria to break Russian codes. Onodera Makoto, 
the Japanese Military Attaché to Sweden (1941-1945), took Michael Rybikowski, one of 
the leaders of Polish military intelligence, under his protection and collected much impor-
tant information such as the Yalta agreement in February 1945 concerning Russia's attack 
on Japan. According to Onodera Yuriko, Makoto's wife, he also gave 300,000 Swedish 
kronor for the Stella Polaris operation, the secret plan in 1944 to transfer the Finnish mili-
tary intelligence unit to Sweden. At that time, Onodera obtained deciphered Russian codes 
from Finns and sent them to Tokyo.  
Reino Hallamaa, chief of the intelligence department of the Finnish General Staff, had 
established contact with Department II (Intelligence) of the Japanese General Staff as ear-
ly as the Winter War (the war between Finland and the Soviet Union, 30 November 1939 
— 13 March 1940). After the Winter War, the Japanese gave the Finns a lot of Russian 
five-numbered military messages collected between Khabarovsk and Vladiyostok in the sum-
mer of 1940. With these messages the Finns were able to break the Soviet codes. The Depart-
ment Il gave some monetary aid to Finnish intelligence officers in the spring of 1941 and 
dispatched Hirose Eiichi, who had once worked at the cryptographic section, as Assistant 
Military Attaché to Finland. He arrived in Finland in June 1941, after Germany attacked 
Russia and Finland declared war on the Soviet Union. Hirose worked with the Finnish Naval 
intelligence section and showed to the Finns the book Istoriia Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi 
partii (bol'shevikov), kratkii kurs 1938 [History of the Russian Communist Party (short 
course of 1938)], upon which the Russian additive numbers of codes had been based. Later, 
Hirose attempted to decipher Russian codes in cooperation with Reino Hallamaa, Erkki 
Pale, an expert cryptographer, and other Finnish intelligence officers. Okubo Toshijirö, 
Tairo angökaidokunikansuru söshi narabini senkuntönikansuru shiryö [Materials Related 
to the Cryptography of Russian Codes], (Manshu, Shusenjino nissosen, 28), BT; Onodera 
Yuriko, Barutokaino hotorinite [Memoirs of a Military Attaché's Wife during the Pacific 
War], (Tokyo, 1985), pp. 169-175; Inaba's interview with Hirose Eiichi in Tokyo on 8 May 
1987, and interyiew with Erkki Pale in Helsinki on 29 August 1988. 
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Antti Kujala 
March Separately — 
Strike Together 
The Paris and Geneva Conferences Held by 
the Russian and Minority Nationalities' 
Revolutionary and Opposition Parties, 
1904-1905 
The strategy of "Getrennt marschieren — vereint schlagen", of marching separate-
ly but striking together, was advocated by two leading Russian Social Democrats, 
G.V. Plekhanov and V.I. Lenin, to their country's revolutionary movement at 
the beginning of the 1905 revolution as the one most likely to bring about the 
changes hoped for on the Left.' In practice, however, only the first half of the 
slogan came to be followed. The revolutionary parties ultimately proved incapa-
ble of dealing Tsarism the fatal blow. Too much at odds with each other to be 
able to agree on a common approach, they proved unequal to the challenge of 
developing any real measure of coordinated action, even in those fields where 
the parties concerned were sufficiently unanimous about the need for such action. 
(G.V. Plekhanov,) "Vroz' idti, vmeste bit"', Iskra No 87 10 February 1905 (o.s.), p. 
1; V.I. Lenin, "0 boevom soglashenii dlia vosstaniia", Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (PSS), 
izd. 5-e, T. 9 (Moskva, 1960), p. 280. — Throughout the article the Gregorian, or new-
style calendar is used, unless otherwise indicated old style (o.s.). To convert dates from 
the Julian to the Gregorian calendar, thirteen days should be added. 
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The conferences organised by the revolutionary and opposition parties active 
within the Russian Empire and held in Paris in 1904 and Geneva the following 
year have attracted relatively little attention,' despite the range of participants 
who took part in them or were involved in their preparation, including Lenin, 
Plekhanov, Martov, Gapon, Chernov, Azef, Miliukov, Struve, Dmowski, and 
Rosa Luxemburg. The simple fact that these figures, together with the parties 
they represented, were conspicuously more successful in acting independently than 
jointly must go some way towards explaining this apparent oversight. The lack 
of coverage given to the conferences might perhaps be forgivable if they had failed 
to spawn any subsequent action. As this was clearly not the case, the origins and 
consequences of these two conferences surely merit a more thorough analysis than 
they have hitherto received. 
Accounts written by the various Finns who took part in events at the time place 
great emphasis on the initiative of the Finnish constitutionalist opposition and 
Konni Zilliacus in organising the Paris conference. The Russian and overall im-
perial context of the conference is often overshadowed in these accounts by the 
writers' concentration on the domestic issue of whether the responsibility for the 
disintegration of the Finnish opposition which took place around the same time 
lay with Zilliacus or the moderate constitutionalists.3 
For a Russian perspective on the two conferences we have to look to the ac-
counts, admittedly partisan, written by the Social Democrat Iu. 0. Martov, the 
liberal P.N.Miliukov, and the Socialist Revolutionary V.M. Chernov.4 Miliu- 
- The best surveys of events from the Russian standpoint can be found in the follow-
ing: Shmuel Galai, The Liberation Movement in Russia 1900-1905 (Cambridge, 1973), 
pp. 214-218 (the Paris conference); Alexander Fischer, Russische Sozialdemokratie und 
bewaffneter Aufstand im Jahre 1905, Frankfurter Abhandlungen zur osteuropäischen 
Geschichte 2 (Wiesbaden, 1967), pp. 103-107 (the Geneva conference). For a Finnish per-
spective, see Olavi K. Fält, "Collaboration between Japanese Intelligence and the Finnish 
Underground during the Russo-Japanese War", Asian Profile, Vol. 4 (1976), pp. 216-222, 
228-230. — The main points of my present study were published earlier in: Antti Kujala, 
"Lenin, Venäjän vallankumousliike ja Suomi 1898-1905", in: Lenin ja Suomi, I (Hel-
sinki, 1987), pp. 73-106. 
3 Konni Zilliaeus, Från ofärdstid och oroliga år: Politiska minnen, I (Helsingfors, 1919), 
pp. 131-149;  Zilliacus 11 1920, pp. 5-48; Adolf Törngren, Med ryska samhällsbyggare 
och statsmän åren 1904-1905 (Helsingfors, 1929), pp. 93-140. The latter of these is the 
best description of events surrounding the preparations of the Paris conference produced 
by a Finnish contemporary of the time, but, like many other accounts of its type, is very 
much concerned with the impact of events on Finnish interests. Zilliacus' memoirs are much 
less precise than Törngren's, but they stand out from the latter's and those of many others 
on account of the wider imperial perspective that their author brings to the issues involved. 
J. Marlow, Geschichte der russischen Sozialdemokratie (Berlin, 1926), pp. 93-95; P. 
Miliukov, "Rokovye gody, (Iz vospominanii)", Russkiia Zapiski (June 1938), pp. 122-127; 
P.N. Miliukov, Vospominaniia (1859-1917), 1 (New York, 1955); pp. 242-245; V. M. 
Chernov, Pered burei: Vospominaniia (New York, 1953), pp. 205-213; V. Lenuar (= V.M. 
Chernov), "Lichnyia vospominaniia o G. Gapone", in: Za kulisami okhrannago otdeleniia, 
sost. A.B. (Berlin, 1910), pp. 157-164. 
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kov's description of events, in particular, is thoroughly apologetic in tone, no 
doubt because the revelation of Zilliacus' involvement with the Japanese' and 
the unmasking of another participant, Evno Azef, as a spy in the employ of the 
Russian secret police' cast an embarrassing light on the Paris conference. When 
the Azef case came up for discussion in the Russian State Duma in 1909, the 
Prime Minister, P.A. Stolypin, announced from the dispatch box that Azef, in 
his secret report, had named Chernov, P.B. Struve, and Miliukov as having par-
ticipated in the conference. This information, according to the minutes of the 
Duma debate, was greeted with shouted interjections from the centre parties, com-
plimenting Miliukov and his associates on the appropriateness of the company 
they kept.' These taunting remarks "Nice company, nice friends!" were almost 
certainly still ringing in Miliukov's ears when he later came to write his memoirs. 
The Paris conference, therefore, aroused considerable political controversy at 
the time. The contrast with the modern interpretation put on that period of Rus-
sian history and which consigns the conference to a footnote reference or two, 
or to the dustbin of history, to use Trotsky's well-known phrase, could hardly 
be greater. 
The dominant interpretation in research to date has been that the Paris con-
ference was first and foremost a personal triumph for Konni Zilliacus. In line 
with this, writers on the major Russian opposition parties and their leaders have 
not shown themselves especially interested in the events leading up to the hold-
ing of the conferences In contrast, in a number of studies dealing with the Em-
pire's minority nationalities and their socialist parties, attention has quite rightly 
been drawn to the fact that the Finnish opposition was by no means the sole po-
litical force which tried to establish some measure of meaningful cooperation 
between the various opposition and revolutionary parties active within the Em-
pire in 1904. A number of other attempts at fostering joint political activity were 
indeed made,9 but the greater success of Zilliacus' initiative served to bury them. 
The Geneva conference has generally been seen in recent studies as a behind-
the-scenes conspiracy directed by Zilliacus and his Japanese confederates, aimed 
5 Iznanka revoliutsii: Vooruzhennoe vozstanie v Rossii na iaponskiia sredstva (S.-Peter-
burg, 1906). 
6 B. Nikolaevskii, Istoriia odnogo predatelia: Terroristy i politicheskaia politsiia (Ber-
lin, 1932). 
Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Tretii sozyv, Stenograficheskie otchety, 1909 g., sessija 
vtoraja, chast' 11, zasedanie 50 (S.-Peterburg, 1909), pp. 1426-1427. 
Richard Pipes, Struve: Liberal on the Left, 1870-1905, Russian Research Center 
Studies 64 (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 363-365; Galai 1973, pp. 214-216. See also 
Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray (Stanford, 1988), pp. 48-50. 
Apart from these brief treatments, little else on the subject exists. 
" Wladyslaw Pobög-Malinowski, Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski, 1864-1945, I 
(Paris, 1953), p. 126, 130; Henry J. Tobias, The Jewish Bund in Russia: From Its Origins 
to 1905 (Stanford, 1972), pp. 281-282; Georg W. Strobel, Die Partei Rosa Luxemburgs,  
Lenin und die SPD: Der polnische "europäische" Internationalismus in der russischen Sozial-
demokratie (Wiesbaden, 1974), pp. 215-217. 
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not only at aiding the revolutionary cause in Russia but also Japanese war 
aims.10  Some scholars, it is true, have pointed out that the Russian revolution-
ary parties, as well as a number of European socialist figures, also contributed 
their share towards the staging of the conference or to attempts to prevent its 
being held.11 
Zilliacus' central role in convening the Paris conference cannot be seriously 
disputed. He was also involved, albeit indirectly, in the efforts to organise a fol-
low-up conference during the spring of 1905. A study of the events leading up 
to these conferences reveals, however, that they cannot be solely considered as 
the fruit of a conspiracy on the part of Zilliacus and of the Japanese alone. The 
notion of developing greater cooperation between the revolutionary and opposi-
tion parties was discussed in a number of quarters during 1904 and 1905, and 
was the subject of various moves to achieve it. The accepted idea of Zilliacus'  
dominant role in organising the Geneva conference could, therefore, bear some 
revision. 
The Finnish Opposition's "Russian Studies" — 1903 
From 1899 onwards the Russian authorities embarked on a series of policies aimed 
at integrating Finland more closely, politically and administratively, with the rest 
of the Empire. These policies were directed by and identified with the then Rus-
sian Governor-General in Finland, N.I. Bobrikov. The Finnish constitutionalist 
opposition, comprising the Swedish Party and the Young Finns, adopted a poli-  
cy of passive resistance in a bid to maintain Finland's autonomy. In the spring 
of 1903, the Tsar issued a special decree granting Bobrikov a range of extraordi-
nary powers to allow him to eliminate the opposition which had emerged. Under 
these new powers a significant number of the leaders of the constitutionalist op-
position were ordered into foreign exile.1z 
Back in the autumn of 1902, the journalist Konrad Viktor (Konni) Zilliacus  
10 Michael Futrell, Northern Underground: Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Trans-
port and Communications through Scandinavia and Finland 1863-1917 (London, 1963), 
p. 66; Fischer 1967, pp. 103-107. 
" Dietrich Geyer, "Die russische Parteispaltung im Urteil der deutschen Sozial-
demokratie 1903-1905", International Review of Social History, Vol. III (1958), pp. 
435-436; Walter Sablinsky, The Road to Bloody Sunday: Father Gapon and the St. Peters-
burg Massacre of 1905 (Princeton, 1976), pp. 296-297. 
12 On the policy of integration introduced by the imperial government in Finland, see 
Tuomo Polvinen, Valtakunta ja rajamaa: N.I. Bobrikov Suomen kenraalikuvernöörinä 
1898-1904 (Porvoo, 1984); Pertti Luntinen, F.A. Seyn: A Political Biography of a Tsarist 
Imperialist as Administrator of Finland, Studia Historica 19 (Helsinki, 1985). On the pas-
siye resistanee, see William R. Copeland, The Uneasy Alliance: Collaboration between the 
Finnish Opposition and the Russian Underground, 1899-1904, Annales Academiae Scien-
tiarum Fennicae ser. B 179 (Helsinki, 1973). 
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Konni Zilliacus.  
had publicly proposed that the Finnish constitutionalists abandon their isolationist 
attitude towards the Russian opposition movement. He argued that the aboli-
tion of the autocracy and the achievement of political freedom should be made 
the basis of a programme around which all the opposition elements across the 
Empire could rally. The various groupings within the opposition had up until 
this point been prevented from uniting their forces and working together by their 
attachment to different and often divergent social and political ideals. The Finn-
ish opposition, because of its very lack of any policy programme covering social 
issues, was, in Zilliacus' opinion, ideally suited to taking on the task of coor-
dinating the activities of opposition forces. By working together, the opposition 
groups would have a much greater chance of succeeding in their aim of over-
throwing the autocracy, than by continuing the anti-government struggle separate-
ly.13 Zilliacus' ideas, however, proved far too radical at this point to evince any 
13 (K.) Z(illiacus), "Den ryska oppositionen och Finlands framtid", Fria Ord 12 Sep-
tember 1902, pp. 3-4;  (K.) Z(illiacus), Den ryska oppositionen och Finlandsframtid (Stock-
holm, 1902). 
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1 
positive response among the Finnish constitutionalists." 
A conference of those Finns exiled abroad, together with representatives of 
the constitutionalists active within Finland, was held in Stockholm at the begin-
ning of September 1903 to consider the situation in Finland. It quickly became 
apparent that, as a result of the extension of Bobrikov's powers and the expul-
sion of leading figures in the opposition movement, the unresponsive attitude 
of the constitutionalists towards the Russian opposition began to change. While 
the moderate majority at the conference looked to the Russian zemstvo (liberal) 
party, Zilliacus and his radical supporters called for an alliance with the revolu-
tionary parties. As no agreement could be reached on this, the question was passed 
on for further discussion to a committee made up of exiles living in Stockholm." 
During the autumn of 1903, a plan emerged among the Finnish exiles in Stock-
holm for the founding of a news agency to represent the Finnish opposition.' 
At the end of November, Zilliacus decided to adapt the plan to fit in better with 
his overall strategy. His idea was that opposition forces throughout the Empire 
should set up a joint news agency which would be able to assume a coordinating 
role in organising the struggle against the government. In developing this no-
tion, he gave new life to his old dream of the Finnish constitutionalists acting 
as the catalyst to unite opposition forces across the Empire. 
Relations between the more conservative Finnish exiles and Zilliacus were 
coloured by a number of political and personal tensions and mutual suspicion.  
Zilliacus kept his most ambitious plans for uniting opposition forces secret from 
Leo Mechelin, an ex-member of the Finnish Senate, and other conservative mem-
bers of the Stockholm committee, whom he referred to pejoratively in private 
as "senators both in name and spirit".'7 
In December 1903, the Stockholm committee decided to send Zilliacus on a 
fact-finding trip around Western Europe to establish contact with the various 
Russian opposition leaders living abroad and to sound out their views on the 
minority nationalities question and other political issues. He was also to find out 
if they were willing to set up a joint news agency. Although Zilliacus was now 
accepted as a member of the committee, some of its members remained less than 
"  Copeland 1973, pp. 112-113.  
"  Ernst Estlander, Personliga hågkomster från det politiska motståndsarbetet i Finland 
ären 1901— (1905-1906), f. 155, V.M. von Born Collection, Sarvlaks arkiv (SA), Pernå;  
Lennart Gripenberg, Från ett skiftesrikt kvartsekel, Utdrag ur minnesanteckningar (1932), 
f. 157, 194-196, Valtionarkisto [National Archives]  (VA), Helsinki; Herman Gummerus,  
Konni Zilliacus: En levnadsteckning (Helsingfors, 1933), p. 116. 
16 L.  Mechelin to V.M. von Born 25 September 1903, von Born Collection, SA; Adolf  
Törngren, Från Finlands strid för rätt och frihet: Personliga upplevelser åren 1901-1914,  
Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Litteratursällskapet i Finland CCXC (Helsingfors, 1942), p. 51.  
Törngren 1942, pp. 49-51, 53-56; K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 18 November 1903, 
Arvid Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to J. Castrén 28 July 1904, Jonas Castrén Col-
lection 2, VA; K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 7 and 10 December 1903, F.V. Volkhoyskii 
Collection, Hoover Institution (HI), Stanford, copy: USA tk 18, VA.  
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completely convinced of the wisdom of relying on him. They considered him too 
independent-minded and feared that he might decide to exceed his brief and be 
tempted to present himself in the role of official representative of the Finnish 
opposition, instead of concentrating on his main task of collecting information. 
The committee's recognition of his excellent negotiating skills, nevertheless, sealed 
the choice.18 
In December, Zilliacus met the Socialist Revolutionaries E. Azef and I.A. 
Rubanovich in Paris and the anarchist P.A. Kropotkin, together with F.V. Vol-
khovskii and N.V. Chaikovskii of the Agrarian Socialist League, which had joined 
the Socialist Revolutionaries, in London, and presented his plan for setting up 
a joint news agency and for developing a more coordinated opposition strategy. 
All of these old acquaintances of Zilliacus backed his news agency proposal, agree-
ing that the Finns were ideally suited to the task of putting forward the idea of 
increased cooperation within the opposition. 
The list of the people Zilliacus met shows that he was keenest to present his 
plan to the Socialist Revolutionaries and those closely allied to them before moving 
on to approach representatives from other groupings. In fact, he was not to have 
time to meet any of the latter during the course of this trip as a result of its being 
cut short. In his report to the Stockholm committee, he gave as positive a picture 
as possible of the Socialist Revolutionaries' stand on national self-determina-
tion.'9 Thus Zilliacus sought to realise united opposition action in unanimity 
with, and according to the aspirations of, the Socialist Revolutionaries. His links 
with Volkhovskii and Chaikovskii were particularly close. 
18 K. Zilliacus to T (probably Th. Homen) 19 March 1905, J.N. Reuter Letter Collec-
tion XXIII, Åbo Akademis Bibliotek (ÅAB), Turku/Åbo; L. Gripenberg, Från ett skiftesrikt 
kvartsekel (1932), ff. 198-199, VA; Törngren 1942, pp. 51-52; Herman Gummerus, "Ak-
tivismens förhistoria: En relation ay Konni Zilliacus", Finsk Tidskrift CVI (1929), pp. 
161-162. 
'9 K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius "1903", 23 and 30 Deeember 1903 (incorrectly dated 30 
January 1904), and 6 January 1904, Neovius Colleetion, VA; K. Zilliacus to C. Mannerheim 
19 and 28 December 1903, Carl Mannerheim Papers 1, VA; Copeland 1973, pp. 151-157  
(Zilliacus did not return to London in January, as Copeland seems to assume); L.A. Rataev 
to A.A. Lopukhin 2 January 1904/20 December 1903, Okhrana Arehives, XX1 F. 1, H1 
(USA tk 18, VA). The latter letter is based on information concerning Zilliacus' travels 
provided by Azef to the Russian secret police. — It is also worth noting that Zilliacus,  
together with a couple of other Finnish eonstitutionalists, had talks with representatives 
of the Polish National League at the beginning of January in Copenhagen, during which 
the idea of a joint news ageney was presented to the Poles. See Copeland 1973, pp. 142-146; 
Alvin Marcus Fountain II, Roman Dmowski: Party, Tactics, Ideology 1895-1907, East 
European Monographs LX (New York, 1980), pp. 114-115. 
91 
The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War 
on Zilliacus' Plans 
Japan attacked Russia at the beginning of February 1904. Following the out-
break of hostilities, secret discussions were begun between a number of the Finnish 
exiles in Stockholm and the Japanese Military Attache in Stockholm, Colonel 
Akashi Motojirö, to sound out the possibility of developing some form of cooper-
ation between the Finnish opposition and the Japanese authorities. One of those 
most active in pursuing this avenue was Zilliacus.20 He was instrumental in put-
ting Japanese representatives in contact with the Polish National League (Liga 
Narodowa) during March.21  
Zilliacus was authorised by the Stockholm committee on 14 February to em-
bark on a second fact-finding trip.22  Relations between Zilliacus and a major 
part of the constitutionalist leadership, which had for some time been under con-
siderable strain, had however by this stage begun to deteriorate even further, to 
such an extent that at the end of February Zilliacus offered to abandon his fact-
finding duties, and only after some persuasion agreed to continue.23 
As on his previous trip, Zilliacus prepared the ground for his forthcoming dis-
cussions through correspondence with Volkhovskii in London. On the basis of 
this exchange of views, Zilliacus set himself the task of working towards the decla-
ration of a joint anti-war manifesto, to be sponsored by the opposition move-
ment as a whole. Russia's military setbacks and the ensuing social unrest could, 
he saw, be used to turn opinion against the autocratic régime. The government 
and the outside world had to be shown that the opposition was capable of con-
certed joint action. As part of this strategy, the liberals were to be encouraged 
to call for the introduction of a constitution. Further efforts aimed at overthrowing 
the autocracy were planned, in the shape of demonstrations and armed disturb-
ances to be organised in various parts of the Empire. Although Zilliacus was 
20 Antti Kujala, "Japanin, Englannin ja Ruotsin yhteydet Suomen perustuslailliseen op-
positioon Venäjän-Japanin sodan aikana", Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 1988 (= Kujala 
1988), pp. 3-23. For the same study in Japanese, see Antti Kujala, "Nichirosensöjiniokeru 
finrandorikkenshugiteiköhato nihon, igirisu, suweedenno kyöryoku", Hokuöshi kenkyu, 
No 5 (1987), pp. 36-51, No 6 (1988), pp. 40-53. 
2' Jerzy J. Lerski, "A Polish Chapter of the Russo-Japanese War", in: The Transac-
tions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Third Series VII (Tokyo, 1959), p. 73; Fält 1976, 
pp. 211-216; Fountain 1980, p. 115. — See also Siegmund (= Z. Balicki) to Akashi 28 
April 1904, No 89-10, Akashi Motojirö Papers, Kensei shiryöshitsu, Kokkai toshokan [Na-
tional Diet Library], Tokyo. 
22 L. Gripenberg, Från ett skiftesrikt kyartsekel (1932), f. 199, VA. 
23 Copeland 1973, pp. 158-159; A. Neovius to K. Zilliacus 27 February 1904, Leo 
Mechelin Letter Collection 46, VA; K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collec-
tion XXIII, AAB; A. Törngren to A. Neovius "1904" and 14 and 23 February 1904, Neo-
vius Collection, VA; E. Estlander, Personliga hågkomster (1905-1906), ff. 178-179, von 
Born Collection, SA. 
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responsible for originating most, if not all, of the various elements of this plan, 
it was Volkhovskii who imbued it with a sense of true radicalism.24 
Zilliacus visited London in mid-April to discuss his plan with Volkhovskii and 
Chaikovskii. As a result of these talks, a call was now added for a joint confer-
ence of the various opposition movements. This was to agree on a common cam-
paign of anti-government activities and nominate a central coordinating com-
mittee. 
Once the plan of action had been finalised, Zilliacus lost no time in presenting 
it to the Japanese diplomats then resident in London, Baron Hayashi Tadasu, 
the Japanese Minister, and the Military Attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Utsunomiya 
Tarö. Zilliacus needed Japanese assistance to fund the various stages of the plan 
and the purchases of the weapons that would be needed in the armed operations. 
Funds were to be channelled in stages to the various apposition parties involved 
as the overall plan progressed. The intention was to disguise the origin of the 
money from the ethnic Russian parties. 
Unrest and disturbances on the home front would, as Zilliacus saw things, pre-
vent Russia from deploying all her military forces against Japan. It was this bait 
which he hoped would attract Tokyo's interest. His own aim in the longer term 
was for the establishment of a constitutionally-administered Russia and the grant-
ing of as wide as possible a measure of self-government to Finland.  
Zilliacus acted completely on his own initiative in London. He was well aware 
that the course of action he was advocating could hope to gain the approval of 
only a section of the Finnish constitutionalist opposition. His links with those 
within the Finnish opposition who supported a more radical approach to rela-
tions with Russia were still relatively close at this stage. Zilliacus outlined his plan 
of action and his intention of acquiring weapons from Japan in some detail in 
his correspondence with members of this group. As he made plain to them, he 
foresaw an inevitable and irreversible split in the Finnish opposition into a moder-
ate wing, significantly less interested in cooperating with the Russian movement, 
and a more radical wing committed to a greater level of active opposition. Zillia-
cus naturally hoped that his friends would choose to ally themselves with him.25 
The group on which Zilliacus pinned his hope in this regard did not, however, 
feel completely confident in him. Deciding to pursue its own approach, this group 
initiated discussions of its own, partly unbeknown to him, with Japanese represen-
tatives in Stockholm and London. While Zilliacus looked to improving Finland's 
24 K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 1 and 31 March 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI 
(USA tk 18, VA). 
25 K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 13 April and 8 August 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K.  
Zilliacus to J. Castrén 18 April 1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA; K. Zilliacus to C. Man-
nerheim 18 and 24 April 1904 & J.N. Reuter, Promemoria (1904), Mannerheim Papers 
1-2, VA;  K. Zilliacus to M. Rosendal 14 April 1904, Eino I. Parmanen Collection XI, 
VA; K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, AAB; Zilliacus I 
1919, pp. 131-132; Fält 1976, pp. 217-218. 
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position through the Russian revolutionary movement and links with Japan, those 
led by Jonas Castrén and J.N. Reuter wanted to disengage Finland as far as pos-
sible from Russia through the help of Japan and the European great powers.26 
Delays in the Preparations for the Conference 
and Its Postponement 
Continuing his trip onwards from London to the Continent, Zilliacus believed 
that it would be possible to hold the conference as early as mid-May.27 He was 
soon to find out, however, that there were as many opinions as individuals in 
the Russian revolutionary movement and that hardly anyone was willing to aban-
don their own proposals on the best way forward for the movement as a whole. 
Flexibility was not, as is widely known, one of the great strengths of the Russian 
revolutionary movement. 
Inspired by Zilliacus' initiative, Rubanovich, who met the former during his 
visit to Paris, had asked the French socialists Jules Guesde, Paul Lafargue, and 
perhaps Edouard Vaillant as well, to do what they could to encourage a greater 
measure of cooperation between the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries and So-
cial Democrats. The French had, in response to Rubanovich's appeal, offered 
to call a conference of all the opposition groups and to act as its sponsors. The 
proposal as it stood was seen by Zilliacus as likely to be unattractive to the non-
socialists, and did not win his wholehearted support. It was, on the other hand, 
difficult to turn down out of hand without offending the French socialists, whose 
rhetorical attacks against the Tsarist régime were otherwise especially welcome. 
It was left to the Polish National League to rescue Zilliacus from this dilemma 
by demanding that the conference should not be held under the protection of 
any foreign group. Rubanovich's proposal then was rejected at a very early stage, 
but it nevertheless remained to haunt Zilliacus right up until the Paris confer-
ence.28  
Fortunately for Zilliacus, the Socialist Revolutionaries, Chernov and L.E. Shish-
ko, based in Geneva, did not come up with any private notions of their own to 
further complicate the picture.  
Zilliacus' Socialist Revolutionary friends had suggested to him that it would 
probably be unlikely, as a result of the internal feuds dividing the Russian Social 
Kujala 1988, pp. 3-23. 
2- K. Zilliacus to C. Mannerheim 24 April 1904, Mannerheim Papers 1, VA. For de-
tails of Zilliacus' itinerary and the various figures he met, see Törngren 1929, pp. 94-95. 
2' K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhoyskii 5 May (this letter is incorrectly dated 5 April) and 
I July 1904. K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 10 May 1904. Volkhovskii Collection, H1 (USA 
tk 18, VA); K. Zilliacus to C. Mannerheim 24 April 1904, Mannerheim Papers 1, VA; K.  
Zilliacus to A. Neoyius 31 August 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; Leninskii sbornik, XV 
(Moskva, 1930), p. 45, 50. 
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Georgii Plekhanov.  
Democrats, that the latter would take part in any joint conference.'' To satisfy 
himself as to the true state of affairs on this point, Zilliacus gathered up his courage 
and presented himself for an audience with Plekhanov on 27 April. To Zilliacus' 
 
surprise, Plekhanov reacted favourably to the idea of a conference and the vari-
ous aims Zilliacus had envisaged for it. The two-hour discussion between the two 
K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 13 April 1904, Neovius Collection, VA.  
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men in Geneva resulted in a fair measure of agreement on the main issues in ques-
tion, which even the later revelations regarding Zilliacus' activities were not able 
to completely expunge from Plekhanov's memory. Zilliacus proved successful 
in making a positive impression on Plekhanov,30 a not insignificant feat as the 
"grand old man" of the Russian Social Democratic Party was widely known for 
his readiness to make plain his antipathy, and refusal to cooperate with those 
to whom he took a disliking. 
During the course of the same trip, Zilliacus presented his plan to Georgii 
Dekanozi (Dekanozishvili) of the Georgian Party of Socialists-Federalists-
Revolutionaries in Paris, to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (the Dash-
naktsutiun) and the Jewish Bund in Geneva, as well as to the Polish National 
League in Cracow.31  
Zilliacus' Socialist Revolutionary friends had managed to convince him that 
the Russian liberals would not make any move on their own towards transform-
ing Russia into a constitutionalist state, preferring instead to "feed on the chest-
nuts others have picked out of the fire". Zilliacus considered the Russian liber-
als, like the Finnish moderate constitutionalists, to be wind-bags and time-wasters. 
These opinions, which Zilliacus shared with the Socialist Revolutionaries, were 
not based purely on political prejudice, but also on the fact that, in the early 
stages of the war, some liberals had argued for holding back on anti-government 
action and adopted an intermediary position between official patriotism and de-
featism.32 
At the end of April or the beginning of May, Zilliacus met P.B. Struve, the 
publisher of the liberal journal Osvobozhdenie, in Stuttgart. Struve, like all the 
others with whom Zilliacus had discussed the proposed conference, also reacted 
favourably to the idea, although he was unable to promise that the Union of 
Liberation, with which he was associated, would participate. Responsibility for 
such a decision lay with the organisation's leadership in Russia, to which Struve 
promised to write on the matter.33 The liberals' procrastination on this issue was 
to emerge as the single biggest obstacle to the conference encountered by Zillia-
cus. A similar reply which he had received from the representatives of the Bund 
30 K. Zilliacus to A. Neoyius 28 April 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to 
F.V. Volkhoyskii 5 May 1904. K. Zilliacus to N.V. Chaikovskii 24 May 1904. Volkhoyskii 
Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA). 
31 K.  Zilliacus to A. Neovius 28 and 29 April 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zillia-
cus to F.V. Volkhovskii 5 May 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA); Törn-
gren 1929, pp. 89-90, 94-95. I am grateful to Ronald Grigor Suny for providing me with 
background information on Dekanozi and his party. 
32 K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 1 and 31 March 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI 
(USA tk 18, VA). On liberal attitudes at the beginning of the war, see Pipes 1970, pp. 
338-345; Galai 1973, pp. 196-205. 
33 K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhoyskii 5 May 1904. K. Zilliacus to N.V. Chaikovskii 24 May 
1904. Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA); P.B. Struve to A. Neovius 4 May 1904, 
Neovius Collection, VA. 
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whom he had met gave him much less anxiety, as the Bund was seen from the 
Finnish opposition point of view as very much a minor factor when it came to 
the conference.34 
Zilliacus arrived back in Stockholm at the beginning of May and presented 
the committee with his plan for a joint conference and manifesto. For the more 
conservative members of the committee whom Zilliacus had not bothered to keep 
informed of developments and had made little attempt to convert to his way of 
thinking, the idea came virtually as a complete shock. Zilliacus proposed that 
the Finnish opposition should send its own representatives to the conference, which 
was scheduled to meet the same month.  
Zilliacus had no intention of postponing the conference on account of the inde-
cision of the Russian liberals. He was quite willing to leave these by the wayside 
if they refused to keep pace with the rest of the opposition movement. To the 
majority of the Finnish constitutionalists, for whom the liberals represented the 
only group worth attention within the Russian opposition, Zilliacus' plan amount-
ed to little short of sacrilege.35 
Zilliacus was unsuccessful in persuading his fellow countrymen to accept what 
he attempted to present as a fait accompli. He was forced, as a result, to inform 
his various contacts whom he had met on his recent trip that the Finnish opposi-
tion wanted to postpone the conference for a couple of weeks to give the liberals 
time to make up their minds about attending.36 
The constitutionalist position on the proposed conference came up for further 
discussion by the Stockholm committee and also within the constitutionalist leader-
ship based in Helsinki which wielded the ultimate decision-making authority in 
affairs affecting the opposition. This took place during May. The Finns were 
keen that the opposition parties should organise a conference to nominate a joint 
coordinating body or central committee. Although the Stockholm committee did 
not put it in so many words, the overall aim was to support the Russian liberals 
in their efforts to secure a dominant place in government and introduce a con-
stitutional form of government. Demonstrations were considered an appropri-
ate form of providing that support. The Finns were also adamant that Finland 
had to be given back her autonomy. They sincerely believed that all previous Em-
perors had confirmed Finland's fundamental laws, which Nicholas Il was now 
thought to be infringing. The constitutionalists were ultimately only willing to 
take part in a conference if the Russian liberals also took part.37 
34 
 K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 5 May 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 
18, VA). 
35 
 See Note 37. 
36 K. Zilliacus to N.V. Chaikoyskii 24 May 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 
18, VA). 
37 L. Mechelin to P.B. Struve 27 May 1904 (draft) and a longer draft version of the 
same letter. L. Mechelin to Petr D. Dolgorukov 20 October 1904 (draft). Mechelin Docu-
ment Collection 23 (30), VA; L. Gripenberg, Från ett skiftesrikt kyartsekel (1932), ff. 
199-204, VA; K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, AAB; 
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7 
Leo Mechelin, an ex-professor of political jurisprudence, drew up a proposal 
running to over a hundred pages for a new constitution. The Russian liberals 
were to present it to the Tsar for approval at the appropriate moment. Mechelin 
was so enthusiastic in pressing his advice on the Russian liberals that the latter, 
representing a different and moreover much larger national group, soon found 
the situation more than a little irritating.38 
In a letter dated 27 May, Mechelin, who claimed to speak on behalf of the 
Finnish opposition, suggested to Struve that the latter agree the date and place 
of the conference directly with Volkhovskii and Chaikovskii. By making this sug-
gestion, the Finnish opposition effectively disclaimed any direct link with Zillia-
cus and made little attempt to hide the fact.39 
Adolf Törngren, one of the major figures among the Helsinki-based constitu-
tionalists, kept in regular touch with leading liberals active within Russia. Törn-
gren informed Mechelin that his contacts had said that the liberals, due to difficul-
ties in communication among themselves, would be able to make a final decision 
about attending the proposed conference by the end of July at the earliest. The 
reasons for this delay were described as purely technical. With the help of Struve 
it might, in Törngren's opinion, be possible to arrange a preparatory conference 
before this. A conference without the presence of the liberals would be unlikely 
to be of any benefit to the Finns, however. Törngren encouraged Mechelin to 
follow the line that had been recently adopted and approach Struve with a pro-
posal for a preliminary conference. Mechelin was also advised not to put too 
much trust in Zilliacus and not to allow him too dominant a role in develop-
ments.40 
The Stockholm committee decided to send Zilliacus on a further fact-finding 
Törngren 1929, pp. 93-102, 229-231. — Richard Pipes has interpreted Mechelin's idea 
of "l'action pratique" proposed by him to Struve as amounting to an armed insurrection, 
when in reality Mechelin saw it as a way of achieying a constitution for Russia and aiding 
the liberals to power. See Pipes 1970, p. 364. On the question of Finland's political status 
and the theory of a separate state advocated by Finnish figures, together with the back-
ground to their deep-seated belief that Finland possessed a constitutional form of govern-
ment, see for ex. Robert Schweitzer, Autonomie und  Autokratie: Die Ste!lung des Gross-
furstentums Finnland im rusnischen Reich in der zweiten Htilfte des 19. Jahrhunderts 
(1863-1899), Marburger Abhandlungen zur Geschichte und Kultur Osteuropas 19 (Gies-
sen, 1978), passim; Osmo Jussila, "Die russische Reichsgesetzgebung in Finnland in den 
Jahren 1809-1898", Jahrbiicher fur  Geschichte Osteuropas 33 (1985), pp. 345-365. The 
theory contained a large amount of wishful thinking. 
3" Mechelin Document Collection 23 (31). Correspondence between L. Mechelin and 
Petr D. Dolgorukoy, December 1903-1904, Mechelin Document Collection 23 (30) & Letter 
Collection 46-47. A. Törngren to L. Meehelin 18 July 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 
47, VA; A. Törngren to A. Neovius 21 July 1904, Neoyius Collection, VA; L. Gripenberg,  
Från ett skiftesrikt kvartsekel (1932), ff. 204-205, VA. 
3, L. Mechelin to P.B. Struve 27 May 1904 (draft), Mechelin Document Collection 23 
(30). Struves reply dated 5 June 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA. 
4" A. Törngren to L. Meehelin 16, 17, and 21 June 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 
47, VA; A. Törngren to A. Neoyius 28 June 1904, Neoyius Collection, VA. 
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mission and approved a set of guidelines for his negotiations in line with the May 
decisions. These made plain the opposition of the Finns to any form of political 
proclamation being issued at this stage. Zilliacus argued against having his hands 
tied in this way in advance, but to no avail. He did not believe that the Socialist 
Revolutionaries would agree to a conference which would only nominate a cen-
tral committee to be given a free hand thereafter to shape opposition policies, 
without the publication of a manifesto." 
Shishko told Zilliacus in Geneva at the end of June that his party had lost in-
terest in the idea of a conference. A conference without the parallel publication 
of a manifesto could not be seriously contemplated, he argued. As far as the 
Socialist Revolutionaries saw things, the ideal opportunity for holding the con-
ference had been allowed to slip out of everyones' hands as a result of the deci-
sion to accede to the liberals' request for a delay. The Socialist Revolutionaries 
did not believe that the Russian Social Democrats, weakened by the worsening 
internal split, would be in any position to take part in the proposed conference. 
Struve in Paris similarly had little better news for Zilliacus. The liberal leaders 
within Russia had still yet to make a decision on their participation in the con-
ference. 
By the beginning of July, it appeared to Zilliacus that the conference idea had 
more or less foundered, although he did not entirely give up hope that some-
thing might not be salvaged.42 
Subversion in Russia and the Japanese Government 
From February or March 1904 onwards, Zilliacus began working in close col-
laboration with Colonel Akashi Motojirö, the head of Japan's European-based 
intelligence operations focused on Russia.43 Zilliacus' activities in this regard 
brought him close to being a Japanese agent, although it should be noted that 
he refused to have any part in military intelligence-gathering work.44 
At the end of June or the beginning of July, Zilliacus received Akashi's ap- 
41 Törngren 1929, pp. 102-105; K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Col-
lection XXIII, AAB; Gummerus 1929, pp. 164-165. 
4= K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 1 July 1904. K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko I July 1904. 
Volkhoyskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA); K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 27 June, 1, 4, 
and 12 July 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter 
Collection XXIII, AAB; Gummerus 1929, pp. 165-166. 
43 On Akashi's activities, see John Albert White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japa-
nese War (Princeton, 1964), pp. 138-142; Michael Futrell, "Colonel Akashi and Japa-
nese Contacts with Russian Revolutionaries in 1904-5", St Antony's Papers 2, Far East-
ern Affairs 4 (London, 1967), pp. 7-22. Also see Akashi's report Rakka ryusui which 
is included in the present volume in a translation produced by Inaba Chiharu. For infor-
mation I have had access to from Japanese-language sources, I am indebted to Inaba. 
43 See Rakka ryusui, included in the present yolume. 
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proval for the beginning of preparations for a series of violent demonstrations 
inside Russia. The Japanese General Staff had forwarded Akashi a smallish sum 
in June for use in subversion work. Writing to Shishko on 1 July, Zilliacus ar-
gued that, although an all-out revolution was not feasible, the issuing of a joint 
manifesto by the opposition, together with a series of small disturbances organised 
by groups of some fifty armed men, could well be enough to secure the fall of 
the régime headed by the Minister of the Interior, V.K. von Plehwe. Despite the 
limited gains likely to be thus achieved, the toppling of von Plehwe would mark 
a step on the way to finally overthrowing the autocracy in its entirety. The plan 
was for the armed disturbances to begin in the Russian heartland and to extend 
only later to areas populated by the minority nationalities, in order to deny the 
authorities the opportunity of fomenting Great Russian chauvinism and hostili-
ty towards the minorities.45 
Having discussed Zilliacus' proposal with Shishko, Volkhovskii wrote to the 
former on 3 July to ask him whether he would be in a position to arrange sup-
plies to Russia of the weapons he had promised, or be able to provide the money 
for acquiring the weapons within Russia. Volkhovskii explained that the Socialist 
Revolutionaries had not the resources to bring more than about a hundred Brown-
ings across the border.4a 
The available records do not provide an unambiguous answer to the question 
of whether Zilliacus did, in fact, arrange for the supply of Japanese-funded 
weapons to the Socialist Revolutionaries as early as this. That he did offer weapons 
to the party is nevertheless clear from both Polish and Japanese sources.47 
In accordance with his plan drawn up that spring, Zilliacus did not inform 
the Socialist Revolutionaries that the weapons he was offering were to be paid 
for by Japan. It is unclear what cover story Zilliacus used in explaining the ori-
gin of the weapons. He had, however, revealed to his friend Volkhovskii back 
in March that he had made contact with Japanese officials through an intermedi-
ary.48 Another close associate of Zilliacus, Chaikovskii, appears to have met 
45 K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 1 July 1904. K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 1 July 1904.  
(Zilliacus had also previously promised to acquire arms for the Socialist Revolutionaries, 
see his letters to Volkhovskii 31 March and to N.V. Chaikovskii 24 May 1904.) Volkhov-
skii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA). The Japanese General Staff proyided Akashi with 
9,000 yen, of which the latter gaye 3,000 yen to Zilliacus (apparently in July). See Rakka 
ryusui and telegram 1 in the Appendix to Rakka ryusui, in the present volume. According 
to Zilliacus' memoirs, the initial reply from Japan to his proposal was favourable, albeit 
sceptical. This reference is probably linked to the period in question. Zilliacus 11919, p. 140. 
36 F.V. Volkhovskii to K. Zilliacus 3 July 1904 (copy), Arkhiv Partii S.-R. (PSR) No 
758/10, Internationaal Instituut yoor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG), Amsterdam. — I would 
like to thank Leo van Rossum for his assistance. 
67 Telegram 2 in the present volume; WI. Pobög-Malinowski, Jozef  Pilsudski, 1901-
1908: W ogniu rewolucji (Warszawa, 1935), pp. 176-177, 192. 
4K K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 31 March 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA 
tk 18, VA). 
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some of the Japanese in London in June or July 1904 thanks to Zilliacus' help.49 
The Socialist Revolutionary leaders must sooner or later have realised whose 
weapons Zilliacus was offering them, but saw no reason to compromise them-
selves by confronting the latter with any direct questions on the issue. 
In contrast to the circumspection he employed with the Russian parties, Zillia-
cus revealed all to the minority nationality groups. He introduced the Georgian 
Dekanozi and Hovhannes Loris-Melikian, the nephew of the Russian ex-Minis-
ter of the Interior, M.T. Loris-Melikov, of the Armenian Dashnaktsutiun, to 
Akashi in Paris in July.'  
Zilliacus had met Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) 
in Berlin at the end of June. The latter had requested arms for his party and 
Zilliacus promised to put the request to the Japanese, which he did on his arrival 
in London.51  
Completely independently of Zilliacus, however, the PPS had already contacted 
Japanese officials back in the early spring. On 23 July, the Japanese General 
Staff nevertheless rejected the proposal put forward in Tokyo by Jozef Pilsudski 
of the PPS. According to the proposal, the Japanese were to make an alliance 
with Poland and supply the Poles and other minority nationalities with arms to 
assist in the secession of the borderlands from Russia. The arguments put for-
ward in Tokyo by Roman Dmowski, representing the Polish National League, 
about the likely harm to be caused by an uprising could well have influenced 
the Japanese decision, although it is true of course that Japan would not proba-
bly otherwise have been willing to enter into commitments of this kind in Eu-
rope. Rather than an all-out uprising, the Japanese hoped instead that the Poles 
would restrict themselves to organising sabotage operations to disrupt the troop 
and military equipment traffic moving along the Trans-Siberian railway.' 
The small group of Finnish constitutionalists led by Jonas Castrén and J.N. 
Reuter probably never received a final answer from the Japanese to their offers 
49 Consul General Uchida (New York) to Foreign Minister Komura 5 March, 12 March, 
and 24 June 1904 and Komura to Uchida 9 March 1904 (telegrams), Nichirosen'ekiniokeru 
finrandojin oyobi pörandojinno taidokankei zassan, 5.2.15.13, Gaikö shiryökan [Archives 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (GS), Tokyo; Rakka ryösui in the present volume. See 
also Note 48; Kujala 1988, p. 7; Ascher 1988, p. 49. — Chaikoyskii probably met the Jap-
anese in order to discuss the Finns' proposal that the Japanese liberate the political exiles 
in East Siberia. There was also a plan for the latter to rise in rebellion. Chaikovskii was 
supposed to convey the list of political exiles to the Japanese. According to the telegram 
sent by Uehida in June the Russian secret poliee caught wind of the plan. 
0` Rakka ryusui, included in the present volume. On Loris-Melikian, see Louise Nal-
bandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Politi-
cal Parties through the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley, 1963), p. 155; Richard G. Hovan-
nisian, The Republic of Armenia, II, From Versailles to London, 1919-1920 (Berkeley, 
1982), pp. 492-494. 
See Note 47. K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 27 June 1904, Neovius Collection, VA. 
Lerski 1959, pp. 69-97; Fountain 1980, pp. 115-139. Also supplementary infor-
mation provided by Inaba. 
101 
of cooperation which they had made in April and May. By not closing the door 
completely on this proposal, the Japanese hoped to be able to keep it in reserve 
in the event that changes in the military situation might make it more attractive. 
Through their non-committal stance, the Japanese did, however, put a brake on 
any further development of the idea in the short term, and little more was done 
about it for the remainder of the war. 
Castrén's and Reuter's proposal did not attract the Japanese, as it would have 
required Japan to pledge herself to guaranteeing Finland's independence as part 
of a peace agreement between Japan and Russia, while lacking any clear assur-
ance that the Finns were themselves committed to organising an uprising against 
the Russian régime. It was also ill-advised of Casual and Reuter to request such 
a large quantity of weapons as 50,000 rifles for a single border area of Finland's 
size at a time when Japan needed to concentrate all her efforts and resources 
to prevent herself from being crushed under the Russian colossus.53 
Zilliacus, in contrast, did not ask the Japanese for any diplomatic or military 
commitments and limited his request for weapons to no more than perhaps about 
a thousand small arms.54 These would not have been enough to start a revolu-
tion but nevertheless enough to tie down some Russian forces in Europe and ham-
per the overall Russian war effort. Japan had no wish, in any case, to be in-
strumental in triggering a revolution in Russia, the effect of which, it was feared, 
might well be to turn many European governments against Tokyo and deprive 
Russia of the type of stable government necessary for signing a peace treaty with 
Japan.55 
Zilliacus realised the need to ask the Japanese only for as much as would be 
likely to be acceptable to them while at the same time meeting his own require-
ments. Small-scale unrest, capable of being organised with minimal resources, 
would in any case prepare the ground for a move towards a constitutional form 
of government. Zilliacus' skill lay in his ability to develop an approach flexible 
enough to embrace the various aims of all the parties involved, the Japanese, 
the Russian revolutionaries, and the Finnish constitutionalists. 
Research by Inaba Chiharu has revealed that the Japanese General Staff ap-
proved Zilliacus' proposed plan of action on 31 August 1904 and decided to free 
funds to finance it. In its instructions sent to Akashi and Utsunomiya, the General 
Staff emphasised that the proposed plan was to include all the opposition par-
ties. Japan was not interested in supplying funds for specific particularist in-
terests.56  In the light of this, it is easier to understand why Japan reacted in such 
" Kujala 1988, pp. 3-23. It is worth emphasising that this group represented only a 
small section of the Finnish constitutionalist opposition. The majority of the constitution-
alists remained loyal to the imperial connection, although more in the name of political 
realism and out of force of habit, than out of any love for Russia or the imperial royal family. 
For details on the size of Zilliacus' request for arms, see K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shish-
ko 10 May and I July 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA). 
" White 1964, pp. 139-142; Futrell 1967, pp. 17-18; Lerski 1959, pp. 93-94. 
'6 See telegrams 3 and 4 in the Appendix to Rakka ryusui, in the present volume. Also 
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a lukewarm way to the proposals put forward by the PPS and Castrén and Reuter. 
Tokyo — or at least Akashi personally — must, in fact, have given Zilliacus  
the green light at the end of July when the latter restarted his efforts to push 
ahead with his plan for a conference. Zilliacus' own comment on the issue at 
the time was that Tokyo had approved the plan and forwarded the necessary funds 
to a Japanese representative (Akashi — AK) in Europe.57 
On 31 August the General Staff approved the placing of 100,000 yen at Akashi's 
disposal to fund the conference and associated series of demonstrations and un-
rest.58 
The Final Preparations for the Paris Conference  
Zilliacus had so far felt himself obliged to abide by the guidelines given to him 
by the Stockholm committee and the constitutionalists in Helsinki, as it was they 
who had financed his trips.59 Even so, he had sometimes strayed on to pastures 
distant from those which had been in the minds of his official backers. Even as 
recently as the previous spring, Zilliacus had thought that neither he nor the rad-
ical group which he wanted to establish within the Finnish opposition should ac-
cept money from Japan, although he considered "instruments" (weapons) ac-
ceptable.60 Zilliacus abandoned this position when Tokyo decided in the sum-
mer of 1904 to begin funding his plan.6' The brake on his freedom of movement 
was now removed. 
At the beginning of July, Zilliacus began work on the preparations for a con-
ference based on his original outline plan which he had made in March and April. 
He wanted to give himself something to fall back on in the event that a confer-
ence of the type envisaged by the Stockholm committee failed to materialise.62 
The hints made by the Japanese of the favourable reception likely to be given 
to his request put in the spring could well have increased his confidence. Zillia-
cus received preliminary blessing for his plan from Tokyo or Akashi at the end 
of July (prior to 8 August). From now on Zilliacus had little option but to go 
ahead with his part of the agreement, regardless of whether the Russian liberals 
supplementary information provided by Inaba. 
$7 Zilliacus informed A. Neovius about the matter in a letter dated 8 August 1904, Ne-
ovius Collection, VA; Törngren 1929, p. 106. It is of course possible that Zilliacus referred 
to the reply Akashi had received from Tokyo in June (see Note 45). 
58 See telegram 3 in the present yolume. 
59 K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius I July 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; K. Zilliacus to F.V. 
Volkhovskii 1 July 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA). 
60 K. Zilliacus to J. Castrén 18 April 1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA. 
61 K. 
 Zilliacus to A. Neovius 8 August 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; Zilliacus 1 1919, 
p. 140; K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, AAB. See also 
Note 45. 
62 K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 27 June, 1 and 12 July 1904, Neoyius Collection, VA. 
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and the Finnish moderate constitutionalists would be willing or able to keep up 
or not. He was simply forced to show that he was able to achieve the results which 
he had promised. 
At the end of July and beginning of August, Zilliacus wrote to the Socialist 
Revolutionaries and those Finnish constitutionalists who he thought would be 
willing to commit themselves to his lead, proposing that his plan for a confer-
ence and public disturbances should be put into action. Zilliacus believed that 
the Russian liberals would not attend. The Finnish radicals, for their part, should 
be willing, he contended, to disassociate themselves from their moderate colleagues 
and participate. 
The Finns, in fact, were to be responsible for drawing up and dispatching the 
invitations to the conference to be sent to the other groups, as an invitation from 
a group conveniently outside the maze of mutual disagreements and suspicions 
bedevilling the mainstream opposition had by far the greatest chance of being 
accepted by all parties.63 This had been made plain to Zilliacus numerous times 
during the course of his discussions with opposition leaders.'  
Zilliacus' approach to the conference was very much a pragmatic one and geared 
to achieving what was feasible rather than what was perhaps ideal. The revolu-
tionary parties would never have acceded to accepting the role of silent partner 
proposed for them by Mechelin.65 
Arguing his case to the Socialist Revolutionaries, Zilliacus justified his revival 
of his earlier plan on the basis of the uniquely favourable conditions for the op-
position created by the murder on 28 July of one of the key figures in the govern-
ment, von Plehwe. A letter written by Zilliacus to Castrén at around the same 
time shows, however, that he had decided on his initiative prior to hearing the 
news of the assassination.66 
Zilliacus' mistrust of the liberals, which he had absorbed from his Socialist 
Revolutionary friends, proved in the event groundless. On 10 August, Struve in-
formed Mechelin that the Union of Liberation had decided to take part in the 
conference, on condition that it be held at the end of September.67 
Those liberals, who at the beginning of the war had variously adopted a pas-
sive or semi-patriotic attitude to developments (Struve amongst others, had ad-
vocated the latter stance), had during the course of the spring moved increasing-
ly closer to their political colleagues who were determined to take the maximum  
fia K. Zilliacus to J. Castrén 28 July 1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA; K. Zilliacus to L.E. 
Shishko 31 July 1904, Volkhoyskii Collection, H1 (USA tk 18, VA); K. Zilliacus to A. 
Neovius 8 August 1904 and the proclamation proposal appended to the latter, Neovius 
Collection, VA; Törngren 1929, pp. 105-106. 
64 K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 28 April 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; L. Gripenberg,  
Från ett skiftesrikt kvartsekel (1932), f. 200, VA. 
65 Reference has already been made to the negative attitude of the Socialist Reyolution-
aries. For the attitude of the Russian Social Democrats see later. 
66 See Note 63. 
B7  P.B. Struve to L. Mechelin 10 August 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA. 
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advantage of the war and the difficult position in which the government found 
itself in order to advance their political aims. The setbacks encountered by Rus-
sian forces and the lack of popularity of the war within the country only further 
emboldened the liberals to develop a more uncompromising anti-government 
stance. 
In the 3 June edition of Osvobozhdenie, Struve published a letter from a read-
er referred to simply as X which proposed a conference of all the opposition groups 
to be responsible for nominating a joint coordinating body and agreeing on a 
joint plan of action. This letter is too obviously Russian-orientated to have been 
written by a Finn. It would seem more than likely that it first saw the light of 
day in the journal's own offices. It was Struve's cautious way of supporting Zil-
liacus' proposal at a time when the leadership of the Union of Liberation within 
Russia had still to decide on its response to the proposal. 
On the basis of his discussions with Petr D. Dolgorukov and a number of oth-
er Russian liberals, Törngren had argued throughout the summer that the liber-
als would not refuse to take part in a conference, if they were only given enough 
time to make up their minds.68 Struve's statement on 10 August, therefore, 
served in effect to undermine Zilliacus' credibility in the eyes of the Finnish con-
stitutionalists. 
Following discussions with the Stockholm committee, Mechelin, in a second 
attempt to bypass Zilliacus, asked Struve to arrange a conference along the lines 
contained in the Finnish proposal of 27 May.69 Struve, however, politely declined 
the role of acting as conference organiser, arguing that he did not have access 
to all the necessary contacts.70 Struve's unwillingness could well have largely 
resulted from the liberals' feeling that the Finns themselves were better suited 
to acting as the prime movers on the conference question.71 Struve underlined 
his position by writing to Zilliacus to confirm his complete approval of the tat-
ter's proposed agenda for the conference.72 
Zilliacus presented his plan to the Bund and to Zygmunt Balicki of the Polish 
National League in Switzerland at the end of July. The international socialist 
as On the change in liberal attitudes, see Galai 1973, pp. 196-213; 'X.' (pseudonym), 
"Pis'mo y redaktsiiu", Osvobozhdenie No 24 (48) 21 May (3 June) 1904, pp. 434-435; 
A. Törngren to L. Mechelin 16, 17, and 21 June and 18 July 1904, Mechelin Letter Collec-
tion 47, VA; A. Törngren to A. Neovius 21 July 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; Adolf  
Törngren, Minnen från en resa i Ryssland under april månad 1904 (1904), f. 41, Adolf  
Törngren Collection, VA. 
69 L. Mechelin to P.B. Struve 15 August 1904 (draft). Stockholm committee minutes 
dated 13 August 1904. Mechelin Document Collection 23 (30), VA; Törngren 1929, pp. 
107-108.  Zilliacus was informed of the reply sent to Struye: A. Neoyius to K. Zilliacus  
14 August 1904 (draft), Neoyius Collection, VA. 
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 P.B. Struve to L. Mechelin 24 August 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA. 
7' A. Törngren to L. Mechelin 18 July 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA; A.  
Törngren to A. Neovius 21 July 1904, Neovius Collection, VA. 
72 K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 28 August 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 
18, VA);  Gummerus 1929, p. 167; Törngren 1929, p. 114. 
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congress held in Amsterdam in August gave Zilliacus the opportunity to discuss 
his ideas with a number of representatives from various socialist groupings. At 
the end of the month, he compared notes on the conference issue with Jodko 
of the PPS and Akashi in Hamburg. Zilliacus used these various meetings to build 
up support for his plan and prepare the ground for the formal calling of the con-
ference. 
Colonel Akashi often accompanied Zilliacus during this period of shuttle 
diplomacy, but was generally careful to keep a low profile, remaining very much 
in the background. His role was one of collecting information, providing Zillia-
cus with advice and keeping a check on his activities and seeing that they did 
not come into conflict with Tokyo's interests. 
Akashi advised Zilliacus not to invite the Russian liberals to the conference. 
This is probably because it was not yet clear whether or not the liberals would 
take a radical stand against the government. Thus Akashi's opinion apparently 
influenced Zilliacus' desire to leave the liberals out. However, when the liberals 
gave notice of their participation, Zilliacus could not afford to assent to Akashi's 
wish.73 
Zilliacus returned to Stockholm in September, where the tug of war between 
himself and the committee continued from where it had left off. Zilliacus need-
ed to have some Finnish group behind him to act as the nominal sponsor for 
the conference. In Volkhovskii's opinion, the Great Russian population within 
the Empire would be unlikely to react favourably to any joint public proclama-
tion including signatories from amongst the minority nationalities. Zilliacus was 
therefore ready to replace the proclamation with a series of parallel resolutions, 
which were also, however, to be made public. This compromise suggestion did 
not meet with the committee's approval, neither did the proposed replacement 
of the central committee, which Mechelin had conceived of as something of an 
executive body carrying out liberal wishes, by a more restricted secretariat. Zil-
liacus had been forced to resort to this idea after he had seen that no single body 
would be able to accommodate representatives from all the parties. 
Frustrated by the continuing delays surrounding the announcement of the Finn-
ish position and with the time drawing closer when it would be necessary to dis-
patch the invitations for the conference, if it was to be held at the agreed time 
at the end of September, Zilliacus decided on his own initiative on 16 September 
to post letters of invitation to all the opposition organisations he was aware of. 
The conference was to be convened in accordance with the programme which  
Zilliacus had previously outlined. When forced to explain his actions to the Stock- 
7'  K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 31  July 1904. K. Zilliacus to F.V. Volkhovskii 17 Sep-
tember 1904. Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, VA); K. Zilliacus to J.N. Reuter 
23 August 1904, Reuter Letter Collection XXI, AAB; K. Zilliacus to A. Neoyius 22 Au-
gust 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA; Karl (= Akashi) to J.  Castrén 6 August 
1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA; Zilliacus 11 1920, pp. 5-10; Rakka ryusui in the present 
volume. 
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holm committee, he argued that he had acted in line with the authority given 
to him by the other opposition parties. Zilliacus' aim in thus going out on a limb 
was to force the Finnish opposition to decide whether it wanted to be a part of 
the common opposition as a united body, or whether only in the shape of a smaller 
radical group. He also now made no effort to discuss the contents of the agenda 
with the committee. Faced with what was little short of a fait accompli, the com-
mittee was in no position to try and dictate to him; the tables had been turned. 
The leadership of the Helsinki constitutionalists, together with the Stockholm 
committee, finally decided that the whole of the Finnish opposition should be 
represented at the conference. It was stipulated, however, that the Finnish move-
ment would not append its name to any form of public proclamation or resolu-
tion. A desire to maintain the unity of the constitutionalist party and its links 
with the Russian liberals eventually tipped the balance in favour of taking part 
in the conference.74 
Mechelin wrote a special statement which the Finnish representatives were to 
read at the beginning of the conference. In addition to the mutual solidarity ex-
isting between the Finnish and Russian opposition movements, Mechelin stressed 
the important differences separating them. While Russian concerns were seen as 
logically being focused on the achievement of a constitutional form of govern-
ment for Russia, Finland's interests were described as concentrated around resto-
ration of the Grand Duchy's fundamental laws.75 
It seems paradoxical in the extreme that no other opposition group was the 
cause of so much difficulty for Zilliacus, or tried to modify his initiatives and 
proposals to nearly the same degree, as the Finnish moderate constitutionalists, 
who did their utmost to underline the separate status of Finland from the rest 
of Russia. The debate which went back and forth surrounding the terms under 
which the Paris conference was to be convened was, in fact, essentially concen-
trated within the ranks of the Finnish opposition. 
This somewhat singular state of affairs is further highlighted when it is remem-
bered that, of the Finnish constitutionalists, only Zilliacus and Törngren were 
seriously committed to the idea of a conference at all. The others in the move- 
7' K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 31 July and 28 August 1904. K. Zilliacus to F.V. Vol-
khovskii 17 and 23 September 1904. Volkhovskii Collection, H1 (USA tk 18, VA); Meche-
lin Document Collection 23 (30). A. Neoyius to L. Mechelin 28 August 1904. K. Zilliacus  
to A. Neoyius 22 August 1904. A. Törngren to L. Mechelin 21 September 1904. Mechelin 
Letter Collection 47, VA; K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 31 August 1904, Neovius Collection, 
VA; K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, AAB; L. Gripen-
berg, Från ett skiftesrikt kyartsekel (1932), ff. 205-207, VA; Törngren 1929, pp. 108-121;  
Gummerus 1929, pp. 166-171; Th. Rein, Lefnadsminnen (Helsingfors, 1918), pp. 441-445;  
Zilliacus II 1920, pp. 11-14, 17-20. — The Emperor's issue of a decree on 26 August 
summoning a meeting of the Diet made it even more difficult for the constitutionalists to 
come to a decision on attending the conference. 
75 For the original French-language version of Mechelin's statement, see Mechelin Docu-
ment Collection 23 (30), VA. Published in Swedish in Törngren 1929, pp. 118-121. 
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ment were either indifferent or even averse to the whole idea. Mechelin and his 
associates, for example, clearly felt a sense of relief when it began to appear in 
July that nothing would come of the conference.76 Zilliacus was not be put off, 
however, and effectively forced the other constitutionalists to follow his lead. 
Seen from the Finnish point of view, the Paris conference was very much Zillia-
cus' own creation. 
The Anti-Russian Insurrection by the Minority 
Nationalities 
 
Zilliacus was far from being the sole opposition figure advocating greater col-
laboration within the anti-government camp and his proposals were paralleled 
by a number of competing plans. The earliest of these was put forward by the 
Polish Socialist Party (PPS), which began efforts to develop a coalition between 
the socialist parties of a number of minority nationalities and established con-
tact with the Japanese soon after the outbreak of war in March 1904.77 
Relations between the nationalist and separatist PPS and the Russian Social 
Democratic Workers' Party (RSDWP) of Plekhanov, Martov, and Lenin had 
been poor for a long time. The latter, while supporting the right of national self-
determination in principle, argued for the need for a centralist approach within 
the existing political framework and demanded that the social democratic organi-
sations of all the minority nationalities throughout the Empire join their party. 
In a proposal made to the central committee of the RSDWP on 26 January 
1904, the PPS suggested the holding of a meeting between representatives of the 
two parties to normalise relations between them and to help coordinate their joint 
struggle against Tsarism. As a prerequisite, the PPS insisted that the RSDWP 
give its support to the demand for Polish independence. 
On receiving the proposal, Lenin, in his capacity as foreign representative on 
the RSDWP's central committee, enquired on 7 February whether the PPS would 
be willing to see representatives from the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of 
Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL) at the same meeting. The reaction of the PPS 
to Lenin's idea was, as might have been expected, negative, as not only were the 
PPS and the anti-nationalist SDKPiL rivals, but also sworn enemies. The PPS 
nevertheless renewed its proposal for a meeting in its reply on 8 March. 
Lenin presented a report, detailing the course of his correspondence with the 
PPS, to the council of the RSDWP, responsible for overseeing relations with 
other political parties, at its meeting on 13 June. After considering the case, the 
council decided to turn down the PPS' proposed meeting at its following sitting 
76 L. Gripenberg to L. Mechelin 19 July 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, VA; L.  
Gripenberg, Från ett skiftesrikt kvartsekel (1932), ff. 203-204, VA.  
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on 18 June. The internationalist SDKPiL, under the ideological leadership of 
Rosa Luxemburg, was after all a much more attractive collaborative partner to 
the Russian Social Democrats than the PPS, a fact which inevitably made the 
Russians reluctant to endanger the potential goodwill existing between the two 
through any move which might be seen as an attempt to court the PPS.78 
The Polish Socialist Party's proposal made to the RSDWP cannot be consid-
ered merely as a tactical move primarily designed to bypass the SDKPiL as the 
PPS also made efforts towards developing bilateral collaboration with the other 
major Russian revolutionary party, the Socialist Revolutionaries, asking for its 
assistance in blowing up munitions trains destined for Manchuria using the Trans-
Siberian railway.79  The RSDWP's refusal to lend its support to the PPS plan, 
together with its earlier reluctance to have any dealings with the PPS, could well 
have only served to strengthen the ideas which had already crystallised within 
the latter to focus its efforts in the future on developing links with the other minori-
ty nationalities, rather than the Russian parties. 
On hearing of Zilliacus' plan from representatives of the Polish National 
League,80 the PPS responded by developing its own variant. This called for the 
holding of a joint conference of socialist and revolutionary organisations represent-
ing the oppressed national minorities within the Empire. The conference was to 
be charged with nominating a central committee and with agreeing a programme 
of anti-government actions. The minority nationalities should also commit them-
selves to opposing any moves aimed at transforming Russia into a centrally ad-
ministered constitutional state. Support for a federal form of future government 
was required of all organisations wishing to attend the PPS' proposed confer-
ence.81  
Zilliacus first heard of the PPS proposal on meeting Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz 
in Berlin at the end of June. Jodko disclosed the ultimate aim of the PPS as be-
ing, with Japanese assistance, to foment a rebellion within Poland. The Poles 
were to be supported by the other minority nationalities. Zilliacus told Jodko 
straight off that the Finnish opposition would refuse any part in a gamble of 
this kind, which would only give the Russian authorities the opportunity to label 
" Anna Zarnowska, Geneza rozlamu w Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej 1904-1906 
(Warszawa, 1965), pp. 123-124; Walentyna Najdus, SDKPiL a SDPRR, 1893-1907 
(Wroclaw, 1973), pp. 178-180; Pobög-Malinowski 1935, pp. 82-84; Leninskii sbornik 
XV (1930), p. 12, 45-48, 80. On relations between the various parties in the Polish so-
cialist movement, see also J.P. Nett!, Rosa Luxemburg, I—II (London, 1966), passim; 
Strobel 1974, passim. On the attitudes of the Russian Social Demoerats on the nationality 
question, see Note 84. 
Russkii politicheskii rysk za granitsei, pod red. L. Men'shchikov, 1, Minuvshee I 
(Paris, 1914), p. 183; Lerski 1959, p. 77. 
80 Törngren 1929, p. 95. 
81 "Primiritel'nye popytki 'Bunda' y 1905 godu, (Po povodu dokumentov iz arkhiva 
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the revolutionary movement as little more than a cover for separatist sentiments, 
and which they would put down as they had the Polish uprising of 1863-64. 
A number of the minority nationality movements leaning towards socialism 
and terrorism active in Lithuania, Belorussia, the Ukraine, Georgia, and Arme-
nia had, by this stage, already reacted favourably towards the PPS' conference 
proposal, according to Zilliacus. Zilliacus was, nevertheless, able to squeeze out 
of Jodko the promise that the PPS would hold back on going ahead with its con-
ference until it had become clear whether anything was going to come of Zillia-
cus' own conference initiative. The PPS was, in any case, very sceptical about 
the latter's chances of success. 
Despite the promise it had given to Zilliacus, the PPS decided in July to renew 
its efforts to sound out the degree of potential support existing for its own con-
ference. This time, however, the PPS idea received a cool reception. In addition 
to the Finns, the Bund and the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party turned down the 
possibility of attending. Contact also failed to be made with a number of organi-
sations. Faced with this situation, Jodko informed Zilliacus on 9 August that 
his party had decided, at least temporarily, to postpone its conference. 
The minority nationalities-led insurrection envisaged by the PPS never materi-
alised, following the Japanese decision to refuse support for it. Zilliacus made 
full use of the PPS plan and the fears it evoked as a way of softening up the 
opposition within the Finnish camp towards his own proposal.82 
Jodko proved the cause of further problems for Zilliacus when he announced 
that the PPS could not agree to attending the same conference or sitting on the 
same central committee as representatives of the SDKPiL or the Polish Proletariat 
Party. Zilliacus knew that a refusal of this type by even one group to accept the 
presence of another would inevitably lead to the conference ending in an open 
quarrel. As a result of the stand adopted by the PPS, Zilliacus therefore decided 
to replace the original plan for a central committee made up of representatives 
of all the parties present with a smaller secretariat.83 
The Russian Social Democrats 
The ultimate success of the struggle against the autocracy and the socialist revo-
lution which was to follow subsequently required, in the eyes of the Russian So- 
" K.  Zilliacus to A. Neoyius 27 June, 4 July, and 8 and 31 August 1904, Neovius Col-
lection, VA; K. Zilliaeus to A. Neovius 22 August 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 47, 
VA; Pobög-Malinowski 1935, pp. 174-177; Pobög-Malinowski 11953, p. 130; Najdus 
1973, pp. 181-183. On the suspicions felt amongst the Georgian and Armenian revolu-
tionaries towards the Russian opposition parties, see G. Dekanozi to A. Neovius 21 May 
1904, Neovius Colleetion, VA; Törngren 1929, p. 94. 
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cial Democrats, the merging of all groups truly committed to socialist ideals to 
form a grouping as united and free of divisive nationalist sympathies as possi-
ble. Their ideal was of a single united social democratic party embracing the whole 
Empire. All models of party political activity incompatible with this ideal were 
considered by the Russian Social Democrats as representing species of bourgeois 
nationalism. The schism which had developed between the Bolsheviks and the 
Mensheviks during 1903 had not concerned the nationality question; both Lenin 
and his opponents remained wedded to the political ideas on this issue which had 
emerged during the pre-schism Iskra period.84 
During the course of the preparations for the Paris conference, it was em-
phasised on two occasions in the Menshevik paper Iskra that the systematic con-
centration of all the forces at the disposal of the proletariat throughout the Em-
pire represented a much more effective way forward, in terms of advancing the 
cause of the overall revolutionary struggle, than any attempts to create alliances 
based on the mechanical linkage of socialist and nationalist movements which 
were otherwise keen to preserve their separate identities.85 The Russian Social 
Democrats tended to look upon themselves as the champions of true socialist 
ideology, an attitude which made them generally disdainful of other revolution-
ary and opposition parties and distrustful of inter-party alliances. 
This was reflected particularly clearly in the bitter hostility evident within the 
Russian Social Democratic leadership towards the other socialist parties active 
in the Empire. Typical of this was the following comment penned by the Menshe-
vik, P.B. Axelrod, to Karl Kautsky, the main ideologist of orthodox marxism,  
on 6 June 1904:  
"Mit den Letten, mach was Du willst, aber den `Bund', die Armänier und 
noch ein halbes Dutzend `Nationen' (z.B. die `Ukrainophielen', Kleinrus-
sen etc.) nehme uns vom Halse. Und die sogenannten `Soc.-revolutio-
näre'?"" 
In writing this, Axelrod may well have been thinking ahead to the meeting of 
the council of the RSDWP in Geneva which had been called for 13 June to dis-
cuss the proposals put forward by Zilliacus and the PPS. This meeting was at-
tended by the Mensheviks Axelrod and Martov, Plekhanov, closely linked with 
the Mensheviks, V.A. Noskov, a representative of the more conciliatory stance 
adopted by the central committee active within Russia, and Lenin, representing 
the Bolsheviks. The latter had recently published his pamphlet One Step For-
ward, Two Steps Back: the Crisis in our Party, which, with its vicious attacks 
14 Lenin, PSS, 7 (1959), pp. 95-106, 117-122, 233-242, 322-325. PSS, 8 (1959), pp. 
65-76; (lu. 0. Martoy,) "Reyoliutsionnyi natsionalizm i sotsial'demokratiia", Iskra No 
66 15 May 1904 (o.s.), pp. 1-2; (lu. 0. Martov,) "Noyeishaia polemika `Bunda"', Iskra 
No 73 1 September 1904 (o.s.), pp. 3-4. 
" See the two articles by Martov cited in the previous note. 
" P.B. Axelrod to K. Kautsky 6 June 1904 (D 11 313), Nachlass Karl Kautsky, IISG. 
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on the Mensheviks, had only served to deepen the crisis already increasingly crip-
pling the party.87 
Although the atmosphere at the council's meeting was superficially concilia-
tory, the minutes indicate that those attending were in silent alliance against Le-
nin. Plekhanov and Martov at least, and perhaps also Axelrod as well, had clearly 
agreed in advance about the decisions to be taken at the meeting.88 
Presenting Zilliacus' proposal addressed to the RSDWP, Plekhanov did not 
forget to recall the former's close links with the Socialist Revolutionaries, as well 
as the blessing which had been given to the initiative by the French socialists Guesde 
and Lafargue. The latter factor made it particularly difficult for the RSDWP 
to refuse to take part in the conference. 
In his comments on Zilliacus' idea, Martov observed that the Social Democrats 
should ensure that they kept collaboration with non-socialist parties limited to 
individual issues. As the proposal did not in effect commit the party beyond this, 
Martov suggested that it could be accepted in principle. Continued links at the 
organisational level were, however, out of the question, as Martov saw it. He 
also went on to propose that, prior to any conference of opposition groups, joint 
discussions should be held between the major social democratic parties, the 
RSDWP, the Bund, the Latvian Social Democrats, the Polish Proletariat Party, 
and the SDKPiL, to agree a common line to be adopted at the main conference. 
All the members of the council were agreed about the desirability of a confer-
ence of the type proposed by Zilliacus. Discussion about which groups should 
be invited to take part in the preliminary talks preceding the conference itself 
revealed a general wish to prevent too many supporters of a federalist form of 
party organisation from attending. The level of council members' awareness about 
the minority nationalities' parties was, in part, so meagre that an onlooker might 
easily have been forgiven for thinking that they were talking about developments 
in South America rather than in their own country. 
In the final resolution proposed by Martov and unanimously accepted by the 
council, the party officially committed itself to taking part in the Zilliacus-
sponsored conference and announced its intention to organise a preliminary meet-
ing to be attended by the various social democratic parties. 
Martov saw the conference's main role as essentially limited to that of acting 
as a forum for a public expression of the sense of solidarity felt between all the 
opposition forces involved in the struggle against Tsarism. He also underlined 
$' On the schism in the RSDWP, see for ex. J.L.H. Keep, The Rise of Social Democracy 
in Russia (Oxford, 1966), p. 107 ff. 
" The minutes of the council's meeting are contained in three sources: Katorga i Ssyl-
ka 32 (1927), pp. 57-72; Sotsial-demokraticheskoe dvizhenie v Rossil: Materialy, pod red. 
A.N. Potresov i B.I. Nikolaevskii, I (Moskva, 1928), pp. 323-337 (also pp. 127-128); 
Leninskii sbornik XV (1930), pp. 45-62. See also Perepiska C. V. Plekhanova i P.B. Ak-
sel'roda, Il (Moskva, 1925), p. 201; Fedor ll'ich Dan, Pis'ma (1899-1946), Russian Se-
ries on Social History 3 (Amsterdam, 1985), p. 94. 
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Iulii Martov. 
the need to call for the introduction of a democratic constitution in Russia. Any 
decisions were only to be taken with the approval of all those attending. This 
interpretation was approved unanimously to form the basis of the instructions 
to be given to RSDWP representatives attending. Zilliacus had agreed to meet 
Plekhanov again after the council's meeting to hear the party's response. It was 
decided not to inform him about these instructions or the planned preliminary 
discussion meeting to be held by the social democratic parties. 
Martov was afraid that the conference would attempt, by the use of majority 
decisions, to push through resolutions on political and social questions outside 
its immediate brief, or try and restrict the independence of individual parties 
through the agency of the proposed central committee. He wanted guarantees 
against the possibility of what was described as the "nationalists and the moder-
ate Finns" gaining the upper hand and dictating proceedings. Lenin initially con-
sidered Martov's various conditions proposed for the conference to be inappropri-
ate and unnecessary. If the conference did develop in a way unacceptable to the 
social democrats, Lenin contended, they were quite free to walk out. Lenin did 
not however oppose approval of the Martov-inspired instructions. 
It is clear from the records of the speeches made by the various participants 
at the meeting that their attitude towards the "moderate Finns", ie. the non-
socialist Finnish opposition, was much more positive than their attitude to the 
Polish Socialist Party. While the former were seeking a meeting of all opposi-
tion groups, regardless of nationality or political allegiance, the PPS' primary 
8 1I3 
aim focused on trying to induce the Russian parties to give their blessing to Pol-
ish separatism.89 
The essential neutrality and non-nationalist aims of the proposal and of Zil-
liacus himself could well have contributed to the RSDWP's decision to take up 
the invitation to attend. The positive attitude of the Russian Social Democrats, 
otherwise often given to following their own policies, shows how well Zilliacus  
had been able to predict the needs of the different parties involved. One can only 
imagine the furore that would have erupted, had it been Mechelin's pro-liberal 
plan which had been put before the council for discussion, rather than that of  
Zilliacus. 
 
In May, the Jewish Bund (the General Union of Jewish Workers in Lithuania, 
Poland, and Russia) rejected the invitation it had received from the PPS to take 
part in the latter's proposed conference of oppressed nationalities. The PPS in-
itiative did, however, alert the Bund to consider the question of the need for de-
veloping cooperation between the social democratic parties. The Bund, together 
with the Latvian Social Democrats, accordingly proposed the holding of a con-
ference to agree on a programme of joint action to seven major social democrat-
ic parties active within the Empire, including the RSDWP, the SDKPiL, and the 
PPS. 
The council of the RSDWP responded favourably to the proposal on 13 June, 
informing the Bund and the other groups involved of its own plan for a smaller-
scale discussion meeting aimed solely at the social democratic parties. The coun-
cil had, in fact, got the idea for the latter meeting from the Bund proposal, but 
had decided to take the initiative into its own hands, reducing the number of 
participants to prevent control at the meeting possibly slipping into the hands 
of the federalists.90 
The Polish Social Democrats (SDKPiL) also made various moves towards closer 
political collaboration with the RSDWP, announcing that they would be willing 
to join the RSDWP after the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had settled their differ-
ences. Thus the leaders of the SDKPiL, Leo Jogiches and Rosa Luxemburg, 
pushed the responsibility for the lack of unity onto the Russians. The aim upper-
most in the minds of the SDKPiL leaders was to isolate the PPS. Whenever the 
RSDWP and PPS showed signs of burying their differences, the SDKPiL returned 
to the theme of the need to achieve the formation of a united social democratic 
party. As the danger receded, it contented itself with merely talking about the 
necessity of increased inter-party collaboration.91  
Having heard that the council of the RSDWP had, in principle, accepted the 
" Leninskii sbornik XV (1930), pp. 45-56. 
y" Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia No 11 (1922), pp. 167-169; Tobias 1972, p. 281; Pis'ma 
P.B. Aksel'roda i !u. O. Martova, Materialy po istorii russkogo revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia 
I (Berlin, 1924), p. 108; Leninskii sbornik XV (1930), p. 46, 52, 105; Najdus 1973, pp. 
183-184. 
`" Strobel 1974, pp. 215-219. 
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idea proposed by the Bund for a meeting of social democratic parties, Rosa 
Luxemburg wrote on 7 August to the Menshevik A.N. Potresov, a member of 
the editorial board of Iskra. She warned the Russian Social Democrats against 
succumbing to the federalist ideas being put abroad by the Bund, PPS, and what 
she described as other sowers of confusion ("Konfusionsrat"). Joint conferences 
and possible party alliances would only lead to the abandonment of the aim of 
true party unity, which was what the federalists were aiming at. In a bid to lend 
extra weight to her argument, Rosa Luxemburg included an extensive hymn of 
praise to the RSDWP and one which patently did not reflect her true sentiments, 
in the hope that this might help to break down her Russian correspondent's 
defences. The SDKPiL did, however, promise to take part in the discussion meet-
ing proposed by the council of the RSDWP.92 
The inter-party cooperation issue came up for discussion at the second con-
gress of the Foreign Organisation of the Socialist Revolutionary Party held on 
the Swiss-French border between 22-28 July 1904. Little or no support proved 
forthcoming at this congress for any form of collaboration with the RSDWP. 
This was largely due to the by now well-established ideological and political divi-
sions separating the two parties and, in particular, the resolution concerning the 
Socialist Revolutionaries which had been passed at the second congress of the 
RSDWP in 1903. This had described the activities of the rival party as harmful 
to the revolutionary cause. The émigré Socialist Revolutionaries decided to radi-
cally curtail collaboration with the RSDWP outside Russia until the latter disas-
sociated itself from the resolution. Joint action with the RSDWP was not neverthe-
less ruled out in those cases when the initiative for such cooperation came from 
a third party.93 
Efforts to eliminate some of the divisions existing between the two main 
branches of the Russian revolutionary movement had now begun to be put in 
hand by the veteran populist leader, M.A. Natanson, who had recently complet-
ed a sentence of internal exile in Siberia and had now arrived in Switzerland. 
Natanson shared a common ideological credo with the Socialist Revolutionaries. 
Of the main RSDWP leaders, he found Plekhanov the most approachable, for 
they had been close allies in the populist movement thirty years previously. 
92 Sotsial-demokraticheskoe dvizhenie 1928, pp. 134-136. 
93 For the minutes of the congress of the Foreign Organisation of the Socialist Revolu-
tionaries and the draft resolutions, see PSR No 364a-b and 514, IISG. For the congress 
of the RSDWP, see Vtoroi s"ezd RSDRP, Iiul'-avgust 1903 goda: Protokoly (Moskva, 
1959), pp. 430-431. Those attending the Socialist Revolutionary congress described them-
selves as Russian Social Democrats to the Swiss police. One participant referred to himself 
as Vladimir Ul'ianov (Lenin), the latter's name being duly recorded by the unsuspecting 
police in the list of those attending alongside the names of some of the major leaders of 
the Socialist Reyolutionaries. This mischief shows whom the Socialist Revolutionaries con-
sidered their staunchest opponent among the Social Democrats. Le Conseiller d'Etat chargé 
du Département de Justice et Police (Canton de Genève) au Ministege publie Fédéral 3 Au-
gust 1904, Bestand E 21 (Polizeiwesen 1848-1925), Nr. 14015, Schweizerisches Bundesar-
chiv, Berne. 
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Following the advice of the Socialist Revolutionary leaders Chernov and M.R.  
Gots, Natanson tried to persuade Plekhanov of the need for closer links between 
the parties, both at the ideological and tactical level. In the wake of the success-
ful assassination of von Plehwe by the Socialist Revolutionary Fighting Organi-
sation on 28 July, Natanson decided to abandon his nominal neutrality and for-
mally join the Socialist Revolutionaries. Plekhanov, in contrast, in line with the 
anti-terrorist precepts of the RSDWP, saw the assassination in a negative light, 
and believed that it represented precisely the type of misguided action which the 
Social Democrats would be wise to advise its supporters against because of its 
harmful effect on agitatory work among the masses. 
Following von Plehwe's murder, Zilliacus was able to rekindle interest among 
the Socialist Revolutionaries in the idea of a joint conference of opposition forces, 
while Natanson succeeded in persuading Plekhanov to promise that the RSDWP 
would also take part. Natanson proved more successful here than in his efforts 
to foster better bilateral relations between the two parties.94 
Chernov's memoirs have served as the main source of information on the dis-
cussions which took place between Natanson and Plekhanov during the summer 
of 1904. The Menshevik interpretation of events, as contained in the various ac-
counts of the party's activities produced by Menshevik writers, has argued that 
Plekhanov changed his ideas about the value of terrorist action in the period sub-
sequent to von Plehwe's assassination and that he proposed its acceptance, as 
a means of advancing the revolutionary cause, as part of the settlement arrived 
at with the Socialist Revolutionaries.95 In reality, this shift only took place in 
March 1905.96 None of Plekhanov's contemporaries seemed able to remember 
that Natanson and Plekhanov twice discussed the state of relations between their 
two parties. No signs whatever are evident, either in Plekhanov's articles or his 
private correspondence during the latter part of the summer or autumn of 1904, 
that he had abandoned or was in the process of abandoning the established hostility 
characteristic of the Social Democrats towards either the Socialist Revolution-
aries or terrorism.97 
The two major Russian revolutionary parties remained almost as much at log- 
94 
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gerheads with each other in the period following von Plehwe's assassination as 
they had been previously,98 although neither the centralist type of party organi-
sation advocated by the Social Democrats, nor the ideological and political divi-
sions between them and the Socialist Revolutionaries, prevented progress being 
made with the plan for a conference embracing the widest possible range of op-
position forces. All parties were aware of the ultimate necessity for greater cooper-
ation within the opposition.99 As was emphasised in Osvobozhdenie, the war had 
revealed the rotten state of the foundations of the autocratic system. The only 
thing that could prevent the régime from collapsing altogether was the lack of 
unity among its opponents.10°  An unprofitable and unpopular war created ideal 
conditions for the opposition's efforts towards unity. 
Events therefore were moving very much in the direction hoped for by Zillia-
cus, but his own lack of caution around the time of von Plehwe's assassination 
served to frustrate his hopes of achieving the widest possible common front within 
the opposition. He made the mistake of considering the Bund a more nationalist 
organisation than it was, and hinted to its representatives in Geneva that money 
(or weapons) might be available to the Bund from Japanese military coffers. Op-
position groups from all the other minority nationalities had seized upon this 
offer, but, in the case of the Bund, Zilliacus was soon forced to realise that he 
had made a fateful error of judgement. 
The sense of indignation evoked in Zilliacus by the Bund's reaction to his sug-
gestion never left him. In his memoirs published towards the very end of his life,  
Zilliacus gave vent to his feelings in the shape of the following caustic descrip-
tion of the Bund representatives in question: "They were a truly bizarre collec-
tion of individuals! Some of them in particular would not have been any the worse 
for a thorough encounter with soap and water.s101 
Zilliacus next met Plekhanov at the Amsterdam congress of the International 
held in August (14-20 August), where the latter informed him that his party 
had decided to take part in the opposition conference.)°2 
Representatives from the RSDWP, the SDKPiL, the Polish Proletariat Party, 
the Bund, the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party, and the Revolution- 
98 (lu. O. Martov,) "Terror i massovoe dvizhenie", Iskra No 70 25 July 1904 (o.s.), 
p. 1; "Mezhdunarodnyi sotsialisticheskii kongress v Amsterdame", Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia 
No 51 25 August 1904 (o.s.), pp. 1-6. 
''y For ex. Plekhanov: K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 28 April 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; 
K. Zilliacus to N.V. Chaikovskii 24 May 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, 
VA). On attitudes within the RSDWP, see the meeting held by the party council on 13 
June 1904. On those within the Socialist Revolutionaries, see "Na dva fronta", Revoliu-
tsionnaia Rossiia No 53 30 September 1904 (o.s.), pp. 1-3. 
""X.' (pseudonym), "Pis'mo v redaktsiiu", Osvobozhdenie No 24 (48) 21 May (3 
June) 1904, pp. 434-435. 
"" Zilliacus 11 1920, pp. 14-17 (the quotation appears on p. 14). For the approximate 
date of the meeting, see K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 31 July 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, 
HI (USA tk 18, VA).  
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ary Ukrainian Party organised a discussion meeting of their own in Amsterdam 
on 22 August. The invitation which had been sent to the PPS was withdrawn 
at the insistence of the SDKPiL. Among those present were Plekhanov, Axel-
rod, and F.I. Dan from the RSDWP, and Adolf Warszawski and Rosa Luxem-
burg from the SDKPiL. No Bolshevik representative would appear to have been 
invited to the meeting. 
Deliberations concentrated exclusively on Zilliacus' conference proposal, while 
the plan for increased cooperation between the various social democratic parties 
put forward by the Bund and the Latvian party was left undiscussed. The Bund 
representative, Mark Liber, alias Mikhel Goldman, was quick to inform those 
present that Zilliacus was working for the Japanese General Staff. Warszawski 
and the Latvian representative indicated that the PPS also had links with the Jap-
anese government. The Polish Social Democrats, for whom opposition to the 
PPS took precedence above all other considerations, demanded that the PPS' 
links with Japan be made public. Although this demand was not conceded to, 
it was decided in consequence to refuse to have anything to do with the Zilliacus-
sponsored conference. Rosa Luxemburg drew up an outline for a joint letter in-
forming Zilliacus of the decision. Despite his efforts, together with those of the 
Bund representative, to tone down the more caustic aspects of Rosa Luxemburg's 
text, Plekhanov remained dissatisfied with the overall letter. It was also agreed 
that each organisation would send this joint reply separately.m3  
The refusal of the other groups to admit the PPS to the Amsterdam discus-
sion meeting led the party at the end of August to begin re-advocating the idea 
of a joint conference restricted to the revolutionary parties of the minority na-
tionalities. The proposal failed, however, to materialise this time around.104 
The issues raised in Amsterdam came up for consideration by the council of 
the RSDWP, in the shape of Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov, and Noskov, togeth-
er with Dan (not a member of the council), at a meeting held on 3 September 
103 I. Volkovicher, "Partiia i russko-iaponskaia voina", Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia No 
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in Geneva. The council approved the actions of the party's representatives who 
had been present at the discussion meeting. Zilliacus' proposed conference ap-
pealed the least to Dan and Martov. They feared that the social democrats would 
be likely to lose out during such a conference and in the organisation of the planned 
news agency. No other groups, and particularly not any bourgeois groupings, 
should be allowed the opportunity to dictate the party's political activities, they 
argued. Zilliacus' close links with the Socialist Revolutionaries also served as a 
source of additional irritation. 
Plekhanov agreed with Dan and Martov that the RSDWP could not take part 
in any conference serving the interests of Japan, but the Mensheviks' emphasis 
on issues of party particularism does not appear to have evoked much sympathy 
in him.105 Natanson's communications had undoubtedly had their effect on 
Plekhanov. 
In their joint reply to Zilliacus, the social democrats declared that, while they 
were ready to support every true opposition and revolutionary movement, they 
had been forced to decline the invitation to the conference because it would em-
brace too wide a spread of heterogenous groupings, including some which pinned 
their hopes, in conflict with the principles of the class struggle, on a Japanese 
military victory. Effective revolutionary activity was only possible through a class 
struggle waged by the masses within the Empire and in unison with the Japanese 
socialist proletariat, aimed at bringing an end to the criminal war as soon as pos-
sible.' 
Rosa Luxemburg's party, the SDKPiL, had not at any stage been keen to take 
part in a conference of opposition groupings for the simple reason that it would 
not have been able to ensure the exclusion of the PPS, and because the SDKPiL 
was otherwise in principle opposed to party alliances cutting across ideological 
and class divides. 1°7 The other social democratic parties stayed away from the 
conference as a result of the revelations surrounding the links of Zilliacus and 
others with the Japanese government. 
The Bolsheviks 
 
Zilliacus had been able, through his Socialist Revolutionary friends, to keep 
abreast of the schism which had developed within the RSDWP.108 Of the party's 
leaders, he had been in direct contact only with Plekhanov, whom he considered 
the most important figure within the main wing of the party. 
105 For the minutes of the council meeting, see Volkovicher 1924, pp. 119--122. Also 
see Leninskii sbornik XV (1930), pp. 45-55, 127; Note 114. 
106 Iskra No 79 I December 1904 (o.s.), p. 4. 
107 Sotsial-demokraticheskoe dvizhenie 1928, pp. 134-136; Rosa Luxemburg, Gesam- 
melte Werke, 1/2 (Berlin, 1979), pp. 456-461. 
'08 K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 13 April and 4 July 1904, Neovius Collection, VA. 
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After learning from Bund representatives at the end of July that both factions 
wanted to take part in the conference, Zilliacus decided to drop his previous ap-
proach and tried to contact Lenin in Geneva. Lenin, however, was away at the 
time. Zilliacus decided not to approach Plekhanov directly to avoid creating the 
impression that he favoured one wing at the expense of the other and instead 
wrote to them both.109 This was the only time when he is known to have ap-
proached Lenin. 
The dispute which had developed surrounding the composition of the party 
delegation at the Amsterdam congress, together with a number of other issues, 
combined to further aggravate relations between the Bolsheviks and the Menshe-
viks during August. As a result of this development, Lenin did not travel to 
Amsterdam, or take part in the meeting of the party council held on 3 Septem-
ber.10 No representatives from the Bolsheviks seem to have been invited to the 
discussion meeting held between the various social democratic parties in Amster-
dam on 22 August. 
According to a Menshevik view of events dating from the period, Lenin re-
fused to take part in the moves to publicise the existence of the PPS' Japanese 
contacts advocated by the Polish Social Democrats and the Mensheviks. This 
assertion, however, would appear to be at variance with the evident reluctance 
of the Mensheviks at the council meeting on 3 September to countenance any-
thing which might lead to a public scandal on the issue. This must put a question 
mark over the interpretation put on Lenin's position, although there may be some 
truth in it all the same. At the meeting on 3 September, Dan and Martov both 
argued more strongly against relying on Japanese assistance than did Plekhanov. 
One possible explanation for this is that Dan would have been ready to expose 
the PPS' links with the Japanese in Amsterdam, but that Plekhanov had suc-
ceeded in persuading him against doing so. According to this argument, both 
Plekhanov and Lenin would have been against a public scandal on the issue from 
the start, and the Mensheviks and other social democrats would have had to yield 
to this.'" 
The Bolsheviks' links with Japanese official representatives maintained by V.D. 
Bonch-Bruevich, a journalist working for the Rassvet magazine and in charge 
of the Geneva office of the RSDWP, ostensibly covering the transmitting of 
propaganda to Russian prisoners of war, came under scrutiny at the same coun-
cil meeting on 3 September. Dan and Martov, in particular, were keen to use 
1/9 K. Zilliacus to L.E. Shishko 31 July 1904, Volkhovskii Collection, HI (USA tk 18, 
VA). 
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"' On the council meeting on 3 September, see Volkovicher 1924, pp. 119-122. For 
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this as a weapon against Lenin and the Bolsheviks, but Plekhanov argued that 
nothing certain had as yet been proved.12 
No one has so far managed to find any clear evidence that the Bolsheviks had 
anything more to do with the Japanese than the propaganda dispatches envisaged 
or actually channelled to Japan by Bonch-Bruevich.13  
Plekhanov's disagreement with Dan and Martov over the Bonch-Bruevich case 
leads one to suspect a similar difference of opinion having existed on the ques-
tion of the revelation of the PPS' Japanese contacts. We can assume that it was 
in Lenin's interests to resist any attempts to publicly label the PPS as a Japanese 
stooge, if only because, if this kind of denunciation were deemed acceptable, 
the Mensheviks would have then also been in a position to tar both Bonch-Bruevich 
and the Bolsheviks with the same brush. 
If our assumptions are correct, they would explain Lenin's passivity towards 
the Paris conference. Following the meeting of the party council held in June, 
according to the documents at present to hand, he did not once voice an opinion 
on the conference or the Menshevik stance towards it, either in his public writ-
ings or in his private correspondence.114 Why unnecessarily involve himself in 
such a sensitive issue? 
Lenin's low profile on the conference question could naturally just as well be 
explained by his passionate concentration on the party's internal developments. 
Organising the Bolshevik group took up nearly all his time and energy at this 
stage.115  It could also be claimed that Lenin was in complete agreement with the 
decisions taken by the Mensheviks on the Paris conference. It is most probable, 
however, that the Bonch-Bruevich controversy was the main reason behind Le-
nin's passivity. 
The Socialist Revolutionaries 
In their policy on the minority nationalities question, the Socialist Revolution-
aries, in the shape of their main ideologist, Viktor Chernov, stressed the impor- 
112 Volkovieher 1924, pp. 120-122; Leninskii sbornik XV (1930), p. 125; V. Boneh-
Bruevich, "Zagranichnaia postanovka tekhniki v sots.-dem. rabochei partii i rasprostranenie 
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1 (Moskva, s.a. = 1924), pp. 232-235. 
"' Futrell 1967, pp. 7-22. 
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while Plekhanov supported it, the latter being left in the minority on the issue and ulti-
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tance of eliminating all forms of ethnically-based oppression as a means of achiev-
ing effective collaboration between different national groups. Minority peoples 
were to be free to decide themselves the nature of their relationship to the Em-
pire, to which they had been forcibly annexed. Voluntary integration was only 
to be achieved by first granting the minority nationalities complete and unilateral 
self-determination. Responsibility for determining the status of each national 
group vis-à-vis the Empire, according to Chernov, lay with the working classes 
of these groups, who were recommended to make their decisions in line with the 
interests of social progress and socialism. He considered it quite acceptable that 
the Poles and Finns might decide to demand their country's complete separation 
from Russia. In the case of other nationalities which had as yet not progressed 
so far in political and social development, a federal arrangement, autonomy or 
some other form of local government would be a more appropriate solution. Cher-
nov visualised federalism as likely to guarantee a good level of cooperation be-
tween individual nationalities much more effectively than any form of central-
ism, both in the areas of political, as well as party political inter-relations.116 
During the course of the first congress of the Foreign Organisation of the So-
cialist Revolutionary Party held in August 1903, it became clear that not all émigré 
leaders were as favourably disposed towards the separatist aspirations of the 
minority nationalities as Chernov. Although a joint resolution was not arrived 
at, the draft version that had served as the basis of discussion followed Cher-
nov's overall ideas. This indicates that his views were, at least to a certain extent, 
representative of the general mood among the émigré leadership.11' 
The second congress of the Foreign Organisation of the party held in July 1904 
covered the question of the party's relations with the other Russian parties. In 
its concluding statement, the commission set up to study and finalise party poli-
cy on this question declared that the Socialist Revolutionaries were willing to enter 
into agreements covering practical issues with any of the other opposition par-
ties. A final resolution enshrining this principle, however, failed to be approved 
and the question was passed on for further discussion to the party's central com-
mittee.118 
ion. Leninskii sbornik XV (1930), passim; Perepiska V.I. Lenina i rukovodimykh im uchrezh-
denii RSDRP s partiinymi organizatsiiami, 1903-1905 gg., 2-3 (Moskya, 1975 & 1977), 
passim. 
116 See V.M. Chernov's anonymous articles: "Natsional'noe poraboshchenie i revoliu-
tsionnyi sotsializm", Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 18 1 February 1903 (o.$), pp. 1-4. "Na-
tsional'nyi vopros i revoliutsiia", Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 35 1 November 1903 (o.s.), 
pp. 1-3; Dietrich Geyer, Lenin in der russischen Sozialdemokratie: Die Arbeiterbewegung  
im Zarenreich als Organisationsproblem der  revolutionären Intelligenz 1890-1903, Bei-
träge zur Geschichte Osteuropas 3 (Köln, 1962), pp. 362-364. 
17 For material relating to the congress, see PSR No 725, IISG. 
"8 For the draft resolutions diseussed, see PSR No 514. Draft of the minutes: No 364a-
b. 1ISG. Aecording to the concluding statement referred to above (No 514), the Socialist 
Revolutionaries saw the possible granting of Polish independence as an exceptional solu-
tion and one which eould not be applied to other nationalities. 
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The Socialist Revolutionaries (from left to right) V.M. Chernov, F.V. Volkhovskii, 
N.V. Chaikovskii, E.E. Lazarev, and L.E. Shishko. 
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The general position of the Socialist Revolutionaries regarding political organi-
sation and nationality made it much easier for them than for the social democrats 
to accept the type of cross-party alliance embodied in the Paris conference. The 
occasional ambivalence evident in their stance resulted in the main from their 
doubts about the depth of anti-government sentiment felt by the liberals and the 
willingness of the social democrats to collaborate with other parties. 
The very obvious low-key role taken by the Socialist Revolutionaries in the 
preparations leading up to the Paris conference was clearly linked to their reali-
sation that Zilliacus, otherwise a close associate of the party, was far better suit-
ed to handling them than they were. 
The Paris Conference (30.9.-5.10.1904) 
and Its Aftermath 
Zilliacus sent out conference invitations to a total of 19 revolutionary and oppo-
sition parties. Eight of these accepted: 
1) The Union of Liberation (represented by V. Ia. Bogucharskii, Petr D. Dol-
gorukov, P.N. Miliukov, and P.B. Struve) 
2) The Polish National League (Zygmunt Balicki and Roman Dmowski) 
3) The Finnish opposition (represented by Konni Zilliacus and Arvid Neovius, 
with Leo Mechelin acting as their unofficial advisor in Paris) 
4) The Socialist Revolutionary Party (Evno Azef and V.M. Chernov; M.A. 
Natanson also attended). 
5) The Polish Socialist Party (Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz, Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz, 
and Aleksander Malinowski) 
6) The Georgian Party of Socialists-Federalists-Revolutionaries (Georgii Dekanozi 
and Gabuniia) 
7) The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Mikayel Varandian-Hovhannisian) 
8) The Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Jånis Ozols) 
Of the eight parties represented, three (1-3) were non-socialist and one (8) 
social democratic. Support for the Socialist Revolutionaries was provided by the 
three minority nationality parties (5-7) otherwise close to them.19 The sole so- 
19 For the official minutes of the Paris conference and the declaration that accompa-
nied them, see Listok Osvobozhdeniia No 17 19 November (2 December) 1904, pp. 1-2 
& Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 56 5 December 1904 (o.s.), pp. 7-9. For A. Neovius' ac-
count of the conference, see Törngren 1929, pp. 241-255. For the report, entitled La con-
férence, and the memorandum, entitled Mémoire 1 (October 1904), delivered by Zilliacus  
to the Japanese, see Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan (rokokunobu) No 3, 1.6.3.2-9, GS. For 
the report on the conference drawn up by the Russian secret police and based on Azef's 
communications, see Russkii politicheskii sysk za granitsei 1914, pp. 182-195. Memoirs 
containing references to the conference include: Zilliacus 1I 1920, pp. 21-28; Miliukov 
1938, pp. 122-127; Miliukov 1 1955, pp. 242-245; Chernov 1953, pp. 210-212. Neovius' 
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cial democratic representative present at the conference stressed that he was there 
to keep a check on whatever decisions were taken. His party, unlike the other 
seven organisations which were represented, did not sign the joint common decla-
ration issued on coordinating the opposition's anti-government activities.120 
Although making it clear that their signatures on the declaration did not signi-
fy their having, in any way, abandoned their own individual programmes or chosen 
tactics, the parties were able to agree on the following common principles and 
demands: 
1) The overthrow of the autocracy; the repeal of all moves taken undermining 
Finland's constitutional rights; 
2) The replacement of the autocratic régime with a democratic form of govern-
ment based on universal suffrage; 
3) National self-determination; the freedom under the law for all national groups 
to be allowed to determine their own development; the elimination of the vio-
lent measures introduced by the Russian authorities against various national-
ities within the Empire. 
During the discussions surrounding the declaration, the PPS had demanded 
complete independence for Poland. The immediate aim of the Polish National 
League was restricted to achieving political autonomy alone. Representatives from 
the other minority nationalities also confined themselves to aiming only at au-
tonomy. While the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Latvians were willing to ap-
prove unqualified recognition of the possibility of secession, the Russian liberals 
refused outright to put their name to any statement of this kind. The PPS and 
the Polish National League were responsible for drafting the final version of the 
third section of the declaration and wording it in such a way as to make it ac-
ceptable to all the parties involved. 
Agreement in principle was reached on the second section of the declaration 
after one of the liberal delegates, Prince Dolgorukov, announced that his group 
accepted the demand for universal suffrage. At the suggestion of the Finnish op-
position, the conference decided to restrict itself to approving this only as a mat-
ter of general principle and did not attempt to define its position on the details 
report on the conference written immediately after its conclusion is the most reliable and 
detailed source on what happened during its eourse. The date of the final day of discus-
sions (5 October) mentioned there is probably correct. The yariety of references concern-
ing the date of this concluding day has resulted from the fact that many representatives 
remained in Paris for their own discussions after the conference proper had ended. Ne-
ovius also includes a complete list of the organisations invited (p. 252). For a list of those 
which actually attended, see Russkii politicheskii sysk za granitsei 1914, p. 185; Galai 1973, 
p. 216. 
20 Listok Osvobozhdeniia No 17 19 November (2 December) 1904, pp. 1-2; Törngren 
1929, p. 245, 247-248. The action of the Latvians went against the agreement they had 
made with the other social democratic groups in Amsterdam, but they did not consider 
it binding on them. See von Transehe-Roseneck 1I 1908, pp. 100-101. 
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of how it was to be implemented in practice, an area in which the parties had 
a variety of conflicting ideas.'2' 
It was decided to set up a coordinating body, to be responsible for maintain-
ing inter-party contacts within Russia, and a news agency abroad.'22  Both deci-
sions failed to be implemented in practice. 
 
Zilliacus had received notice of the decision of the RSDWP, the SDKPiL, and 
the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party not to attend only shortly prior to the begin-
ning of the conference. These decisions came as a complete surprise to him.'23 
The Bund's letter declining his invitation arrived only later.124 
The conference approved a reply to the RSDWP in which the signatories at-
tempted to refute the arguments which the RSDWP had advanced as part of its 
case for not attending, alleging that they were based on misunderstandings. It 
was decided to give the social democrats the possibility of subsequently aligning 
themselves behind the conference decisions, should they so choose.125 
Publication of the minutes of the conference and the joint declaration was post-
poned at the request of the Union of Liberation until the beginning of Decem-
ber, although the Finnish delegation received the impression that the material 
could be made public by the beginning of November. During the discussion prior 
to this decision, the Finnish opposition had unsuccessfully called for an even longer 
delay than that asked for by the Union of Liberation. The revolutionary parties, 
in contrast, had advocated immediate publication.126 
Much of the time during the course of the conference and the attendant infor-
mal talks was spent by the parties in discussing their plans on anti-government 
action. The revolutionary parties (all those present except the Union of Libera-
tion, the Polish National League and the Finnish opposition) organised a sepa-
rate meeting of their own to coordinate a campaign of civil disturbances directed 
121  Törngren 1929, pp. 242-246. See also Leo Mechelin's memorandum entitled La 
question du suffrage universel, Mechelin Doeument Collection 23 (30), VA; Wies/aw 
Bierikowski, Kazimierz Keltes-Krauz: Zycie i dzielo (Wroclaw, 1969), pp. 219-220; Cher-
nov 1953, pp. 210-212; Chernov 1970, p. 172; Miliukoy 1938, pp. 125-126. 
127 Törngren 1929, p. 248; K. Zilliacus, La conférence, Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan 
(rokokunobu) No 3, 1.6.3.2-9, GS. 
123 Törngren 1929, p. 241. 
23 Törngren 1929, p. 241; Russkii politicheskii sysk za granitsei 1914, p. 186; A.A. 
 
Makaroy to L.A. Rataev 6 September 1904 (o.s.), Okhrana Archives, XXI F. I, H1 (USA 
tk 18, VA); Iskra No 79 1 December 1904 (o.s.), p. 3; Iskra No 82 1 January 1905 (o.s.), p. 2. 
'25 Törngren 1929, p. 241, 249, 251, 254-255. Zilliacus wrote to Plekhanov and the 
Bund, amongst others, with this in mind, but to no avail. K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 23 
October 1904, Neovius Collection, VA; Pis'ma P.B. Aksel'roda i Iu. O. Martova 1924, 
pp. 109-110. 
'26 Russkii politicheskii sysk za granitsei 1914, p. 193; Törngren 1929, p. 131, 249-251; 
A. Törngren to L. Mechelin 4 and 8 November 1904, Mechelin Letter Collection 48, VA; 
K. Zilliacus to A. Neovius 16 and 23 October and 5 November 1904, Neovius Collection, 
VA; K. Zilliacus, La conférence, Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan (rokokunobu) No 3, 
1.6.3.2-9, GS. 
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against the war and the government. Zilliacus attended this meeting, albeit not 
as an official representative of his party. Although a detailed plan of action to 
be adopted by all the parties concerned did not emerge, agreement was reached 
on the need to strengthen their actions and adopt a more radical approach directed, 
for example, at hampering military call-up and recruitment.127 
Unrest did indeed increase in a number of areas of the Empire towards the 
end of 1904, but primarily as the result of independent action taken by individual 
parties, rather than any concerted effort. The most visible signs of opposition 
activity, the banquet campaign mounted by the liberals128 and the violent demon-
strations masterminded by the PPS in Poland from 13 November onwards''-9, 
cannot really be considered as resulting from either the talks in Paris or the ef-
forts of Zilliacus. The liberals had not taken part in the separate set of discus-
sions held by the revolutionary parties and Zilliacus remained opposed to the 
idea of disturbances breaking out first in any areas populated by minority na-
tionalities. 
In his memoirs, Zilliacus did not forget to mention the commendation he 
received from Japan for his work in organising the Paris conference.130 The Jap-
anese were nevertheless not completely satisfied with their enthusiastic associ-
ate. In his memorandum on the Paris conference, Zilliacus had requested Japan 
to state officially that it would rather conclude peace with a Russian constitu-
tional government than with Tsarism, which it considered to be its real enemy. 
His request had not been well received within the Japanese Foreign Ministry, 
used as it was to working through traditional diplomatic channels. The General 
Staff refused Akashi's request to allow him access to additional funds for sub-
version above and beyond the 100,000 yen already granted. The General Staff 
had previously underlined to Akashi the need to ensure that funds were distributed 
to a range of parties and not restricted to two or three organisations.131 
Writing to a correspondent in Finland in March 1905, Zilliacus indicated that 
he had passed on various Japanese monies to the parties which had attended the 
Paris conference after it had finished, taking care not to reveal the origin of the 
funds to the Russian parties.132  This money was probably part of the sum 
''-' Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 65 25 April 1905 (o.s.), p. 4;  Michal Lusnia (= K. 
Kelles-Krauz), "Die Lage in Polen und Litauen", Socialistische Monatshefte 1905, pp. 
235-236;  Konni Zilliacus, Revolution und Gegenrevolution in Russland und Finnland,  
2. Aufl. (München, 1912), pp. 87-90;  Russkii politicheskii sysk za granitsei 1914, pp. 
194-195;  Zilliacus 11 1920, pp. 25-27; Törngren 1929, pp. 246-248, 255-256; von Trans-
ehe-Roseneck 11 1908, p. 101; K. Zilliacus to A. Neoyius 16 October 1904, Neovius Collec-
tion, VA.  
'28 Galai 1973, p. 218 ff.  
'29 Michal Lusnia (= K. Kelles-Krauz), "Die Lage in Polen und Litauen", Socialistische 
Monatshefte 1905, p. 236; Lerski 1959, p. 95. 
140 Zilliacus II 1920, pp. 27-28. 
131 K.  Zilliacus, Mémoire I (October 1904), Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan (rokokunobu)  
No 3, 1.6.3.2-9, GS; Futrell 1967, p. 18; Telegram 5 in the present volume. 
132 K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, AAB. Akashi's  
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(100,000 yen) approved by the Japanese General Staff for transfer to Akashi on 
31 August the previous year. 
The poor turn-out witnessed at the Paris conference served to reduce its over-
all significance. Of the 19 organisations invited to attend, only 8 sent representa-
tives. Only the social democratic groupings are known, however, to have inten-
tionally decided to boycott the conference. A number of those who stayed away 
were, in any case, of less than major significance. 
Subsequent to the conference, the ranks thinned out even further. While the 
Stockholm committee was prepared to give a belated blessing to the Finnish dele-
gation's decision to bypass some of its instructions, the Helsinki constitution-
alists were adamant in demanding that all references to the Finnish opposition 
be removed from the minutes of the conference and the joint declaration. Fol-
lowing the Emperor's announcement on 26 August 1904 of the convocation of 
the Finnish Diet for a session beginning on 6 December, the Helsinki-based con-
stitutionalists feared that their party's participation in an anti-government man-
ifesto alongside Russian revolutionary parties would undermine their aim of the 
formation of a joint front in the Diet committed to campaigning for the return 
of autonomy. 
The Helsinki constitutionalists were also moving towards the belief that it might 
now be possible to achieve an acceptable compromise with the autocratic authori-
ties. The hopes centred around this ultimately weighed more heavily in the bal-
ance with the Helsinki constitutionalists than did calculations based on the pos-
sible success of the opposition in achieving some form of breakthrough which 
would affect the Empire as a whole. Particularist interest proved to be stronger 
than any sense of solidarity with the rest of the Empire, particularly after the 
Russian liberals had promised that the Finnish opposition's decision to remove 
its signature from the conference papers would not harm relations between the 
two parties. 
During November, the Finnish opposition also persuaded the other signato-
ries of the conference minutes to agree to the removal of all references to the 
Finnish opposition from material intended to be made public. 
Around the same time, Zilliacus went ahead with his plan, which had been 
maturing in his mind for some time, for a separate party and founded a new 
radical opposition group known as the Finnish Active Resistance Party. The new 
party proved most attractive to the small group of supporters which had formed 
around him during September 1903, while the majority of the exiles resident in 
Stockholm, together with the consitutionalists active within Finland, remained 
faithful to the old party. The new party moved swiftly to fill the vacuum left 
by the decision of the mainstream Finnish opposition to rescind its association 
with the Paris conference, simply appending its name in the place of the latter's 
letter to G. Dekanozi dated 18 November 1904 apparently covered funds to be paid to the 
Georgians, see Iznanka revoliutsii 1906. 
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to the official documents connected with the conference. It would be easy as a 
result of this switch of names to get the impression, from the documents alone, 
that it was the activist party and not the main Finnish opposition which actually 
took part in the Paris conference.13  
Another organisation not represented during the conference proceedings, the 
Belorussian Socialist Hramada, also subsequently added its endorsement to the 
conference decisions, although in this case its name was not added to the confer-
ence documents which were made public.134 
A lukewarm attitude towards the joint conference of opposition forces active 
throughout the Empire made itself felt not only among the Finnish constitution-
alists, but also within certain elements of the Polish opposition. The Polish Na-
tional League, in particular, did not attach much significance to the Paris con-
ference. The weakness of the Russian revolutionary and opposition parties had, 
up until 1904, served to fuel the PPS' separatism, but the strengthening of the 
Russian opposition during the year forced the PPS to re-evaluate its attitudes 
towards Poland's eastern neighbour. Many of those within the party gravitated 
towards supporting closer cooperation with the Russian liberals. It was largely 
because of this that the PPS finally decided to attend the Paris conference. A 
substantial body of opinion within the party, however, remained opposed to the 
new policy.'35 
The minutes of the proceedings of the Paris conference, together with the joint 
declaration issued, were published in a number of Western European papers on 
1 December 1904.136 These were accompanied in Listok Osvobozhdeniia by a 
Törngren 1929, pp. 122-136; Törngren 1942, pp. 145-149, 396-407; L. Gripen-
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29 November 1904. V. Furuhjelm to A. Neovius 24 November 1904. Lehmann to A. Ne-
oyius 12 October 1904. J.N. Reuter to A. Neovius 4 and 8 Noyember 1904. A. Törngren 
to A. Neovius 21 and 22 October and 14 and 29 November 1904. Neovius Collection, VA; 
L. Mechelin to J.N. Reuter 29 October 1904. A. Neovius to J.N. Reuter 5 November 1904. 
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and to T 19 March 1905. Reuter Letter Collection XIII, XIX, XXI, and XXIII, ÅAB; L. 
Mechelin to J. Castrén 6 August 1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA; O. Procopé's circular 
dated 30 October 1904, Törngren Collection, VA. For the documents relating to the party's 
founding and the Paris conference, see the Finnish Active Resistance Party Archive, VA;  
Zilliacus 11 1920, pp. 28-37; Gummerus 1929, pp. 171-176; Alma Söderhjelm, "Det ak-
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ländsk politik 1899-1919 (Helsingfors, 1919), p. 43 ff. 
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'" On the League, see Fountain 1980, p. 209; Wladyslaw Pobög-Malinowski, Najnow-
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communiqué issued by the Union of Liberation making its existence and politi-
cal aims public for the first time. The communiqué's calls for a democratic form 
of government went further than those agreed on at the Paris conference. In line 
with its political programme, the Union demanded not only universal suffrage 
but also equal suffrage, and secret and direct elections. The decision of the Union 
of Liberation to make its existence public at the time of the publication of the 
conference material indicates that it considered the conference to be of great sig-
nificance.137 
A similarly positive attitude towards the conference was also typical of the So-
cialist Revolutionaries. According to an editorial published in mid-October in 
Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, collaboration between the socialist parties and other 
opposition forces on specific questions in the area of anti-government activities 
was an absolute necessity, on account of the sheer scale of the system the oppo-
sition was up against. It was at this point that the idea of "getrennt marschieren, 
vereint schlagen" was proposed; no permanent alliances or compromises on policy 
programmes or tactics with the non-socialists, on the other hand, were thought 
acceptable. Collaboration across party divisions in the struggle against the au-
tocracy was also necessary, the journal argued, because it would allow the so-
cialists a say in the decisions affecting society and the nationality question likely 
to follow an overthrow of the autocracy. After the final fall of the Tsarist ré-
gime, however, the ways of the socialists and their class enemies were inevitably 
bound to part. 
Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia also argued that the socialist parties should work to-
wards the establishment of a federative socialist bloc. Total unification would 
not be possible as long as political freedom did not exist within Russia.138 
Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia published the official conference documents in De-
cember. Alongside them, the journal also printed a declaration signed by the So-
cialist Revolutionaries, the PPS, the Georgian Party of Socialists-Federalists-
Revolutionaries, and the Latvian Social Democratic Union (which had not tak-
en part in the Paris conference). In this, the signatories emphasised the signifi-
cant differences which existed between the socialist camp and the non-socialists 
in their attitudes towards the struggle against the autocracy.139 In an editorial 
in the same issue, the journal denied that the socialists had agreed to any alliance 
or ideological compromises with the non-socialists during the conference.19 The 
137 Listok Osvobozhdeniia No 17 19 November (2 December) 1904, p. 2; Galai 1973, 
pp. 189-190. 
138 "Na dva fronta", Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 53 30 September 1904 (o.s.), pp. 
1-3. 
'39 
 "Ko ysem rabochim", Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 56 5 December 1904 (o.s.), pp. 
1-2. See also Michal Lusnia (= K. Kelles-Krauz), "Die Lage in Polen und Litauen", So-
cialistische Monatshefte 1905, pp. 235-236; Najdus 1973, pp. 196-197. 
1 A0 "Sotsialisty-reyoliutsionery i nesotsialisticheskaia demokratiia", Revoliutsionnaia 
Rossiia No 56 5 December 1904 (o.s.), pp. 2-7. 
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Socialist Revolutionaries were right in assuming that it was precisely in this area 
that the social democrats would choose to attack them. 
The international socialist congress held in Amsterdam in August 1904 had 
rejected revisionist attempts to transform the concept of revolutionary class strug-
gle into a reformist type of policy, as well as all attempts advanced in various 
quarters to downplay the central tenet of class conflict, made in the hope of 
smoothing the path for collaboration with the bourgeois parties. The final reso-
lution approved was particularly directed against the policies advocated by the 
French socialist Jean Jaures, who had argued for the need for coalitions across 
class divisions as a means of advancing the progressive cause.141 
The Menshevik paper Iskra believed that events at the Paris conference had 
led to the formation of a permanent bloc in which the most politically conserva-
tive of those represented had been allowed to determine the shape of the pack-
age of political aims which had been adopted there. As a result, the conference 
had not demanded the formation of a republic, a constituent assembly or the 
introduction of equal suffrage or secret and direct elections, although even the 
Russian liberals had approved the latter three principles. The paper also expressed 
its surprise at the behaviour of the PPS, which had previously called for the Rus-
sian Social Democrats to align themselves behind a call for Polish independence, 
but which had now satisfied itself with a significantly more modest demand af-
ter allying itself in a common front with Russian moderate bourgeois forces. Iskra 
underlined what it saw as the close parallel existing between the policies adopted 
at the Paris conference and those advocated by Jaures. The paper declared that 
the social democrats should only enter into temporary agreements with the bour-
geois parties.'4z 
A significant part of the international social democratic movement, however, 
reacted rather more favourably to the Paris conference than Iskra, the Bund and 
the Rosa Luxemburg-led SDKPiL.143 The leader of the German Social 
Democratic Party, August Bebel, had, for example, recommended a policy of 
cooperation with the Russian liberals to Axelrod in September 1904.144 Iskra 
soon found itself drawn into a polemical argument with the leading organs of 
the German and Austrian Social Democrats, Vorwärts and Arbeiter-Zeitung, 
which both considered the self-imposed isolation adopted by the Russian party 
with regard to other revolutionary and opposition forces as very much a regret- 
141  Internationaler Sozialistischer  Kongress, Congres Socialiste International, Interna-
tional Socialist Congress, Amsterdam 1904: Resolutionen, Resolutions, Resolutions 
(Bruxelles, 1905), pp. 5-10. Discussion: Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Amster-
dam, 14. bis 20. August 1904 (Berlin, 1904), pp. 31-49, 58-78. 
142 "Ob"edinenie burzhuaznoi demokratii", Iskra No 79 1 December 1904 (o.s.), pp. 
1-4. 
143 Tobias 1972, pp. 282-283; karnowska 1965, p. 142; Luxemburg, Gesammelte 
Werke, 1/2 (1979), pp. 456-461. 
149 A. Bebel to P.B. Axelrod 13 September 1904, P.B. Axelrod Archive, IISG; Geyer 
1958, pp. 419-420. 
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table mistake.145 
In contrast, Karl Kautsky, in a letter written to Axelrod, expressed his approval 
of the Mensheviks' policy adopted towards what he termed the "liberal bloc". 
Kautsky hoped that Axelrod would present his group's approach in the German 
party press. "6 
The Socialist Revolutionary journal Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia made sure that 
its readers were kept informed of the attitudes towards the conference expressed 
in Vorwärts and its views on the isolationist attitudes of the Russian social 
democratic movement.147 To the annoyance of the Socialist Revolutionaries, 
Jean Jaures also gave his support to the policies adopted at the Paris confer-
ence.148 Only Struve, writing in Osvobozhdenie, expressed his satisfaction at 
Jaures' move.149 The Socialist Revolutionaries had traditionally been critical of 
this figure on the right wing of French socialism15°, and now suspected that he 
was attempting to interpret the decisions taken at the conference as approval for 
his own policies. The Socialist Revolutionaries feared that, unless they were careful 
to make their position clear, the Russian émigré socialist community, together 
with the international socialist movement, would put them in the same category 
as Jaures and the other revisionists. In order to reduce this danger, Chernov dis-
patched a letter to Jaures' L'Humanite, in which he explained that the limited 
coordination of opposition activities proposed at the conference was something 
quite different from a comprehensive joint plan of action uniting the opposition 
of the type which Jaures had referred to.151 
Seen from the outside, the argument which developed within the Russian so-
cialist movement in connection with the Paris conference as to what kind of agree-
ments with the non-socialist were acceptable seems little more than petty quib-
bling of the worst kind. Within the movement, however, the importance of the 
theoretical issues which lay behind this dispute was never questioned, irrespec-
tive of the patent gulf separating them from more practical, down to earth polit-
ical problems. 
The social democrats claimed that the Paris conference had taken a rather am-
biguous stance on a number of democratic fundamentals. The Socialist Revolu-
tionaries found it hardest to reply to this kind of criticism, which could not be 
135 Vorwärts 22 December 1904 and 20 January 1905; Arbeiter-Zeitung 22 December 
1904; Iskra No 82 1 January 1905 (o.s.), pp. 1-2; Geyer 1958, p. 422. 
136 K. Kautsky to P.B. Axelrod 19 December 1904, Axelrod Archiye, IISG. 
37 Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 58 20 January 1905 (o.s.), pp. 21-22. 
145 L'Humanite 1 December 1904. 
159 P. S(truve), "Jaures o soglasovannykh deistviiakh russkoi oppozitsii", Osvobozh- 
denie No 61 13 December (30 Noyember) 1904, pp. 185-186. 
150 "Voina s laponiei i interesy russkoi revoliutsii", Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 54 30 
October 1904 (o.s.), pp. 20-22; Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Amsterdam 1904, 
p. 62. 
151 N.S. Rusanoy, V emigratsii, Istoriko-revoliutsionnaia biblioteka XL—XLI (Mosk-
va, 1929), pp. 278-280. See also lu. Gardenin (= V.M. Chernoy), "Nashim obyiniteliam", 
Vestnik Russkoi Revoliutsii No 4:1, March 1905, pp. 386-410. 
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avoided by taking refuge in theoretical hair-splitting. In the view of Revoliu-
tsionnaia Rossiia, it had been unanimously accepted at the conference that con-
firmation of the principle of universal suffrage automatically implied equal suf-
frage, together with secret and direct elections.152 In reality, however, the con-
ference had avoided spelling out in detail its position on the suffrage question, 
as agreement on any more precise definition would have been impossible to 
achieve. The Finnish moderate opposition, for example, would have refused to 
put its signature to a more specific resolution containing the latter points. 
But, if some real measure of collaborative action between opposition forces 
was to be achieved, compromises would inevitably have to be made. The Socialist 
Revolutionaries considered it better to sacrifice something, if by doing so agree-
ment — even if only a modest degree of agreement — could be achieved; in the 
view of the social democrats, on the other hand, the importance of allegiance 
to one's ideological beliefs and established policies was more important than the 
results to be gained from diverging from them in the name of compromise. It 
should be remembered, however, that this attitude only really emerged in the 
period subsequent to the conference. Particularist opinion gained the upper hand 
in the minds of the Russian social democrats over that more favourably disposed 
towards cross-party collaboration only after the social democrats had got wind 
of the Japanese links of Zilliacus and the PPS. In the final analysis, it was Zillia-
cus himself who effectively scuttled his own aim of uniting opposition forces. 
It is impossible to say, all the same, what degree of agreement would have emerged 
in Paris had the social democrats relented and attended the conference. 
Moves towards Unification within the Russian 
Socialist Movement in the Wake of 
the Amsterdam Congress 
The imperative requirement to establish a single, united socialist party in every 
country was underlined in a resolution issued at the conclusion of the Amster-
dam international socialist congress.153 This call was particularly addressed to 
the French and Russian socialists, both of which had thus far proved incapable 
of uniting their forces under a common banner. The divisions existing within 
the movement in Russia were additionally complicated by the fact that they result-
ed not only from conflicts of approach and emphasis, but also from the efforts 
evident among many of the socialists representing the minority nationalities to 
X52 Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 58 20 January 1905 (o.s.), pp. 21-22. See also "V ot-
vet na zaprosy", Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 74 1 September 1905 (o.s.), pp. 27-28. 
153 Internationaler Sozialistischer Kongress... Amsterdam 1904... Resolutionen 1905, pp. 
11-13. 
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organise their activities around independent national parties.'sa 
Beginning in October 1904, August Bebel began a concerted effort aimed at 
tackling some of these problems. Bebel sought to organise a conference of social 
democratic parties and factions active across the Russian Empire to be charged 
with improving inter-group collaboration. Bebel's moves were backed by Karl 
Kautsky and the Austrian socialist leader Victor Adler. Adler also suggested in-
viting the Polish PPS and the Socialist Revolutionaries to the proposed confer-
ence. The divisions existing between the Russian socialists proved, however, yet 
again to be insurmountable and the conference, planned for January 1905, never 
took place. The Mensheviks, for example, resisted the idea of including the PPS, 
the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolshevik faction on the list of those to be 
invited. They would also have preferred to see the national social democratic par-
ties amalgamated with the RSDWP. Rosa Luxemburg too opposed the proposed 
conference, seeing it as being based on the federalist party model. She was also 
concerned about the threat of the PPS. It was her opposition which ultimately 
compelled Bebel to throw in the towel and abandon his conference plans. j$5  
The Russian socialists could not, however, have been left in any doubt that 
the continuing divisions existing within the Russian Left were viewed with in-
creasing disapproval by the international socialist movement. This disapproval 
only grew following the moves taken by the French socialists in the wake of the 
Amsterdam congress towards establishing a single united party. In a meeting held 
on 15 January 1905, the International Socialist Bureau urged the national move-
ments which had still failed to unite themselves to follow the French example 
and comply with the resolution on party unity approved at the Amsterdam con-
gress.156 
The SDKPiL failed to prevent the Bund and the Latvian Social Democratic 
Workers' Party from organising a joint conference at the end of January 1905 
in Riga. This was also attended by representatives of the central committee of 
the RSDWP and the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party. In an appeal approved by 
the conference, the central importance of achieving a united party was under-
lined. A demand was also made for the calling of an All-Russian constituent as-
sembly to be elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage through direct 
and secret elections, and to be responsible for transforming Russia into a 
democratic republic. As part of this transformation, a large measure of local self-
government was to be granted to the minority nationalities. 
In a separate resolution, those attending agreed to refrain from making alli- 
154 On the disputes among the Russian soeialists at the Amsterdam congress, see Geyer 
1958, p. 216, 418-419; Tobias 1972, pp. 278-280; Najdus 1973, pp. 185-189. 
155 Geyer 1958, pp. 419-428; Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia No 11 (1922), p. 169, 173, 178; 
Najdus 1973, pp. 194-195, 223-224. 
156 Bureau Socialiste International: Comptes rendus des reunions, Manifestes et cir-
culaires, éd. Georges Haupt, Matériaux pour l'histoire du socialisme international, I'° sér. 
Il, Vol. I, 1900-1907 (Paris, 1969), p. 117. 
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Rosa Luxemburg. 
ances with bourgeois and democratic opposition parties (in other words, the liber-
als and the terrorist-inclined revolutionaries), although agreements covering limited 
joint action were deemed acceptable. This was, however, only on the condition 
that those with whom such an agreement was reached also committed themselves 
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to the demand for a constituent assembly elected by universal and equal suffrage 
through direct and secret elections. 
A further resolution approved at the Riga conference condemned the decisions 
taken at the Paris conference as being insufficiently democratic in their content, 
the "liberal-democratic bloc", as it was described, having restricted the confer-
ence to a call for a democratic form of government and universal suffrage. In 
the eyes of those attending the Riga conference, any link-up with the coalition 
of forces represented at the Paris conference ran counter to the social democrat-
ic political programme and, in consequence, could not be sanctioned. 
The Polish Proletariat Party and the Armenian Social Democratic Workers' 
Organisation subsequently added their names to all three resolutions, while the 
SDKPiL signed only the first (the appeal). Through the Riga conference, the so-
cial democrats effectively established their own bloc. Despite the efforts of the 
Bund, it nevertheless proved impossible to achieve an official party alliance which 
would have set the seal on linking the parties together at an organisational lev-
e1.157 The most significant social democratic group left outside this informal bloc 
were the Bolsheviks. 
Father Gapon's Collaborative Initiative 
Father Georgii Apollonovich Gapon had, with the approval of the authorities, 
founded a workers' association known as the Assembly of the Russian Factory 
and Mill Workers of the City of St Petersburg, with the aim of improving the 
conditions of the working class and keeping workers untainted by revolutionary 
ideas. Early in 1905, on Sunday 22 January, the Assembly organised a large 
demonstration in St Petersburg, which has since become identified as marking 
the beginning of the first Russian revolution (1905-1907). Despite the demon-
stration's peaceful beginning, the government gave its armed forces permission 
to open fire on the crowds which had gathered. Bloody Sunday, as the day be-
came known, quickly sparked off disturbances in various parts of the Empire. 
The authorities managed with some difficulty to prevent the collapse of the govern-
ment and the autocracy, but their reserves and prestige continued to fade as time 
went on. Although successful in suppressing isolated disorders and outbreaks of 
violence, they proved incapable of putting a complete stop to the unrest. 
Gapon declared himself a revolutionary and fled abroad.158 Arriving in Gene- 
157 "Isveshchenie o konferentsii sots.-demokraticheskikh organizatsii Rossii", Iskra No 
89 24 February 1905 (o.s.), pp. 7-8; Iskra No 98 23 April 1905 (o.$), pp. 3-4; von Trans-
ehe-Roseneck II 1908, pp. 102-103; Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia No 11 (1922), pp. 169-181; 
F.E. Dzerzhinskii, Izbrannye proizvedeniia v dvukh tomakh, 1, 1897-1923, izd. 2-oe, dopol-
nennoe (Moskya, 1967), p. 111; Najdus 1973, pp. 192-195, 219-222; Strobel 1974, pp. 
217-219; Tobias 1972, p. 284, 290, 293-294, 303, 324. 
' On Gapon, his Assembly and Bloody Sunday, see Sablinsky 1976. 
137 
va at the end of January, Gapon found himself taken under the wing of various 
leading Mensheviks. In order to please his hosts, Gapon agreed to put his name 
to a statement announcing that he had decided to join the Social Democrats, a 
statement which was published in Vorwärts and Leipziger Volkszeitung. By linking 
themselves with a world-famous revolutionary hero, the Mensheviks hoped to 
strengthen their own position. But there was no ignoring the fact that Gapon 
was essentially an untutored priest, who understood next to nothing about the 
niceties of socialist theory. He soon began to feel out of place alongside the in-
tellectually-orientated Social Democratic leadership and gravitated towards the 
more practically-minded Socialist Revolutionaries. Finally he asked the Menshe-
viks to withdraw the notice regarding his decision to join the Social Democrats. 
This switch of camp, together with a Social Democratic leaflet which appeared 
soon after in Russia attacking him, served to thoroughly sour relations between 
him and the Mensheviks, although not, however, to completely break them al-
together.159 
The Socialist Revolutionaries advised Gapon not to join their party officially, 
at least for the time being, and instead to concentrate on advancing cooperation 
between the Russian revolutionary parties.160 Gapon represented something lit-
tle short of an heaven-sent gift to the Socialist Revolutionaries, who were keen 
to take advantage of the tense situation created by the Bloody Sunday massacre 
in St Petersburg to advance the revolutionary cause. 
Akizuki Sachio, the Japanese envoy in Stockholm, had informed the Japa-
nese Foreign Minister, Komura Jutarö, on 3 January 1905 that a sum of 200,000 
yen would be required for funding a joint campaign by the Russian revolution-
ary parties. Immediately after Bloody Sunday, on 25 January, Akizuki request-
ed a million yen for the same purpose. Both requests were rejected by Komura, 
who particularly feared the possible reactions of Russia's neighbours, Germany 
and Austria-Hungary, should the campaign lead to a full-scale revolution.161 
Although Akizuki's requests were formally put in his name, the main figures 
behind them were probably Colonel Akashi, the Military Attaché in the Lega-
tion, and Zilliacus. Akashi and Zilliacus had tried to organise various campaigns 
of subversive activity within Russia prior to Bloody Sunday, but it seems clear 
that it was only the events of 22 January and their aftermath which prompted 
them to begin planning an out and out uprising. 
159 K. Kautsky to P.B. Axelrod 14 February 1905, Axelrod Archive, IISG; Iskra No 87 
10 February 1905 (o.$), p. 4; (G.V. Plekhanov,) "Sviashchennik G. Gapon", Iskra No 
93 17 March 1905 (o.s.), pp. 1-2; "G. Gapon i russkaia sotsial'demokratiia", Revoliu- 
tsionnaia Rossiia No 62 25 March 1905 (o.s.), pp. 1-3; Ley Deich (= Deutsch), "Geroi 
na chas, (Iz vospominanii o Gapone)", Sovremennyi Mir No 1 (1909), pp. 134-137, 
142-144; A.S. ( = S.A. Rappoport), "lz zagranichnykh vstrech: Georgii Gapon", Rus-
skoe Bogatstvo No I (1909), pp. 174-179; P. Rutenberg, "Delo Gapona", Byloe No 11-12 
(1909), pp. 38-39; Chernov 1910, p. 145, 156-161; Martynoy-Piker 1925, p. 279; V.I. 
Lenin, Sochineniia, izd. 3-e, V1I (Leningrad, 1935), p. 449; Sablinsky 1976, pp. 292-295. 
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According to Rakka ryusui written by Akashi in 1906, Zilliacus discussed the 
possibility of an uprising during talks in Paris with a Socialist Revolutionary leader 
Akashi named as Wanhovusukii. Akashi's presence at the Paris Embassy at 
around the same time allowed him to influence these discussions. Akashi and 
Zilliacus subsequently travelled to London to hear Chaikovskii's opinion on the 
subject.162 These talks in Paris and London took place between 2-12 Febru-
ary.163 The mysterious Wanhovusukii could well have been Volkhovskii, as a 
number of other European names mentioned by Akashi in Rakka ryusui were 
similarly distorted, some to such an extent that it is very difficult to clarify the 
identity of the person referred to. This is backed up by the fact that Zilliacus  
also made use of Volkhovskii and Chaikovskii, both close associates of his, on 
various other occasions as a means of access to the Socialist Revolutionary Party. 
On 12 February, Akashi proposed to the Japanese General Staff that a sum 
of some 450,000 yen be granted to back an uprising coordinated by the Socialist 
Revolutionaries and timed to take place in June.164 
Azef informed the Russian secret police around the middle of February that  
Zilliacus had arrived in Geneva and offered the Foreign Committee of the So-
cialist Revolutionaries 2,000 revolvers to be used at workers' demonstrations. 
According to Azef, Zilliacus had also been active in moves to acquire weapons 
for a number of other parties as well.'65 
In March, the Socialist Revolutionary Party sent P. Rutenberg to St Peters-
burg to lay the groundwork for a campaign of mass armed action.166 The Finn-
ish Active Resistance Party had already decided in February to begin the crea-
tion of an armed organisation to be responsible for coordinating revolutionary 
mass action.'67 These two moves were clearly connected with the new approach 
formulated by Zilliacus, Volkhovskii and Chaikovskii in their joint talks. 
In order to achieve something concrete in Russia, collaboration between as 
many revolutionary parties as possible was a necessity. Moreover, it seems likely 
that the Japanese were no more willing to fund actions sponsored by individual 
parties at this point than they had been in the period prior to the Paris conference. 
As a significant number of revolutionary parties had decided to boycott the 
Paris conference because of Zilliacus' links with the Japanese, it was obvious 
161 White 1964, p. 140; Futrell 1967, p. 17; Telegrams 8-11 in the present volume. 
162 Rakka ryusui in the present volume. 
163 E. Wolff to I. Berendsen 2 February 1905, Ivar Berendsen Archive, Rigsarkivet, 
Copenhagen (microfilm Denmark 7, VA). According to this letter, Akashi preceded Zillia-
eus to Paris and had already waited there for him for a few days. 
164 Telegram 13 in the present volume; Futrell 1967, p. 18. 
165 "Doneseniia Evno Azefa, (Perepiska Azefa s Rataevym v 1903-1905 gg.)", Byloe 
No 1 (23) (1917), p. 220. See also the circular issued by the head of the Finnish Gendar-
merie (the Russian Gendarmerie in Finland) to his subordinates dated 12 February 1905 
(o.s.), Archive of the Finnish Gendarmerie, S 3 No 16, f. 27, VA. 
166 Rutenberg 1909, pp. 41-42; B. Savinkov, Vospominaniia terrorista (Khar'koy, s.a. 
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that someone else would have to be entrusted with the task of organising a fol-
low-up conference. Zilliacus was also handicapped by not being a socialist, while 
the majority of the revolutionary parties adhered to the socialist cause. The hero 
of St Petersburg's Bloody Sunday was chosen to fill the place vacated by Zillia-
cus as a neutral mediator. Although keen to make Gapon the figurehead of their 
plan, the Socialist Revolutionaries were careful to avoid revealing to him at this 
stage the real extent of what they were aiming at. 
Soon after mid-February, Gapon dispatched an open letter to the various so-
cialist parties active within the Empire. In it he called on them to work towards 
an agreement on a set of common aims, foremost among which were the over-
throw of the autocracy, the founding of a provisional government, the calling 
of a constituent assembly, and a joint plan for an uprising. Gapon also urged 
the need for making use of both individual and mass terror.168 
The first reactions to Gapon's letter were generally favourable. The Socialist 
Revolutionaries, who in any case lay behind Gapon's declaration, declared that 
they agreed with it in its entirety.169 
Lenin announced his overall backing for Gapon's proposal in Vpered, the paper 
he had recently founded, together with his support for mass terror and a mili-
tant alliance between the Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries, as 
well as other revolutionary parties, concentrated on organising a coordinated anti-
government struggle.170 
Plekhanov drafted an article for Iskra in which he argued that given the situa-
tion in Russia nothing less than armed resistance against the government, ulti-
mately escalating into an armed mass uprising, would be adequate. The success 
of the uprising, ie. the overthrow of the Tsarist régime, required in his opinion 
not only agitation among the masses, but also bourgeois society to be favoura-
bly disposed towards the uprising's aims, as well as a measure of terrorist action 
to paralyse the authorities and prevent them from mounting an effective count-
er-offensive. Political assassinations were also now deemed acceptable by the So-
cial Democrats, something which they had been reluctant to do in more peaceful 
times, and this provided them, according to Plekhanov, with the opportunity 
to come to practical collaborative agreements with the terrorist movements.17' 
Plekhanov and Lenin adopted the slogan of "march separately, strike togeth-
er" to form the basis of the hoped-for increased collaboration between the vari- 
167 See the annual report of the party council for 1904-1905, 19 November 1905, Finn-
ish Active Resistance Party Archive, VA. The actual work of putting the decision into practice 
did not get very far, however. 
'68 Georgii Gapon, "Otkrytoe pis'mo k sotsialisticheskim partiiam Rossii", Revoliu-
tsionnaia Rossiia No 59 10 February 1905 (o.$), p. 1. 
'69 Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 59 10 February 1905 (o.s.), p. 1, 4. 
170 Lenin, PSS, 9 (1960), pp. 274-282 (Gapon's letter appears on p. 279). Lenin's re-
sponse to Gapon's proposal appeared in Vpered No 7 21 (8) February 1905. 
171 (G.V. Plekhanov,) "Vroz' idti, vmeste bit"', Iskra No 87 10 February 1905 (o.s.), 
pp. 1-2 (Gapon's letter appeared on p. 4). 
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ous revolutionary parties. In so doing, they made plain the impossibility of any 
complete unification of the revolutionary parties, while at the same time under-
lining the desirability of limited cooperation between them. Plekhanov and Le-
nin made use of the same slogan as the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bund 
had previously.172 
 This move was an important declaration of principle to the 
other parties. The needs of the revolution were now unambiguously declared to 
be more important than the differences dividing the parties. 
Gapon renewed his proposal made to the Russian socialist parties in a letter 
he sent to the International Socialist Bureau at the end of February. He also an-
nounced that he would continue, for the foreseeable future, to retain his non-
aligned status and not join any party. In compliance with Gapon's request to 
the effect, the Bureau's Secretariat forwarded his letter to the member parties 
of the International on 2 March, thereby lending its implicit backing to his in-
itiative. At the same time, it again urged the Russians to follow the example of 
the French socialists. Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia gave extensive prominence to the 
Secretariat's communiqué. 173 
The Bolshevik-sponsored Vpered expressed its satisfaction at the fact that the 
news which had circulated previously of Gapon's joining the Mensheviks had 
proved unfounded.174 
Gapon offered his services as a mediator in discussions between the Social 
Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries, but the Menshevik-controlled council 
of the RSDWP, for whom the loss of their protégé to their competitors had come 
as a particularly unwelcome development, turned down his offer. The council 
argued that the leaderships of both parties should negotiate directly. By insisting 
upon this condition, the council also effectively excluded the Bolsheviks, one of 
the groups which Gapon had mentioned in his offer of mediation, from any pos-
sible discussions.'75 
The Discussions between Plekhanov and Natanson 
After the RSDWP had turned its back on Gapon, the Socialist Revolutionaries 
called on Natanson at the beginning of March to act as mediator between the 
172 "Na dva fronta", Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 53 30 September 1904 (o.s.), p. 2; 
"Sotsialisty-revoliutsionery i nesotsialisticheskaia demokratiia", Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia 
No 56 5 December 1904 (o.s.), p. 4; Tobias 1972, p. 283. 
173 Bureau Socialiste International 11969, pp. 133-134; Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 
60 5 March 1905 (o.s.), pp. 22-23. 
74 Vpered No 1 123 (10) March 1905, p. 4. See also Iskra No 94 25 March 1905 (o.s.), 
p. 2. 
175 Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 65 25 April 1905 (o.s.), p. 4; Leninskii sbornik, XVI 
(Moskva, 1931), p. 81. 
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parties, along similar lines to the previous summer.176 Natanson had a number 
of secret discussions in Geneva on behalf of the Socialist Revolutionaries with 
the chairman of the council of the RSDWP, Plekhanov. 
Natanson and Plekhanov were able to agree on two basic issues relating to 
a possible political agreement between their two parties: the transfer of land to 
popular control and the endorsement of terror as an appropriate and necessary 
part of the ongoing revolutionary struggle. With regard to the former issue, agree-
ment on a choice of words acceptable to both parties was left to a later date. 
Plekhanov presented the fruits of these talks to the council of the RSDWP, 
which, however, rejected the draft proposal he outlined at a meeting held on 11 
March. Martov and Axelrod threatened to resign from the council and, bypass-
ing the council altogether, to appeal directly to the party's membership for sup-
port to quash it, in the event that the council endorsed a policy condoning in-
dividual terrorist acts as an acceptable weapon in the anti-Tsarist struggle. They 
feared that if the RSDWP gave its blessing to terrorism the party's membership 
would abandon agitation and propaganda work among the masses altogether and 
resort to bomb-throwing. 
The hard-core Mensheviks thus proved again to be more unwilling to tolerate 
any form of compromise than Plekhanov, in exactly the same way as they had 
done prior to the Paris conference. 
In a memorandum drawn up the same day, the council of the RSDWP pro-
posed to the Socialist Revolutionaries the holding of talks on a collaboration agree-
ment, restricted to such technical questions as the coordination of mass action 
and individual acts of terrorism. The other revolutionary parties were to be en-
couraged to add their signatures to the agreement later. The council stressed that, 
despite an agreement of this sort with the Socialist Revolutionaries, the RSDWP 
would have to adapt its activities in line with the requirements imposed by the 
party's political alliance with its fellow social democratic parties. In conclusion, 
the council informed the Socialist Revolutionaries that the latters' break with 
the Paris bloc would significantly assist the revolutionary struggle being waged 
by both parties. 
The council made it plain therefore that it continued to consider the social 
democratic parties of the minority nationalities as the RSDWP's political allies, 
while seeing the Socialist Revolutionaries as suitable partners only at a technical 
level. This was highly unlikely to go down well with the latter, who wanted the 
RSDWP to recognise them as the second major socialist party in Russia along-
side the RSDWP itself. Plekhanov, even at his most charitable, was willing only 
to put the Socialist Revolutionaries into the category of petty bourgeois socialists. 
The council, in the shape of Plekhanov, Axelrod, and L.G. Deutsch (Deich) 
forwarded its memorandum in person to Natanson the same day (11 March). 
Natanson was quick to express his disappointment at its content which ran largely 
j76 Byloe No 1 (23) (1917), p. 223 (information provided by Azef). 
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Ley Deutsch. 
counter to the joint discussions which had preceded it. Plekhanov promised to 
call a further meeting the following day. The council did not, however, meet on 
12 March to discuss the draft agreement proposal; instead, Deutsch sent Natan-
son a letter in which he asked the Socialist Revolutionaries for a reply to the 
memorandum the council had sent the previous day. This came as yet a further 
disappointment to Natanson, as he had wanted to avoid having to put the 
RSDWP's memorandum before the Socialist Revolutionaries for official con-
sideration, anticipating that his party would be highly unlikely to accept the terms 
contained in it. 
With the discussions thus deadlocked, Natanson and Plekhanov wrote to each 
other (on 13 and 15 March) outlining their respective positions on the talks they 
had had and expressing the hope that the other side would be able to show a 
little more flexibility. Plekhanov, who found himself in a rather difficult predica-
ment as a result of the situation, attempted to deny that any formal discussions 
on the issues in question had in fact even taken place. He least of all wanted 
to reveal that the other members of the council had run roughshod over him and 
forced him to accept their conditions. Both correspondents must have realised 
that the possibility of coming to an agreement at this stage had now dwindled 
alarmingly. This correspondence, in fact, effectively put the seal on the failure 
of the discussions between the parties to produce any workable agreement.' 
'" RSDWP council memorandum, dated 11 March 1905, No 125 item 3, B.1. Nikolaev-
skii Collection, HI (USA tk 19, VA); M.A. Natanson to G.V. Plekhanov 13 March 1905 
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The divergent opinions held by the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolution-
aries regarding the class nature of the Russian revolution had no meaningful part 
in the failure of the talks. Neither did the agrarian question emerge as a signifi-
cant obstacle, as might have been expected. The decisive disagreements between 
the parties did not focus on policy programme questions, but were concentrated 
around a single issue, the role to be given to terrorist action. The Social Democrats 
were additionally hampered by their total unwillingness to recognise the Socialist 
Revolutionaries as a socialist party of equal standing with themselves. 
One cannot be absolutely certain to what extent Natanson followed instruc-
tions provided by the Socialist Revolutionaries during these talks, or to what ex-
tent he acted independently. Various factors point to the latter being the more 
likely. According to Chernov's memoirs, Natanson had, during his exploratory 
talks during the summer of 1904, set his sights on bringing the Social Democrats 
and the Socialist Revolutionaries closer together in the areas of both programme 
and tactics, while the Socialist Revolutionary leaders, in contrast, had consid-
ered the hammering out of a much less ambitious practical collaborative agree-
ment to be the main focus of interest.18 Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia wrote, at the 
end of March, that a new conference was necessary to achieve the signing of a 
temporary agreement covering the joint organisation of an armed uprising.179 
Gapon's initiative was similarly aimed at developing only a limited degree of 
cooperation.180 
Although Natanson would appear then to have gone further than his party 
expected, it is, nevertheless, difficult to imagine that the Socialist Revolution-
aries would have rejected the fruits of the talks between him and Plekhanov, if 
they had been ratified by the council of the RSDWP. That this would indeed 
have been the case is indicated not only by the obvious acceptability to the So-
cialist Revolutionaries of the initiative born out of the talks, but also by their 
greater willingness to promote inter-party collaboration compared to the Social 
Democrats. 
As if by common agreement, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Menshe-
viks allowed the discussions between Natanson and Plekhanov to be quietly for-
gotten. Neither side returned to them at any stage or made use of them in the 
conflicts which continued to divide them. As a result, virtually nothing has been 
known hitherto about this interesting stage in relations between the two parties. 
(copy). G.V. Plekhanov to M.A. Natanson 15 March 1905 (copy). Natanson's name was 
systematically remoyed from both copies, apparently because he wished his role here to 
remain unknown. PSR No 758/11/b (a copy of the memorandum is also contained here), 
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The Social Democrats' Response to Gapon's 
Conference Proposal 
Gapon sent out a formal invitation to a total of 18 revolutionary parties around 
10 March, inviting them to send representatives to his proposed conference.181 
In its reply sent on 14 March, the Menshevik council of the RSDWP rejected 
the invitation out of hand. Gapon's ambiguous status as a non-aligned figure 
and very much of a political novice was seen as effectively disqualifying him from 
the role of organising a inter-party conference or collaborative agreement. The 
council ensured that its reply was communicated to all 18 parties involved.182 The 
previous day (13 March) the council had received Natanson's letter making it 
plain that the attempts to narrow the rift existing between the Social Democrats 
and the Socialist Revolutionaries had come to nothing.183 The foundering of 
these bilateral talks proved therefore the deciding factor in shaping the Menshe-
vik response to Gapon's proposed conference. 
The Bund was less inclined to dismiss the whole idea as the RSDWP had been. 
The émigre leaders of the Bund informed Gapon that the agreement signed be-
tween the various social democratic parties in January prevented the Bund from 
entering into any form of discussions on programme issues with other political 
groupings. Discussions, or even an agreement restricted to questions of joint ac-
tion would be feasible, according to the Bund. As the final authority on the issue 
lay with the party's central committee in Russia, the Bund was forced to declare 
that it was in no position to agree to the date in the third week of March pro-
posed for the conference by Gapon. The latter, in fact, agreed as a result to post-
pone the conference until the beginning of April.'84 
Shortly before the conference, the Bund, the Latvian Social Democratic Work-
ers' Party, and the Armenian Social Democratic Workers' Organisation sent 
Gapon a joint letter in which they made their attendance dependent on two con-
ditions. According to these, all the organisations taking part in the conference 
were to commit themselves to a demand for a constituent assembly to be elected 
by universal and equal suffrage in secret and direct elections. This condition echoed 
the position which had been adopted by the social democratic parties at their 
conference in Riga in January. And secondly, the conference would have to re-
strict itself to discussing possible joint anti-government action, any decisions be- 
Lenin, PSS, 10 (1960), pp. 180-181. PSS, 47 (1964), p. 20, 22; yon Transehe-Rosen-
eck II 1908, p. 103. — The Socialist Revolutionaries also discussed the conferenee issues 
in advance with their most important ally, the PPS. See Stanislaw Wojciechowski, Moje 
wspomnienia, I (Lwow, 1938), pp. 164-165. 
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10 
ing limited to purely technical questions.185 As the Socialist Revolutionaries saw 
things, while not wanting to be seen as responsible for scuttling the conference 
outright, because of the prestige enjoyed by Gapon and the obvious enthusiasm 
of the Bolsheviks, these groups were effectively attempting, by imposing condi-
tions, to achieve the same result. The conditions in question were, in any case, 
mutually incompatible. )86 
The Bund did indeed take a suspicious attitude toward Gapon and his pro-
posed conference.187 Nevertheless, the Socialist Revolutionaries' interpretation 
of its motives was too simple. The Bund's interest in developing a role for itself 
as a third force alongside the warring Mensheviks and Bolsheviks and aligning 
the smaller social democratic parties of the minority nationalities alongside it, 
also has to be remembered.188 The joint letter to Gapon produced by the three 
parties thus reflected a desire on their part to register their independence from 
the two factions of the RSDWP. 
Remaining loyal to its own policies, the SDKPiL rejected the conference invi-
tation it received from Gapon.189 
During the period leading up to Gapon's conference, the main focus of in-
terest of Lenin and the Bolsheviks lay with their preparations for the third RSDWP 
party congress, which, despite being described as for the party as a whole, amount-
ed in reality to their own group gathering. Weakened by further arrests, the party's 
central committee had now abandoned its previous conciliatory but quietly pro-
Menshevik stance and instead entered into closer cooperation with the Bolshe-
viks. The émigré Menshevik-led party council proved unsuccessful as a result in 
its efforts to prevent the holding of Lenin's party congress.190 
Lenin's relations with Gapon were significantly better than those enjoyed by 
the Mensheviks. Gapon saw Lenin as sincere and candid, unlike Plekhanov, whom 
he likened to a wrestler whose greased body always seems to allow him to slip 
away before his opponent has managed to get a purchase on him.191 Lenin spent 
quite a lot of time with Gapon in order to pump him for information about the 
mood of the workers and peasants within Russia. He did not, however, consider 
Gapon a true revolutionary leader and made no attempt to hide this from 
Gapon.19- 
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For Lenin, the Gapon-sponsored conference marked an end to the long peri-
od of isolation which had afflicted the Bolsheviks, and the latters' recognition 
as a grouping on an equal footing with the other socialists. The conditions put 
by the Mensheviks on their attendance were seen by Lenin as an attempt to ex-
clude the Bolsheviks from the conference.193 In its reply to Gapon's invitation, 
the Vpered group stated that it did not see any necessity to restrict in advance 
the areas of discussion to be dealt with at the conference.194 By adopting such 
an openly flexible approach, the Bolsheviks could not have made their enthusiasm 
for the conference more plain. 
For tactical reasons and questions of prestige, Lenin considered the possibility 
of the Bolsheviks linking themselves to the alliance agreed on between the Bund, 
the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party, and the central committee of the 
RSDWP in Riga completely out of the question.195 The differences between the 
responses given to Gapon by the two groups, the Bolsheviks and the one which 
had crystallised around the Bund, indicate that each decided on their position 
towards the conference completely independently of each other. Only in the im-
mediate lead-up to the conference did the two groupings made any moves to-
wards coordinating their positions. 
On 30 March, Lenin received a letter from Fricis Rozir}s of the Latvian Social 
Democratic Workers' Party enquiring about Lenin's feelings towards Gapon's 
forthcoming conference. On the opening day of the conference, 2 April, Lenin, 
together with A.A. Bogdanov (Malinovskii), met Rozigls and representatives 
from the Bund and the Armenian Social Democratic Workers' Organisation, at 
which meeting they agreed on a common course of action to be adopted during 
the conference.196 
The European Socialists 
After meeting Gapon, through the good services of the émigré Socialist Revolu-
tionaries living in Paris, Jaures and Vaillant, who represented the moderate wing 
of the French socialist movement, gave their public support to his unification 
initiative.' 97 
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In Germany and Austria, Vorwärts and Arbeiter-Zeitung concentrated their 
attention in their articles and comments on the revolutionary movement within 
Russia on spontaneous popular disaffection and disturbances and acts of terror. 
The internal disputes afflicting the RSDWP were seen as an unwelcome develop-
ment, about which little was said.19R Against this background, Gapon's initia-
tive inevitably reflected worst against the Russian Social Democrats. At the end 
of March, Vorwärts published Gapon's appeal for unity which he had sent to 
the International Socialist Bureau, together with the statement of support which 
had been issued in response by the organisation's Secretariat. In order to avoid 
there being any uncertainty about where Vorwärts stood on the issue, the paper 
also included alongside these two texts an extract from Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia 
underlining the fact that the blame for the lack of internal unity within the Rus-
sian socialist movement did not lie with the Socialist Revolutionaries.199 
Karl Kautsky, who felt an affinity with the Mensheviks, argued forcefully 
against Gapon's initiative. In his opinion, the Secretariat of the International 
had overstepped itself in deciding to act as what amounted to little more than 
Gapon's mouthpiece. As the latter had failed to show how unity within the Rus-
sian socialist movement was actually to be achieved in practice, his initiative, 
together with the Secretariat's backing for it, was worthless. Kautsky also criti-
cised the assertion in Vorwärts that the Social Democrats were responsible for 
the split which had opened up in the Russian movement. When Vorwärts refused 
to print his comments, he turned to Leipziger Volkszeitung, which published them 
on 29 March. The Mensheviks naturally appreciated the support they received 
from Kautsky and reprinted his protest in Iskra. 
Shortly later, Kautsky again took up the question of the split within the Rus-
sian socialist camp in an article in the journal Die Neue Zeit, in which he again 
made plain his sympathies with the Social Democrats.200 
The Russian socialists succeeded in mobilising their European supporters to 
join in the fray. This effectively sounded the death-knell for any compromise 
solution to the schism. 
The Geneva Conference (2-8/9 April 1905) 
Many of the Russian socialist leaders despised Gapon because of his unsophisti-
cated ways and lack of education, treating him little better than an overgrown 
I"  Geyer 1958, pp. 428-429, 435-437. 
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child and trying their utmost to extract the maximum benefit from his celebrated 
status. When a more natural relationship failed to develop, Gapon resorted to 
cajoling. He was impulsive, but also intelligent and above all ambitious.-01  
Through his proposed conference, Gapon hoped to make himself nothing less 
than the supreme leader of the Russian revolutionary movement. This he hoped 
to achieve through a special fighting committee set up to coordinate the revolu-
tionary struggle. This committee was to be nominated by the conference and would 
consist of one social democratic representative, one Socialist Revolutionary, 
and Gapon himself.202 
But in reality, however, Gapon's role was very much one of a figurehead. Nei-
ther Gapon nor Zilliacus can really be considered as being ultimately responsible 
for organising the conference. The latter, in fact, took no part in the prepara-
tions leading up to the conference and did not attend it once it had begun. Zillia-
cus satisfied himself with exercising influence over developments indirectly through 
the Socialist Revolutionaries. 
Azef informed the Russian secret police on 8 March that Zilliacus had invited 
him to London. 
"He (Zilliacus — AK) is busy organising a new conference to include the 
Social Democrats. The Social Democrats now want to join up with the 
Socialist Revolutionaries and consider terror, together with the drawing 
up of a plan for a popular uprising, as essential.... Zilliacus maintains 
links with the Japanese Legation (in London — AK) and has acquired large 
sums of money for the Finns and Poles (for the PPS — AK). ... You 
will have to begin to keep a close eye on his activities. He often visits Ham-
burg, where he is negotiating various arms deals. 6,000 Mauser pistols have 
already been purchased and a ship will be bought within a month to trans-
port these onwards."203  
On 19 March, Zilliacus informed an unidentified correspondent in Finland that 
"we will soon have a new conference embracing the revolutionary parties at the 
least and perhaps all the opposition, which will make the necessary decisions about 
the continuation of activities. I know which way these decisions will go and, as 
a result, I also know that the continued existence of the Tsarist régime is to be 
201 See the articles relating to Gapon contained in Note 159 (Deich et al.) and Sablinsky 
1976. 
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measured at most in a matter of months, and preferably and hopefully in a mat-
ter of weeks.i204 
Regarding the conference's resolutions, Zilliacus knew enough to anticipate 
that they would be geared to the organisation of an uprising. As regards the pos-
sibility of the Socialist Revolutionaries settling their differences with the Social 
Democrats, on the other hand, he had no real influence. Rather than Zilliacus  
or any other outsider, it was the Socialist Revolutionary leadership which was 
ultimately responsible for organising the conference, while the conference's com-
position was settled in the talks held between them and the members of the council 
of the RSDWP. 
According to the list of 18 organisations invited to the conference by Gapon, 
the social democrats enjoyed a comparable level of representation to that en-
joyed by the Socialist Revolutionaries and their allies.205 On the day, however, 
on 2 April, a total of seven socialist revolutionary or allied parties attended, but 
only four social democratic organisations. These included: 
1) The Socialist Revolutionary Party (represented by E.K. Breshko-Bresh-
kovskaia and V.M. Chernov) 
2) The Polish Socialist Party (Adam Buyno, Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz, and Hen-
ryk Walecki) 
3) The Finnish Active Resistance Party (Victor Furuhjelm and Johannes Gum-
merus) 
 
4) The Latvian Social Democratic Union (E. Rolays and one other) 
5) The Belorussian Socialist Hramada (one representative) 
6) The Georgian Party of Socialists-Federalists-Revolutionaries (G. Dekanozi) 
7) The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Mardiros Markarian and two pseu-
donymous representatives, Omon and Rusten; one of these was H. Loris-
Melikian, also known as Loris-Melikov) 
8) The RSDWP Vpered group and the Bureau of the Committees of the Majority 
(V.I. Lenin and A.A. Bogdanov) 
9) The Bund (Vladimir Medem and Isaiah Izenshtat) 
10) The Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party (F. Rozit}s) 
11) The Armenian Social Democratic Workers' Organisation (G. Ter-Ghazarian) 
Gapon also attended, together with S.A. Rappoport, the latter acting as the con-
ference's secretary at Gapon's request. As neither of them represented any specific 
group, they were only entitled the right to speak, but not to vote on resolu-
tions.206 
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The four social democratic representatives made their entrance at the second 
session of the conference held on its opening day. Rozii}s, representing the Lat-
vian Social Democratic Workers' Party demanded that the Latvian Social 
Democratic Union's right to attend be withdrawn forthwith, as the latter organi-
sation had no basis in reality and existed only on paper. Unless this demand was 
complied with, Rozil}s declared, he would be forced to leave the conference. 
Lenin, Bogdanov, the two Bund representatives, and Ghazar Ter-Ghazarian ad-
ded their backing to this ultimatum. 
The insistence of the social democrats on the issue led to debate on it stretch-
ing on until the following day. According to Rozipg, the Latvian Social Democratic 
Union could not lay claim to any political base within Latvia and represented 
no more than a handful of socialist revolutionary émigrés, who described their 
organisation as social democratic only in order to pull the wool over workers' 
eyes.207 
Rozi>}s had also tried to contest the Latvian Social Democratic Union's right 
of representation at the Amsterdam congress, but to no avail, as Ernests Rolays' 
mandate to attend had been duly confirmed by the International Socialist Bu-
reau. According to Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia, Victor Adler had enquired from 
Rozi>;tš whether, on the basis of his personal knowledge of the man, he con-
sidered Rolays an honourable revolutionary. "You don't think I don't know him 
by now?" the latter was obliged to answer, "we were at school together, and 
we've both done time in prison together." "Well, you can sit in prison alongside 
him for the same offence, but not at the congress, is that it?", retorted Adler, 
and Rozit)s had lost his case.208 
Following the publication by the Secretariat of the International Socialist Bu-
reau in 1906 in its circular of an announcement by the Latvian Social Democratic 
Union, Rozit}š, together with his party colleague, Jekabs Kovajevskis, protested 
to the Secretariat. They claimed, amongst other things, that the social democrat-
ic organisations had concluded at the Geneva conference that the Latvian Union 
was a mere fiction. In its reply, the Union labelled this assertion a blatant lie 
as the majority at the conference had not sanctioned this interpretation.209 
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As relations between the Latvian organisations were virtually as rancorous as 
those existing between the Polish PPS and the SDKPiL, Rozins' ultimatum 
presented to the Geneva conference was meant in all seriousness and was in no 
way merely an excuse to torpedo the conference. On the other hand, there is good 
reason to believe that the presence of the Latvian Social Democratic Union 
represented a matter of secondary importance to the three other social democratic 
organisations. Central to the latters' concerns were the range of groups represented 
at the conference and the balance of power between them. 
The social democrats had been aware in advance that they would find them-
selves in a weaker position compared to the Socialist Revolutionaries at the con-
ference. Lenin and his associates suspected that the invitations sent out to the 
social democratic organisations had been deliberately arranged to guarantee the 
Socialist Revolutionaries a clear field of play. Speaking at the conference, Lenin 
made no bones about his irritation that the Finnish Social Democrats, the SDKPiL, 
the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, and the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party 
were all missing from the conference.21°  He was unaware that the SDKPiL had 
decided not to attend the conference.211  
Lenin was informed by one of the Socialist Revolutionary representatives (prob-
ably E.K. Breshko-Breshkovskaia) that the activists had been responsible for con-
veying the conference invitation to the Finnish Social Democrats as they had been 
the only available channel open to the organisers, while the Lithuanians and the 
Ukrainians had never replied to the invitations they had been sent. This did not 
satisfy Lenin, however, as he knew from his own experience that contact with 
the Finnish Social Democrats could be arranged through the Swedish socialist,  
Hjalmar Branting.212 
The Russian Social Democrats (presumably Lenin) went on to ask whether the 
activists could be considered a socialist party. Breshko-Breshkovskaia replied that 
they were not, but that nevertheless their programme contained nothing which 
would have prevented socialists from joining them.213 Lenin's attempts to get 
an unambiguous answer on this point were part of his efforts to search out the 
weak links in the conference preparations and among the allies of the Socialist 
Revolutionaries, to provide a suitable pretext, should one be needed, to justify 
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Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaia. 
a walkout by the social democrats from the conference. 
The activists had not, in fact, conveyed Gapon's invitation to the Finnish So-
cial Democratic leadership as, committed to operating legally, they would, in all 
likelihood, have refused to have anything to do with it. The activists were a com-
pletely non-proletarian party, although they did work in close cooperation with 
what was known as the workers' activist wing within the official Social Democratic 
Party. This group too was not informed of Gapon's invitation. Victor Furuhjelm 
and Johannes Gummerus were careful not to refer to the true state of affairs 
on this issue at any point during the conference.214 
The defence of the activists' case was effectively handled by Ekaterina Breshko-
Breshkovskaia, the oldest representative attending the conference (born in 1844) 
and commonly known by all as Babushka, as the party's own representatives, 
 
Furuhjelm and Gummerus, did not speak Russian.215 In fact, the latter found 
themselves confined very much to the role of supporting players during the con-
ference as a whole, although more on account of their political inexperience than 
their inadequate linguistic skills. Neither Konni Zilliacus nor Adolf Törngren spoke 
Russian well, although this does not seem to have created any undue difficulties 
for Zilliacus, as his work in organising the Paris conference shows, while Törn-
gren moved with ease among Russian liberal circles. Törngren used French and 
German, as did Zilliacus, who also spoke English. 
The majority at the conference refused to bow to the social democrats' ultima-
tum, acceding only in so far as to allow the latters' dissenting opinion about the 
Latvian Social Democratic Union's right to attend the conference be recorded 
2 14 See the annual report of the party council for 1904-1905, 19 November 1905, Finn- 
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in the minutes, with the result that the social democratic contingent duly walked 
out. 
The dominant position of the Socialist Revolutionaries at the conference proved 
too much to swallow for the four social democratic organisations. The Socialist 
Revolutionaries were undoubtedly correct when they suspected that the social 
democrats had decided in advance to break up the conference.216 The latter cer-
tainly must have been able to foresee that their ultimatum would not be met. 
If, against all the odds, it had been accepted, Lenin and his associates would 
undoubtedly have followed it up with new conditions, as the elimination of the 
Latvian Union would not, in any case, have altered the overall balance of power 
existing between those attending. 
The impossibility of achieving a truly broadly-based conference had already 
been evident in the pre-conference discussions between the Socialist Revolution-
aries and the council of the RSDWP. The decision by the most important wing 
of the Russian social democratic movement, in the shape of the Mensheviks, not 
to attend, set the seal on the balance of power at the conference, giving the So-
cialist Revolutionaries the upper hand. The latters' dominant role served, in turn, 
to prevent the Bolsheviks and the Bund, together with its associates, from taking 
part in the conference, despite the fact that Lenin was originally sincerely interested 
in Gapon's initiative. 
Although the Socialist Revolutionaries were successful in outmanoeuvring the 
social democrats and dealing them the worst hand, responsibility for the failure 
of the attempt to arrange a broadly-based conference lay equally with both groups. 
The chances of the Mensheviks agreeing to some form of compromise solution 
would certainly have been greater, had the Socialist Revolutionaries been less 
enthusiastic in their attempts to use the Gapon gambit. The temptation to use 
Gapon's revolutionary reputation to boost the party's prestige proved, however, 
too great. It might well have been the case, nevertheless, regardless of Gapon, 
that the mutual suspicion and competition already existing between the two main 
wings of the Russian revolutionary movement would have anyway proved too 
deep-seated to have allowed them to come to some form of compromise agree-
ment on the question of improved collaboration. 
The Paris and Geneva conferences revealed beyond any shadow of doubt that, 
despite their protests to the contrary, Lenin and the Bolsheviks had assumed the 
role of a breakaway faction within the RSDWP set to challenge the main line 
represented by the Mensheviks. 
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The Results of the Geneva Conference 
The conference went smoothly following the departure of the representatives of 
the four dissenting social democratic groups. The remaining seven parties ap-
proved a general political declaration which contained a call for the overthrow 
of the autocracy through an armed uprising and the summoning of a constituent 
assembly to be entrusted with providing Russia with a republican and democrat-
ic form of government based on universal and equal suffrage and direct secret 
elections. The latter principles were also to be followed in the election of the con-
stituent assembly itself. In addition, a number of other human and political rights 
and freedoms were also to be introduced. 
Finland and Poland were to be excluded from the constituent assembly planned 
for Russia and instead to be provided with their own parallel assemblies. Fin-
land would, according to the declaration, remain an autonomous constitutional 
state. "All the parties attending the conference ally themselves", it was an-
nounced, "with the efforts of the Finnish people, and proletariat in particular, 
to use the instruments at its disposal to ensure the calling of a constituent assem-
bly", one, which it was planned, would be elected along exactly the same 
democratic principles as the parallel Russian assembly. The method of election 
to be used in the case of the Polish Sejm, on the other hand, was not specified 
in the declaration. 
The Russian assembly was, according to the declaration, to be entrusted with 
arranging the details of the political relations to exist between central govern-
ment and the sovereign Polish and Finnish assemblies through a free agreement 
arrived at with the latter bodies. The declaration also promised autonomous sta-
tus within Russia to the Caucasus. 
Six of the parties present, but not including the non-socialist Finnish Active 
Resistance Party, additionally signed a further joint declaration issued in the name 
of the socialist organisations. This itemised a number of economic and social 
demands over and above purely political ones. The most important of these were 
calls for an eight-hour working day and the socialisation of land presently worked 
on the basis of the exploitation of outside labour, in other words the adoption 
of a collective form of land management administered by the peasants and suit-
ed to satisfying local conditions and needs.217 
The demands made in the two declarations were largely equivalent to those 
217 "Obshchaia politicheskaia deklaratsiia konferentsii" and "Deklaratsiia sotsia-
listicheskikh organizatsii", Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 65 25 April 1905 (o.s.), pp. 1-3. 
For an account of the conference ("Novaia mezhdupartiinaia konferentsiia"), see pp. 3-7. 
— According to Akashi, the declaration (presumably the general political declaration — 
AK) had been drawn up by Breshko-Breshkovskaia, Gapon and Furuhjelm. The contribu-
tion of the latter two, however, could not have been very considerable since Gapon had 
little comprehension of political theory and Furuhjelm did not understand Russian. See 
telegram 22 in the present yolume. 
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contained in the Socialist Revolutionaries' minimum programme which related 
to the democratic phase of the revolution.'-18 The reference in the general polit-
ical declaration to the terrorist struggle only further underlines the dominant role 
played by the Socialist Revolutionaries in shaping much of what emerged from 
the Geneva conference. 
In contrast, Gapon's influence at the conference was relatively small. His pro-
posal for the setting up of a joint fighting committee to coordinate the revolu-
tionary struggle and for his inclusion as one of its members gained no support.219 
The amount of discussion devoted during the course of the conference to the 
question of the rights of the minority nationalities and the separate assemblies 
proposed for them proved particularly annoying to Gapon. By concentrating so 
extensively on the rights of the borderlands, there was the danger that those of 
Russia itself would be overlooked, he thought. "Everyone only seems concerned 
with their own interests and no one thinks of Russia! We must think of her as 
well!", Gapon insisted.22° 
At its congress held in March 1905, the Polish Socialist Party had approved, 
as one of its short-term aims, the establishment of a Polish constituent assembly 
to be elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage and through secret and 
direct elections. This assembly was to be endowed with sovereign political authority 
in Russian Poland. The PPS now aimed at achieving national self-determination 
within the framework of the existing political borders and set the restoration of 
an independent Poland as a longer-term target. This shift in the party's policy 
had been unsuccessfully opposed by the separatist-minded right wing of the 
party. r - 1 
The section of the general political declaration issued at the Geneva confer-
ence relating to Poland was undoubtedly put together by the PPS delegation.'-z-
The conference did not, however, go completely the way that the party had hoped 
for. The PPS and the Belorussian Socialist Hramada were unable to persuade 
the other parties, the Socialist Revolutionaries in particular, it would seem, to 
agree to committing themselves to demanding the summoning of a separate con-
stituent assembly for Greater Lithuania (what is now Lithuania and Belorussia). 
Having failed in their attempt, the Hramada and the PPS issued a joint state-
ment of their own calling for the area in question to be given its own separate 
political identity, albeit with the proviso that any final decision on the issue was 
to be made by common agreement between all the socialist parties active in the 
218 The party lacked an officially-approved programme, but a semi-official draft 
programme did exist: "Proekt programmy Partii Sotsialistov-Revoliutsionerov, vyrabotannyi 
redaktsiei `Revoliutsionnoi Rossii"', Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 46 5 May 1904 (o.s.), 
pp. 1-3. 
219 Chernov 1910, pp. 163-164. 
271 Rappoport 1909, pp. 183-184. 
221 Zarnowska 1965, pp. 180-181. 
222 Najdus 1973, p. 232. 
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region. The latter proviso would appear to have been included as a result of the 
arguments put forward by the proponents' opponents that no final decision could 
be taken when not all of the organisations concerned, such as the Lithuanian 
Social Democratic Party and the Bund, were present to put their views on the 
issue.223  
To cover similar questions of this type, the hope was voiced in the general po-
litical declaration that it would be possible at some point to agree with the so-
cialist parties representing the other nationalities and national areas on the neces-
sary constitutional guarantees that would be required to provide for their future 
development. 
The Georgian Party of Socialists-Federalists-Revolutionaries called for auton-
omy and a federal relationship to be established between Georgia and the rest 
of Russia, while the Armenian Dashnaktsutiun, for its part, contented itself with 
similar arrangements for Armenia or Transcaucasia. This indicates that the au-
tonomous federal status suggested for the Caucasus (Transcaucasia and the North-
ern Caucasus) by the conference presumably satisfied both groups.224 
The outline formulation regarding Poland and Finland contained in the general 
political declaration did not, by virtue of its very lack of precision, exclude even 
the possibility of complete secession. In the case of Finland, however, it was stated 
that the country would remain an autonomous constitutional state, presumably 
because this was sufficient to satisfy the Finnish activists. Following the decision 
by the PPS in the spring of 1905 to content itself in the short term with a de-
mand for a constituent assembly for Russian Poland and postpone the realisa-
tion of full Polish independence until some undetermined point in the future, 
the section of the declaration referring to Poland can be interpreted as an at-
tempt at giving the country a measure of national self-determination within the 
framework of a voluntary federal relation with Russia. 
223 Zarnowska 1965, p. 205; Najdus 1973, p. 232. Although the Hramada's programme 
demanded the status of federative autonomy for Belorussia, the party was also interested 
in the creation of a wider Lithuanian-Belorussian federation. The Hramada did not aim 
at Belorussia's complete secession from Russia. Nicholas P. Vakar, Belorussia: The Mak-
ing of a Nation, A Case Study, Russian Research Center Studies 21 (Cambridge, Mass., 
1956), pp. 84-86; Peter Scheibert, "Der weissrussische politische Gedanke bis 1919", Joins-
burg (1938), p. 341; Eugen von Engelhardt, Weissruthenien: Volk und Land (Berlin, 1943), 
pp. 88-90. 
223 Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 65 25 April 1905 (o.s.), p. 2. On the Georgian and 
Armenian organisations in question generally, see Revoliutsionnaia Rossiia No 46 5 May 
1904 (o.s.), pp. 8-11, 24. No 63 5 April 1905 (o.s.), pp. 2-5; Richard G. Hoyannisian, 
Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918 (Berkeley, 1967), pp. 16-22; Anaide Ter 
Minassian, Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement 
(1887-1912), Zoryan Institute Thematic Series 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1984); Gerard J. 
Libaridian, "Revolution and Liberation in the 1892 and 1907 Programs of the Dashnak-
tsutiun", in: Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change, Essays in the History of Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, ed. by Ronald Grigor Suny, East European Series 2 (Ann 
Arbor, 1983), pp. 185-196. 
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The general declaration did not envisage leaving the task of defining the fu-
ture status of Poland and Finland to the latter alone, but saw the Russian con-
stituent assembly also playing a part in these decisions. This was somewhat at 
odds with Chernov's policy programme covering the nationality question, which 
proposed leaving the authority over the final decision on these issues solely in 
the hands of the minority nationalities in question. 
The Socialist Revolutionaries therefore attached more importance to the unity 
of the Empire than Gapon had feared, even given the fact that their chosen ap-
proach to guaranteeing that unity provided for a significant measure of room 
for manoeuvre on the part of the borderlands. No other Russian party, in fact, 
went as far in trying to come to terms with the interests of the minority national-
ities. 
At the time of its founding in the autumn of 1904, the policies of the Finnish 
Active Resistance Party differed from those of the constitutionalists in the area 
of tactics for the most part. Unlike the constitutionalists, the activists were ready 
to resort to an active armed struggle against the Tsarist authorities and to link 
forces with the Russian revolutionary movement and to make use of terrorism. 
Both parties defended Finland's special political status with regard to the im-
perial government. In terms of its attitude to the Tsarist régime, the activist party 
therefore allied itself to the revolutionary cause, but in terms of its attitude on 
the question of the return of legitimacy, it was actually more constitutionalist 
than the constitutionalists. It took a few months before this implicit paradox in 
the party's position was resolved. The party lacked any policy programme covering 
social issues. In terms of their private opinions, a number of the activists were 
either openly socialist in their leanings, or shared sympathies with socialist think-
ing.225 
The activist party's acceptance of the section on Finland included in the Gene-
va declaration meant, in effect, a shift in its position away from its constitution-
alist roots to a revolutionary stance in regard to Finland's fundamental laws. 
No role, after all, had been proposed in the declaration for the existing un-
democratic estate-based Diet, the handling of the country's affairs being trans-
ferred to a new constituent assembly to be elected by universal and equal suf-
frage. The inclusion of this section in the declaration had been dictated by the 
Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, who brushed aside the doubts voiced by the 
activist representatives, Furuhjelm and Gummerus.' The Socialist Revolution-
aries were keen to avoid a repetition of the type of charges levelled against them 
22' See the broadsheets produced by the Finnish Active Resistance Party between the 
end of 1904 and the proclamation No 5 issued 14 April 1905, contained in the party's ar-
chive. Also, O. Procopé's circular dated 30 October 1904, Törngren Collection, VA; Söder-
hjelm 1919, p. 43 ff. 
-'-6 J.  Gummerus, Utdrag av minnen (1909-1910), Parmanen Collection II, VA. The 
party congress held by the activists on 14 May 1905 approyed the actions of the party's 
representatives and the call for a constituent assembly as faits accomp/is. See the congress 
minutes and party proclamation No 6, contained in the party's archive, VA. 
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at the time of the Paris conference by the social democrats that they had com-
promised democratic objectives in favour of the class interests of the bourgeois 
parties. Lenin's questions put at the beginning of the Geneva conference about 
the nature and status of the Finnish activists had alerted the Socialist Revolu-
tionaries to the possibility of a social democratic attack being directed in that 
quarter, and they therefore made every effort to buttress the section on Finland 
against possible criticism. 
The idea of replacing the Finnish four-estate Diet with a revolutionary con-
stituent assembly was also new to Zilliacus, as he had not proposed anything along 
these lines prior to the Geneva conference.227 This only serves to further indi-
cate that his part in the planning of the conference was limited to dealing with 
the question of an armed uprising. It would be wrong to underestimate Zillia-
cus' role behind the scenes, but, as has become clear, the main role in the lead-
up to, and in directing, the conference itself belonged with the Socialist Revolu-
tionaries. The view put forward by some scholars that the Geneva conference 
represented some form of grand conspiracy masterminded from the wings by Zil-
liacus (and Akashi) is clearly mistaken.zzs 
The seven parties attending the conference also decided to set up a coordinat-
ing office outside Russia to help maintain their mutual links and to collect funds 
for the revolutionary struggle. Delays meant that the office was only set up dur-
ing the autumn of 1905 and did not have time as a result to develop into a sig-
nificant factor in the opposition movement, as the revolutionary parties moved 
their headquarters soon after this to Russia.229 
The decision by Vorwärts to print an announcement regarding the Geneva con-
ference provoked Iskra to vent its anger in an article attacking the four social 
democratic organisations which had decided to send representatives to the con-
ference. According to Iskra, the Bund, the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' 
Party, and the Armenian Social Democratic Workers' Organisation had, by decid-
ing to attend, acted against the resolutions adopted at the Riga conference. There 
was every reason to doubt, Iskra argued, whether the latter of these was any more 
active within Armenia than the Latvian Social Democratic Union within Latvia, 
the Union's right to attend the conference having been the subject of fierce de-
bate by the four organisations in question. According to Iskra, none of the or-
ganisations should have accepted Gapon's invitation to attend in the first place, 
as the invitation had made it plain that the Latvian Union would also be attend-
ing. The split which had developed within the Menshevik-led social democratic 
bloc clearly annoyed Iskra more than the success of the Socialist Revolution-
aries.70 
227 K. Zilliacus to T 19 March 1905, Reuter Letter Collection XXIII, AAB. 
22% Futrell 1963, p. 66; Fischer 1967, pp. 104-105. 
229 The secretary of the coordinating office to the executiye of the German Social 
Democratic Party (draft), PSR No 63, IISG; Zarnowska 1965, p. 205. 
21" "Sotsial'demokratiia i burzhuazno-revoliutsionnyia partii", Iskra No 98 23 April 
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V.I. Lenin. 
Lenin presented his report on the Geneva conference to the third (Bolshevik) 
party congress of the RSDWP on 6 May. He attacked the resolutions adopted 
at the conference as being based virtually exclusively on the programme of the 
Socialist Revolutionaries, seasoned with a number of concessions to the various 
nationalist non-proletarian parties present. Although the RSDWP party 
programme recognised the principle of national self-determination, it was im-
possible, he contended, for the Bolsheviks either to support or oppose the de-
mand for a separate assembly for Poland which had been made at the confer-
ence, as no decision could be taken on this question without first hearing the 
views of the Polish workers' party, the SDKPiL. (Lenin may have been aware 
that the SDKPiL opposed this demand as separatist.) In Lenin's view, inter-party 
conferences covering practical issues should in the future be held in Russia, where 
it was easier to guarantee the presence of all the organisations and bodies con-
cerned and to exclude those which only existed on paper. 
The party congress approved a resolution stating that short-term agreements 
1905 (o.s.), pp. 3-4. Also see the conference announcements in Vorwärts 29 April 1905 
and Arbeiter-Zeitung 5 May 1905. On the disputes between Plekhanov and the Armenian 
Social Democratic Workers' Organisation, see Bureau Socialiste International I 1969, pp. 
160-165, 174, 329; Ter Minassian 1978, pp. 86-87. 
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between the social democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries covering cooper-
ation in the anti-government struggle were desirable in principle, but only as long 
as they did not restrict the formers' independence of action. Agreements at the 
local level were also considered acceptable, if put before the party's central com-
mittee for approval.23' 
The Plan for the Uprising and Its Fate 
During the early part of March 1905, the Japanese army had scored an impor-
tant victory over Russian forces at the battle of Mukden in Manchuria. Despite 
this success, the Japanese General Staff concluded that Japan's already stretched 
economic and military resources would not allow pushing the front any further 
into enemy-occupied territory and thereby further protracting the struggle. Moves 
were put in hand, as a result, to sound out the possibilities of arranging an ar-
mistice and signing a peace agreement.232 
If Russia could not be forced to the negotiating table by force of arms, it would 
be possible, according to Japanese thinking, to break Russian morale and deter-
mination to continue the struggle by paralysing the country from within through 
subversion. Abandoning their former caution on the subversion question following 
Mukden, the Japanese government and General Staff moved quickly to make 
up for lost time. According to Inaba Chiharu, Akashi received new instructions 
from Tokyo, in line with this shift in policy, prior even to the Geneva conference 
held at the beginning of April. A million yen was now allocated to backing an 
armed uprising and revolution in Russia.233  
Zilliacus offered some of this to the Socialist Revolutionary central commit-
tee, allegedly as funds collected in America to promote the Russian revolution-
ary cause. The donators, Zilliacus told the committee, had stipulated that the 
money in question was to be used to arm the masses and not to be used for in-
dividual terrorist acts, and was to be divided between all the revolutionary par-
ties, irrespective of their ideological differences. The central committee decided 
to accept the money on these terms. 
The Socialist Revolutionary leaders B.V. Savinkov and Chernov appear, on 
the basis of their memoirs, to have been quite willing to accept Zilliacus' expla-
nations at face value, even following the publication of the secret correspondence 
between Zilliacus and Akashi, after its seizure by the police, in St Petersburg 
in 1906. That something at least of the true origin of the money must have been 
known to the party is indicated by the fact that Nikolai Chaikovskii, a member 
of the party's Foreign Committee, was in direct contact with Akashi. Zilliacus'  
231 Tretii s"ezd RSDRP: Protokoly 1959, pp. 378-389, 456. 
232 White 1964, pp. 201-203; Futrell 1967, p. 18. 
233 Futrell 1967, pp. 18-19. Information provided by Inaba. 
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11 
Boris Savinkoy. 
connections with the Japanese were known to the Russian social democrats and 
the liberals. If the Socialist Revolutionaries really knew nothing of the origins 
of the money, they nevertheless certainly had good reason to suspect Zilliacus'  
explanation. It seems they simply wanted to avoid facing up to the truth.23a 
Following the break-up of the conference and the failure of the attempts that 
had been made to develop some kind of working relationship between the two 
wings of the Russian revolutionary movement, Zilliacus and Akashi had to re-
sign themselves to the fact that only the Socialist Revolutionaries and their allies 
would be involved in the plans for a rebellion. This must have been a source of 
major disappointment to both of them, but particularly for the Japanese, who 
had considered it important to gain as wide a base as possible for the planned 
campaign of subversion. 
The uprising was planned to start in St Petersburg following the arrival of the 
arms shipment from the West. The aim was to stage a final settling of accounts 
with the autocracy. Even if the uprising in the capital was to fail, it would be 
sufficient, it was assumed, to trigger popular rebellions in Poland, the Caucasus 
and elsewhere, which would serve to provide the impetus for a revolution em-
bracing the Empire as a whole.235 
2" Savinkov 1926, p. 123; Chernov 1953, pp. 234-235; Antti Kujala, "The Russian 
Reyolutionary Movement and the Finnish Opposition, 1905: The John Grafton Affair and 
the Plans for an Uprising in St Petersburg", Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 5 (1980), 
p. 261. On Chaikovskii's relation with the party, see Manfred Hildermeier, Die Sozial-
revolutionäre Partei Russlands: Agrarsozialismus und Modernisierung im Zarenreich 
(1900-1914), Beiträge zur Geschichte Osteuropas 11 (Köln, 1978), pp. 55-56 and PSR 
No 18, 1ISG. 
Kujala 1980, p. 262. 
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Zilliacus, Chaikovskii, Akashi, and the Georgian leader, G. Dekanozi, began 
to acquire arms and the vessels needed to transport them to Russia in the period 
immediately after the Geneva conference. The weapons purchased were intend-
ed for the Socialist Revolutionaries, the Finnish activists, the PPS and the Geor-
gian revolutionaries. Gapon was recruited to serve as a figurehead to incite the 
workers in St Petersburg.236 
The freighter John Grafton sailed for St Petersburg at the beginning of Au-
gust, loaded with 15,560 rifles and 2,500 revolvers, together with ammunition 
and explosives. About a third of the cargo was destined for the Finnish activists.  
Zilliacus approved the inclusion of the underground organisation of the Finnish 
constitutionalists, the Kagal, and the Bolsheviks in the operation. He and Chai-
kovskii aimed for the uprising to get under way immediately on the arrival of 
the arms in St Petersburg. Akashi's desire for events to be put in hand as quickly 
as possible to take some of the pressure off Japan, which was by this stage sorely 
in need of a respite from the conflict, undoubtedly contributed to this decision. 
The Socialist Revolutionary party leadership, on the other hand, argued for 
stockpiling the weapons until Russia was truly ripe for revolution. Zilliacus and 
Chaikovskii shut their ears, however, to Gots' warnings, putting their faith in-
stead in Gapon's completely unsubstantiated assurances that his men were ready 
to move in St Petersburg and that the workers were just waiting for the sign to 
mount the barricades. 
In an effort to swing developments more their way, the Socialist Revolution-
aries turned to Henry Biaudet, a Finnish activist resident on the Continent, for 
assistance. Biaudet enjoyed a comparable amount of respect within the activist 
party to that enjoyed by Zilliacus. Biaudet duly informed his party's leadership 
in Finland that their Russian comrades wanted the uprising postponed to a more 
favourable juncture and that the weapons should be temporarily stockpiled. 
At the beginning of August, the Helsinki-based activist leadership decided to 
bypass Zilliacus' promises made to the constitutionalist Adolf Törngren and the 
Bolsheviks regarding the arms shipment and changed the John Grafton's port 
of arrival from St Petersburg to the western Finnish coast in the Gulf of Both-
nia. In so doing, they effectively accepted the argument for the need to delay 
the planned rebellion advanced by the Socialist Revolutionaries and backed by 
Biaudet, and at the same time openly challenged Zilliacus, the party's founder 
and undisputed authority up until then. An additional reason for this change 
of policy was the lack of preparation witnessed in St Petersburg. 
Azef also played a part in the uprising plan. During the early summer, he 
travelled to Russia on behalf of the Socialist Revolutionaries to sound out the 
country's true level of revolutionary preparedness and thereby provide the where-
withal to allow the party to finalise its position on the uprising question. Azef 
236 Kujala 1980, p. 262, 269; N.V. Chaikovskii to O.S. Minor 3 June 1905, PSR No 262, 
1ISG; Wojeiechowski 1 1938, pp. 163-164, 167-168. 
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took a substantial quantity of money along with him provided by Chaikovskii 
and Zilliacus from the Japanese. Azef intended to use the money to ferment dis-
turbances in southern Russia. It would seem more than likely, however, that this 
money played no part in the unrest which developed in the area over the summer 
or in the mutiny on the Potemkin. Azef probably salted it away for his own per-
sonal purposes. During his stay in Russia he did virtually nothing to promote 
the plans for an uprising in St Petersburg. Zilliacus was not completely mistaken 
when he later made Azef the scapegoat for the failure of the uprising plan, al-
though he did exaggerate the latter's responsibility for the unpreparedness wit-
nessed in St Petersburg, while at the same time passing over the degree which 
he had allowed himself to be taken in by Gapon's fabrications. As a result of 
this the true situation in the capital only fully came home to those in charge of 
planning the uprising after the John Grafton had already set sail.  
Zilliacus' assertion that Azef effectively betrayed the arms shipment would not 
appear to hold water, on the basis of Azef's subsequently published secret reports, 
together with official Russian documents on the case. Azef kept his superiors 
informed of Zilliacus' arms purchases and plans for an uprising right up until 
the Geneva conference. After gaining access to Japanese funds in the wake of 
the conference, Azef probably stopped drawing his employer's attention to the 
subversive activities of Zilliacus and the Japanese, for understandable reasons. 
Japan and Russia signed a peace agreement on 5 September 1905. Akashi had 
already halted his assistance to Zilliacus during the early part of August, if not 
before, most probably as a result of the dispute which blew up over the John 
Grafton and which had seen control of the project slip out of Japanese hands 
and into those of the Socialist Revolutionaries. Rather than the type of carefully 
planned revolution visualised by the latter, the Japanese had wanted an uprising 
organised as soon as possible, regardless of its outcome. The progress being made 
in the peace negotiations at the time may also have influenced Akashi's decision.  
Zilliacus' planned uprising finally ended in complete failure, when the John 
Grafton ran aground on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, off Jakobstad/ 
Pietarsaari, at the beginning of September 1905. Most of the weapons, posses-
sion of which had been the subject of so much manoeuvering by the activists, 
the Socialist Revolutionaries, the Bolsheviks, Törngren, and Gapon, were lost: 
those that were salvaged found their way to government arsenals.2' 
='7 Kujala 1980, pp. 257-275 and the sources indicated there. The following sources 
which I haye only had access to since my article mentioned above was written have forced 
me to correct the partially erroneous picture I gave in 1980 of the Socialist Revolution-
aries' plan for the uprising, the moves taken by the Finnish activists with regard to them 
and the role of Azef: M.R. Gots to N.V. Chaikovskii 12 August 1905, No 115 item 14, 
B.I. Nikolaevskii Collection, HI (USA tk 19, VA); H. Biaudet to Sliotoff (a representative 
of the Socialist Revolutionary leadership) 31 October 1905, the portfolio of copies of Hen-
ry Biaudet's letters, ff. 31-33, in his collection, VA; Rapport du Comité Central sur l'affaire 
Azev (8 January 1909), PSR No 677a, IISG; Rakka ryusui — For the government's knowl-
edge of Zilliacus' plan for an uprising, see Fond 102 (Departament politsii), 1905, Osob. 
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The Idea of Broad-Based Inter-Party Collaboration 
and Its Collapse, 1904-1905 
The failure of the 1904 Paris conference to attract as wide a range of participants 
as had originally been hoped for by its organisers can be largely attributed to 
the revelation of Zilliacus' links with the Japanese, which prevented the social 
democratic parties from sending their representatives to Paris. The inability of 
the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks to come to any form of agree-
ment about the role of terrorism emerged, in turn, as the major stumbling block 
which restricted the range of participants at the 1905 Geneva conference. The 
disagreements existing between the main wings of the Russian revolutionary move-
ment effectively frustrated all the attempts made during the spring of 1905 to 
establish a common front. 
Of the two main parties, the RSDWP and the Socialist Revolutionaries, the 
former, firmly committed to its own ideological orthodoxy and centralist ap-
proach, was clearly the less flexible in its attitude towards cross-party collabora-
tion. Differences of opinion nevertheless existed with the party, with Plekhanov's 
attitude to joint action generally being more positive than that of the hard-core 
Mensheviks, such as Dan and Martov. The conciliatory approach adopted by 
Lenin in the spring of 1905 towards the other parties owed much to the Bolshe-
viks' desire to break out of their isolated position. 
The various competing socialist parties representing many of the borderlands 
within the Empire often, however, enjoyed significantly worse mutual relations 
than those existing between the Russian Social Democrats and Socialist Revolu-
tionaries. Internecine competition came to dominate local opposition politics in 
a number of regions, particularly in the case of the Polish and Latvian socialist 
movements. The weak overall position of the minority nationalities tended to 
prompt their most important revolutionary parties to promote collaboration be-
tween revolutionary forces across the Empire more actively than the Russian par-
ties. The activity of the minorities in this field was especially prominent in the 
early stages of the development of the idea of joint action during the spring and 
summer of 1904. As a result of the smaller degree of influence wielded by the 
minority nationalities, none of these parties was in a position to be able to torpe-
do the common front idea alone, unlike the larger Russian parties such as the 
RSDWP. 
The Polish Social Democrats (SDKPiL) reacted to the question of collabora- 
otd., op. 5, d. 450 t. 2 lit. A, Tsentral'nyi gosudarstyennyi arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii, 
Moscow; Ministerstvo inostrannykh del, II departament, sekr. dela 1-4, 1905, op. 456, d. 
8, Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossii, Moscow; ACGG, 1904, Special Section, 11-5, VA; Ar-
chive of the Finnish Gendarmerie, S 3 No 16, f. 27, 36, 40, VA; Iznanka revoliutsii 1906; 
Byloe No 1 (23) (1917), pp. 220-225; 1905: Boevaia gruppa pri TsK RSDRP (b) (1905-1907 
g.g.), Stat'i i vospominaniia, sost. S.M. Pozner (Moskva, 1927), pp. 223-224. 
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tion between the social democrats and the other revolutionary parties and oppo-
sition movements the least favourably of any party within the whole of the Em-
pire. In the lead-up to both the Paris and Geneva conferences, the SDKPiL con-
sistently followed policies at odds with those espoused by the RSDWP and the 
other social democratic parties. Despite this, the Russian Social Democrats, both 
the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, favoured the Rosa Luxemburg-led party be-
cause of its renunciation of the nationalism advocated by its competitor, the PPS. 
The SDKPiL's unambiguous internationalist stance made the party an impor-
tant ally for the Russian Social Democrats. 
The Polish Socialist Party's attachment to Polish nationalism, together with 
its anti-Russian sentiments, forced the party into a position within the opposi-
tion movement which fell far short of its potential significance as the main so-
cialist party of the Empire's second most important national group. The PPS' 
traditional separatism was based in large measure on the weakness of the Rus-
sian revolutionary movement. The strengthening of the Russian opposition dur-
ing 1904 forced at least part of the party to reassess its attitude to separatism 
and to the idea of collaboration, and led to a number of disputes within the party 
over its future policy position. 
Of the other parties, the Jewish Bund in particular attempted to promote uni-
ty among the social democrats, while among the Finnish opposition, Zilliacus,  
together with his supporters, similarly aimed at the creation of a joint front em-
bracing all revolutionary forces, albeit one biased in favour of the Russian So-
cialist Revolutionaries. The other minority nationality parties inevitably tended 
to play second fiddle to the major parties. 
The obstacles in the way of cooperation between the revolutionary parties 
proved, in the final analysis, insurmountable. This alone, however, can hardly 
explain the failure of the 1905 revolution. The revolutionary parties were much 
weaker comparatively at the beginning of 1917, when even the small measure 
of collaboration existing in 1905 was lacking. The 1905 revolution remained no 
more than a "dress rehearsal" for things to come because of the fact that, de-
spite its weakened position, the autocratic régime was able, drawing on what 
reserves it had left at its disposal, to avoid the type of complete and absolute 
collapse which it was to encounter only 12 years later. 
Appendix: The Idea of Inter-Party Collaboration 
in the Light of Historical Research 
In the eyes of Soviet party historians, everything diverging from the narrow road 
trod by Lenin and orthodox Bolshevism tends to be considered as an unnatural 
phenomenon which they would prefer to pretend does not exist. This is the con-
clusion one is forced to draw from the way in which the Bolsheviks' competitor 
parties and the various "lost sheep" not in tune with the party's so-called main 
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line have usually been treated in Soviet scholarship. They are typically given very 
little attention in relation to their political significance, and the space that is devot-
ed to them takes the form, for the major part, of unforgiving criticism of their 
various "errors". (What changes perestroika may bring in this regard remains 
to be seen.) 
As a result of this type of approach, Soviet historical research has had little 
to say about the Paris and Geneva conferences. Those who are familiar with Le-
nin's actual attitude to the Paris conference and its background have kept quiet 
about what they know. The Moscow Institute of Marxism-Leninism, in its chrono-
logical biographical survey of Lenin's life and in his collected works, seems to 
suggest that in the lead-up to the Geneva conference Lenin negotiated solely with 
the Latvian Social Democrats in the shape of Rozit}s and represented the Bolshe-
viks alone at the conference itself. Thanks to the memoirs of the Jewish socialist, 
Vladimir Medem, we know, however, that Lenin agreed on a common approach 
to be adopted at the conference not only with the Latvians but also with his old 
opponents, the Bund, as well as with the Armenian Social Democrats. Medem 
also reveals that Bogdanov, who later emerged as one of the leading figures of 
the Bolshevik wing opposed to Lenin, represented the Bolsheviks alongside Le-
nin at the Geneva conference.23s 
Western scholars of Russian revolutionary and opposition parties have gener-
ally looked upon the question of inter-party collaboration as an issue of third-
rate importance and treated it accordingly. This can hardly be the result of the 
ultimate failure of the idea to take root alone, but must also owe its origin to 
the fact that, as representatives of major nations (the United States, Britain and 
Germany), the scholars in question have generally not been interested in a ques-
tion in which various minority nationalities, otherwise of perhaps only peripher-
al interest, played what amounted to a quite central role. The question of inter-
party collaboration has, for essentially the same reason, received the most atten-
tion in Western scholarship on the Bund and in Polish historical research. The 
latter stands out particularly favourably when compared to Soviet work in the 
field. The Finnish literature on the subject has tended to be dominated by a rather 
restricted, nationally-focused approach, although the amount of specific research 
on the issue has been sparse. 
23 Vladimir Il'ich Lenin: Biograficheskaia khronika 2 1971, pp. 44-45; Lenin, PSS, 
10 (1960), pp. 180-185; Tretii s"ezd RSDRP: Protokoly 1959, pp. 378-382; Medem 1979, 
pp. 331-334. 
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The Letters of Colonel Akashi 
and His Aide Major Nagao 
Preserved in Finland 
and Sweden 
edited and annotated by Antti Kujala 
[These nine letters are published here unabridged in their original languages. Lin-
guistic and spelling mistakes have been left intact. However, errors which hinder 
comprehension of the text have been corrected in brackets.] 
1) Colonel Akashi Motojirö (Karloff), Berlin, to Jonas Castrén, Stockholm, 14 February 
1904, Jonas Castrén Collection 2, Valtionarkisto {National Archives] (VA), Helsinki. 
le 14. fevrier 1904. 
Monsieur 
Permettez moi de vous prier de garder une lettre que j'adresse å Balogh de 
Galanta [Miklos (Nicolas) Balogh de Galåntha] jusqu'å son arrive å Stockholm 
et que vous auriez la bout é de lui donner quand il viendra chez vous parce qu'il 
m'a dit qu'il vas partir å Stockholm pour vous voir. 
Veuillez agreer Monsieur l'expression de mes sentiments respectueux et de mes 
sinceres compliments.  
Karloff.  
32.1 " Kleist str. Berlin 
2) Akashi, Stockholm, to J. Castrén, Stockholm, undated (February 1904, probably 22 
February), Castrén Collection 2, VA. 
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Monsieur 
J'ai l'honneur de vous prier de me la faire savoir si vous connaissez l'adresse 
de Monsieur Balogh de Galanta qui devait déja arriver å Stockholm de St Peters-
bourg. Je Vous serai bien obligé si vous me donniez lå-dessus un mot de reponse. 
Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, l'assurance de mes respecteux sentiment  
Akashi 
å l'Hötel Rydberg. 
[Letters 1 and 2 demonstrate that Akashi tried to make connections with the Finn-
ish constitutionalists through the mediation of the Hungarian Miklos Balogh de 
Galåntha.] 
3) Akashi, Stockholm, to Captain Nils Dayid Edlund, Stockholm, undated (8-10 March 
1904), Nils Dayid and Elsa Edlund Archive 7, Krigsarkivet [War Archives], Stockholm. 
Mon Capitaine 
J'étais extremement heureux de vous avoir eu å mon modeste diner d'hier. Je 
vous en remercie beaucoup.  
Comme Vous avez eu la bouté de me dire que je vous donne la resumée des 
questions, je profite de votre complaisance et je Vous envoie la note sous ce pli.  
Naturellement bien que je ne m'attende pas que toutes ces questions seront repon-
dues d'une maniere exacte, je serai heureux de savoir les choses autant que pos-
sible. 
Mon desire å présent est d'avoir 3 correspondants, (1) s'occuppant des ques-
tions de Moscou accessoirement de Kazan et de Yaroslaw, (2) de celles de St Peters-
bourg c'est-å-dire de l'état du centre, (3) de celle de Samara—Penza point im-
portant de transport militaire. Mais ce programme dépend seulement de nombre 
des correspondants, je ne compte que sur votre bonne volonté et sur votre avis  
pour qu'il doit titre changé å cause de nombre de correspondants 
Veuillez agreer, mon Capitaine, l'expression de mes sentiments les plus respec-
tueux et de ma cordiale amitié. 
Akashi 
P.S. Susmentionne (1) regarde surtout l'execution de transport que je mentionne 
dans le papier ci-ajoint 
(2) (3) sont plutöt pour le mouvement des troupes que je mentionne aussi dans 
le papier ci-ajoint. 
Dans le papier ajoint, je mentionne les choses que je veux savoir, naturelle-
ment c'est une chose tres difficil je ne tiens pas donc å ce que toutes ces ques-
tions soient bien répondues, je donne seulement le principes. 
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Note principale [Appendix] 
I. Pour le transport 
a) Nombre de trains partant chaque jour pour ]'Extreme-Orient. 
b) Le numeros des regiments d'infanterie et de cavalerie ainsi que des autres unités, 
le nombre des hommes, des chevaux, des canons ou de materiaux que chaque 
train porte (si c'est possible) 
Example 
le 10. mars. un train de 30 wagons transportent 500 hommes 20 chevaux du 100e 
regiments d'infanterie. 
11 Mars. deux trains d'ont une 500 hommes et 8 pieces de 10 Brigade d'artillerie, 
et l'autre 700 hommes de 101 regiment d'infanterie. 
12 Mars, un train de 30 wagon, hommes 300 de 5e regiment d'infant. et de 400 
du 6e infant. regiment. Un train de 10 cavalerie regiment, hommes 200, chevaux 
80. 
etc etc 
Mais ce n'est pas rigoureusement util de savoir les détails de transport comme 
susmentionné, il est largement suffisant de savoir combien d'hommes, quelle 
troupes ont été envoyé å quel jour. 
b) toutes les nouvelles concernant le chemin de fer transsiberien 
II. Pour Le Mouvement des troupes dans la Russie. 
a) Mobilisation 
b) réorganisation 
c) rappel des reservistes etc. 
d) le bruit de susmentionnés a) b) et c) 
e) l'Etat sanitaire et moral des soldats renvoyés du theatre de la guerre 
f) les choses concernant les arsenaux, les cartoucheries, les magasins de vivre, 
de ravitaillements etc 
g) Pétat politique et stratégique quand c'est possible de savoir 
[Captain N.D. Edlund was the Swedish General Staff's officer in charge of recon-
naissance regarding Russia. On 8 March 1904 the Swedish Minister of War, Otto 
Virgin, ordered him to the Far Eastern front to follow the wartime activity of 
the Russian troops. Edlund left Stockholm for Manchuria on 10 March. Before 
his departure Akashi invited him to dinner. Edlund promised to arrange for mili-
tary spies to serve Japan in Russia. Certain other Swedish General Staff officers, 
in particular Lieutenant Klas Axel Klingenstierna, also aided Akashi and Nagao 
in military reconnaissance. This cooperation began in the spring of 1904. 
The Swedish government adhered to a strict policy of neutrality in regard to 
the participants of the Far Eastern war. The behaviour of the Swedish officers 
contradicted the government's official line and the government certainly did not 
give its blessing to it. Apparently a group formed within the General Staff which 
prepared for the possibility that Russia might be forced into war not only with 
Japan but also with some of the European powers, above all Britain. In such 
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Då Castrens 'donas kief till tatareputpeten, 
då smeto U-S-iterna tilt kaffet i buffeten. 
As Jonas Castrén ascended the speaker's platform his opponents left for a coffee break.  
Fyren 1908. 
an event Sweden could get revenge on Russia for the loss of Finland in 1809. 
As Akashi relates in Rakka ryusui the Finn Jonas Castren arranged contacts 
between Akashi and Swedish General Staff officers. In May and June of 1904 
Finnish Captain Lieutenant Gösta Theslöf and Castren briefly participated in 
joint Swedish-Japanese reconnaissance work but were not of much help to the 
Japanese. 
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A small group composed of Jonas Castren, Julio Reuter, Carl Mannerheim 
and certain other Finnish constitutionalists tried to persuade the governments 
of Japan and Britain to commit themselves to procuring for Finland, with the 
conclusion of peace, as much independence from Russia as possible. In return 
the group proposed that the Finns might rise in rebellion against the Russian 
government. This, however, would have required Britain's participation in the 
war and massive aid from its fleet; other conditions for rebellion also had to be 
as favourable as possible. Since Britain had no desire to go to war and Japan 
was not interested in making military or political commitments in Europe, Reu-
ter's alliance proposals in May 1904 in London to the Japanese Minister Hayashi 
and Military Attache Utsunomiya and the British Minister of War H.O. Arnold-
Forster (30 May) met with a cool reception. See Kujala 1988, pp. 3-23.] 
4) Akashi (Karl), Stockholm, to J. Casual (Herr Gustay), Stockholm, undated (18 March 
or 18 November 1904, probably 18 March), Castrén Collection 2, VA. 
Mein Guter Herr Gustav!  
Noch ein mahl theile ich Ihnen mit dass ich heute (den 18 Freitag) ganz sicher 
von jetzt bis zur 5 % zu Hause sein. Wollen Sie so gut sein den Herr von dem 
Sie gesprochen haben zu mir zu schiken. Herzlichter Grüss von 
Karl 
[The gentleman who Akashi wanted to meet with the help of Castren was some 
unidentified Finnish constitutionalist who had come to Sweden to inquire into 
Japan's willingness for cooperation.] 
5) Akashi, Stockholm, to J. Castrén, Stockholm, 25 April 1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA. 
Hier d. 25/4 04. 
Sehr geehrter Herr Rechtsanwalt! 
Bitte Sie hiermit, morgen abend im kleinen gewöhnlichen Anzug, also nicht 
im eleganten wie Frack, zu erscheinen. 
Mit achtungsvollem Grusse 
Ihr 
Karl. 
6) Akashi (Karl), Stockholm, to J. Castrén, Stockholm, undated (27 April 1904), Carl Man-
nerheim Papers 2, VA. 
Mein lieber Herr.  
Hier habe ich zwei Brief umgeschrossen [umgeschlossen], einer von denen (ich 
habe nicht des Empfingers geschrieben) ist an den Herrn [Hayashi] von dem wir 
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gestern gesprochen haben und der andere ist an meinen Freund [Utsunomiya] 
der die Gelegenheit beschaffen soil. Wenn der letzte nicht zu sechen [sehen] wäre,  
ist es auch gut den weissen Brief (No 1 bezeichnet) direct Herrn H. [Hayashi] 
übergeben. 
Genehmigen Sie den Ausdruck meiner herzlichsten Grüss 
Karl 
[Along with this letter Akashi sent by way of Castren two letters of recommen-
dation to Julio Reuter who travelled from Stockholm to London to propose his 
group's alliance offer to Hayashi and Utsunomiya.] 
7) Major Nagao Tsunekichi (Heinrich), Stockholm, to J. Castrén, Copenhagen, 4 July 1904, 
Castrén Collection 2, VA. 
Stockholm d. 4/7 04. 
Sehr geehrter Herr Rechtsanwalt! 
Viele Dank für Ihren gütigsten Brief. Der Herr [Akashi] kommt noch nicht 
hier an. Falls er kommt, werde ich ihm das übermitteln, was Sie mir kürzlich 
geschrieben haben. Der dortige Schlimmste [Govenor-General N.I. Bobrikov] ist 
nun hingeschieden, Gott sei dank! 
Erlaube mir Ihnen zu wunschen recht angenehmen Aufenthalt und mit frischer  
Gesundheit zurückkommend, Sie wieder begrüssen zu durfen. 
Mit vorzüglichem Ausdruck Hochactung. 
Ihr sehr ergebener 
Haeinrich.  
8) Akashi (Karl), place of origin unknown, to J. Castrén, Ronneby (Sweden), 6 August 
1904, Castrén Collection 2, VA. 
6/8 1904 
Mein Herr und guter Freund 
Was verlebt nun mit Ihnen? schön länge Zeit habe ich nicht Sie zu sehen. Aber 
mein Freund N. [Nagao] gab mir oft Ihre lebensweise und ich danke vielmehr 
Ihnen Ihre liebenswördige Freundschaft fir meinen Freund N. 
Ich sende Ihnen meinen herzlichen Grüss zum neuen Ergebniss [assassination 
of Bobrikov] das kurzlich geschehen ist. Meine Ruckkehrt nach Stock[holm] ist 
noch nicht bestimmt. Ich habe fast die hälfte meiner Reise mit Ihrem Freund 
Z [Konni Zilliacus] zusammen verlebt. 
Herzlichsten Gruss  
Karl 
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9) Nagao (Heinrich), Stockholm, to J. Castrén, Ronneby, 8 August 1904, Castrén Collec- 
tion 2, VA.  
Stockholm d. 8/8 04.  
Sehr verehrter Herr Advocat! 
Eben habe ich von Karl den beilegenden Brief erhalten. Denselben sende ich 
Ihnen.  
Mit viel herzlichstem Grusse. 
p.s. Sie hätten meinen Brief schon erhalten. Herr Cap. [Captain Lieutenant Gösta 
Theslöf] kommt immer noch nicht. 
Ihr ergebenster 
Heinrich 
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Olavi K. Fält 
The Influence of Finnish- 
Japanese Cooperation during 
the Russo-Japanese War on 
Relations between Finland and 
Japan in 1917 1944* 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
In order to acquire more weight than the paper on which it was written, Fin-
land's declaration of independence on 6th December 1917 required a broad mea-
sure of international recognition. The most importance recognition of all, that 
of Soviet Russia, was received at the beginning of January 1918, and this was 
immediately followed by similar statements from Sweden, France and Germa- 
* Pages 177-190 of this article are based on Olavi K. Fält, Eksotismista realismiin. Perin-
teinen Japanin-kuva Suomessa 1930-luvun murroksessa [From exoticism to realism. The 
traditional image of Japan in Finland in the transition years of the 1930's.], Studia Historica 
Septentrionalia 5 (Oulu, 1982) and pages 190-196 on Olavi K. Fält, "Japanin ja Suomen 
suhteet kansainvälisen politiikan ristiaallokossa 1935-1985" [Japanese-Finnish relations 
in the cross-currents of international politics in 1935-85], Suomalais-japanilaisia suhteita 
1935-1985 — Lähetystyötä, politiikkaa, kulttuuri vaihtoa, Suomalais-Japanilainen Yhdistys 
R.Y:n 50-vuotisjuhlajulkaisu, Julkaisu No 4, Toim. Tuija Kinnunen-Härmälä (Helsinki, 
1985), pp. 35-45. 
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ny. After this the situation remained unchanged for a considerable time, and it 
was not until 23rd May 1919, for example, that Japan declared her de facto recog-
nition of Finnish independence'. 
The delaying of recognition by Japan was due to a general reticence on the 
part of the major victorious powers in the First World War in this respect in 
view of the apparently pro-German line pursued by Finland in 1918. Once Ger-
many had lost the War and the political leadership in Finland had changed, Great 
Britain and the United States recognized Finland at the beginning of May 1919, 
and France, too, issued a confirmation of her earlier decision. Thus Japan, with 
her own declaration, was simply following the example set by the other World 
War victors in this respect3. 
The first charge d'affaires to be accredited to Tokyo and Beijing, and stationed 
in Tokyo, was Prof. Gustaf Ramstedt.4 The establishment of a legation in Tokyo 
was intended as a diplomatic safety measure to clarify Finland's new status as 
an independent nation in the eyes of governments in the Far East in the light 
of the strong support felt in Eastern Asia for a policy of anti-Bolshevist inter-
vention and of the reservations towards Finnish independence harboured by the 
White Army in Russia and those in sympathy with this body.5 Also, Finland was 
interested in the possibility of a division of the Russian Empire in Eastern Asia, 
as elsewhere, into a number of independent national states, in which respect a 
legation in Tokyo was a necessary vantage point from which to observe develop-
ments.'  
Minutes of the Council of State 16.7.1919. Minutes of the Council of State 1919, July 
VII. Valtionarkisto [National Archives] (VA), Helsinki. De jure on January 27 1921. The 
Japanese Ambassador to Paris, Makino Nobuaki had proposed in private that Finland's 
independence should be recognized on condition that she allowed the White Russians to 
use her territory for offensives against St. Petersburg, but he later withdrew this proposal, 
largely on account of opposition from the American and British representatives. Jaana 
Koivisto & Salme Tuokila, Japanin suhtautuminen Suomeen maailmansotien välisenä aikana  
[Japanese attitudes towards Finland in the inter-war period], Lyhennelmä pro gradu-tut-
kielmasta, Turun yliopisto historian laitos, maaliskuu 1985. Turun Suomalais-Japanilai-
nen Yhdistys. Julkaisu no. 3 (Turku s.a.), pp. 1-2. 
2 Juhani Paasivirta, Ensimmäisen maailmansodan voittajat ja Suomi. Englannin, Yh-
dysvaltain ja Ranskan sekä Suomen suhteita vv. 1918-1919 [The First World War Vic-
tors and Finland. Relations between Finland and Britain, the United States and France 
in 1918-1919]  (Porvoo, 1961), pp. 245-246. 
3 Momose Hiroshi, "Japan's Relations with Finland 1919-1944. As Reflected by Jap-
anese Source Materials", Surabu Kenkyu 17 1973, pp. 6-7. 
3 Minutes of the Council of State 6.9.1919. Minutes of the Council of State 1919, Sep-
tember IX. VA. 
5 Juhani Paasivirta, Suomen diplomaattiedustus ja ulkopolitiikan hoito. Itsenäistymises-
tä talvisotaan [Finnish diplomacy and the conduct of foreign policy from Independence 
to the Winter War]  (Porvoo, 1968), pp. 185-186. 
a Heikki Pohjala, Suomen ja Japanin suhteet (1919-1925) eli Miten se seikka, että Neu-
vostoliitto oli Japanin ja Suomen yhteinen naapuri, vaikutti suomalais-japanilaisen yhteistyön 
syntymiseen  [Finnish-Japanese relations in 1919-1925, or how the existence of the Soviet 
Union as a common neighbour led to the establishment of cooperation between Finland 
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G.J. Ramstedt. 
The Tokyo legation had largely lost its importance by the early 1920's, howev-
er. Parliament made no grant towards its upkeep in the budget of December 1922, 
and although the grant was restored early in 1923 the legation began to assume 
a commercial rather than political role from that time on.' Commercial relations 
were established on a firm basis with the signing of a trade and shipping agree-
ment between the two countries in 1924, to come into force in 1926.8 
From the Japanese point of view, Finland was in principle just one of the many 
nation states in Europe which had achieved independence as a consequence of 
the World War, and the minor importance attached to Finnish affairs was reflected 
in the fact that Helsinki fell within the province of the Japanese legation in Stock-
holm until 1st November 1936, when a legation was opened in the Finnish capi-
tal as well.9 The chief factor as far as Japanese foreign policy as a whole was 
concerned was undoubtedly the proximity of Helsinki to the Soviet Union, as 
and Japan] (Degree dissertation in World History, University of Helsinki, 1970), pp. 11-12.  
Paasivirta 1968, p. 186; Pohjala 1970, pp. 65-85.  
Martti Lintulahti, Finland to tainichikankei no enkaku. A Treatise of the Finno-Jap-
anese Relations from the early Contacts to the Present (Tokyo, 1963), pp. 56, 116-125;  
Koivisto & Tuokila, pp. 12-13. 
9 
 Japanin Helsingin lähetystö VI [The Japanese legation in Helsinki]. Report no. 36 of 
Hugo Valvanne, Tokyo 3.11.1936. Finnish Foreign Ministry 5 C 15. Ulkoasiainministe-
riön arkisto [Archives of the Foreign Ministry] (UM), Helsinki. 
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shown by the speculation in the Osaka Mainichi on 13th October 1936 that the 
reason for the new legation lay in Finland's close relations with Japan and her 
status as an immediate neighbour of the Soviet Union.10 
The Soviet Threat — a Common Denominator 
It would seem from the above that the cooperation between the Finns and the 
Japanese which had taken place during the Russo-Japanese War scarcely had any 
influence at all on relations between the two countries. In actual fact, however, a 
stream of close relations fostered precisely by this earlier collaboration was running 
beneath the official surface all the time, and the image of Japan in Finland was 
a relatively favourable one, largely on account of her victory in that War, an 
image which the author has referred to earlier as an activist-constitutionalist view 
of Japan.11 Admittedly that country's expansionist policies towards China in the 
1930's later caused some polarization in this image, with the extreme right in Fin-
land entertaining an extremely favourable view of Japan while the attitude of 
the left was highly critical. By the end of that decade, with the increasing threat 
of war in Europe, the public image of Japan in Finland began to assume a more 
neutral tone.12 
The generally favourable stance adopted by the Finns towards Japan is well 
reflected in a letter from the Finnish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, J.K.Paasiki-
vi, to the leader of the Social Democrat Party, Väinö Tanner, in 1940, in which 
he stresses the fact that Finland was rescued from the burden of the years of 
repression by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the World War of 
1914-1918.13 
A similar favourable attitude towards relations between the two countries may 
also be detected in Japan, since the first charge d'affaires, Ramstedt, noted upon 
his arrival that a certain friendliness towards Finland existed in Japanese politi-
cal circles precisely as a consequence of the collaboration which had taken place 
during the Russo-Japanese War, and that this naturally made the task of Fin-
land's first representative in that country very much easier than that of the 
delegates from many other new nations.14 
Ramstedt himself was able to convey the Finns' sentiments of approval in his 
10 The Osaka Mainichi 13.10.1936. See also Momose 1973, pp. 10-12. On the sig-
nificance of Finland to the Japanese as a vantage-point for observing circumstances in the 
Soviet Union in the early 1920's, see Koivisto & Tuokila, pp. 9-10. 
11 Fält 1982, pp. 101-103. 
12 
 Fält 1982, pp. 315-319. 
13 Väinö Tanner, Kahden maailmansodan välissa. Muistelmia 20- and 30-luvuilta [Be-
tween two world wars. Recollections from the 1920's and 1930's] (Fourth impression. Hel-
sinki, 1966), p. 261. 
14 Interview with Prof. G.J. Ramstedt. Papers of Eino I. Parmanen, file X. VA. 
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Akashi and his three children. 
message of congratulation to Admiral Togo Heihachiro in 1920 on his victory 
in the Battle of Tsushima: "On behalf of the Finnish people, who have led a 
quiet life and have suffered much through the ages, I beg you to allow me as 
their first representative in this land of your birth to bring before you our thanks 
for the most significant improvements which have dawned even upon the distant 
18I 
Finnish nation as a benefit achieved on account of your victory at Tsushima.s15 
These memories of past collaboration did not have any political repercussions 
at that stage, however, unless one considers the support expressed by Japan for 
the resolution of the Åland question in the League of Nation in Finland's favour 
in 1920-1921, although here one should perhaps pay more tribute to the active 
work done by Ramstedt to arm the Japanese delegation to Geneva with the neces-
sary background information in support of the Finnish cause16. 
Finland was known to the general public in Japan in the 1920's most of all 
on account of the achievements of her athletes," and perhaps also as a respect-
ed nation belonging to the same race as the Japanese18. Early in the 1930's Fin-
land was still arousing interest in non-political circles within Japan as a country 
of sport and culture, whereas in the political sphere the main interest lay in her 
position as a bastion against the spread of communism into Europe.19 
This favourable image of Finland as an anti-communist nation arose very largely 
out of the nature of Japanese society itself, where the communist party had been 
dissolved.20 At the same time relations with the Soviet Union were strained, to 
the extent that considerable international speculation had been aroused on the 
possibility of a war between the two countries.21  
The memory of earlier cooperation against Russia was a tinder box which it 
was easy to grasp for when the threat posed by the Soviet Union emerged as a 
new common denominator in relations between Finland and Japan. Particularly 
to non-socialist eyes, the chief problem in Finnish foreign policy from independ-
ence onwards had been the Soviet Union and the threat which it presented. Thus 
the Finnish defence forces had been armed specifically to repel a Soviet attack, 
and it was also for this reason that the League of Nations had come to the fore 
as the favoured alternative in terms of security policy in the late 1920's and early 
G.J. Ramstedt to Admiral Togo, Tokyo 6.6.1920 (draft). K 10, papers of G.J.Ram-
stedt. VA. 
16 G.J. Ramstedt, Lähettiläänä Nipponissa. Muistelmia vuosilta 1919-1929 [Envoy to 
Nippon. Recollections from the years 1919-1929]  (Porvoo, 1950), pp. 56-59. See Momose 
1973, pp. 13-15. 
"  Maailman hirvittävin murhenäytelmä. Kuvauksia maanjäristyksen kauhuista Japanis-
sa [The most terrifying tragic drama in the world. Pietures of the horrors of the earth-
quake in Japan] (Helsinki, 1923), p. 40. 
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1930's. Not that Finland entertained any very strong feelings towards the League 
of Nations, but simply because it was hoped in this way to obtain external sup-
port in the event of a threat from the Soviet Union.22 
One may conjecture that in the foreign policy situation which prevailed at that 
time any support which directly or indirectly increased Finland's security was 
at least a matter worth considering for those in charge of foreign affairs, and 
one possible source of such support was Japan. The invasion of Manchuria in 
autumn 1931 and later of northern China nevertheless complicated the picture 
greatly as far as the Finns were concerned, since this expansionism ran contrary 
to the fundamental principles which Finland had advocated in the League of Na-
tions. More care had to be taken when framing official statements, although the 
Finnish charge d'affaires in Tokyo, George Winckelmann, still maintained that 
the most important thing of all in spite of these offensives was that Japan should 
remain as a counter-balance to the Soviet Union.23  
Finland was confronted with her trickiest foreign policy problem in this re-
spect when these matters came up for discussion in the League of Nations itself. 
This prompted President P.E. Svinhufvud to instruct the Finnish delegates that 
they should align themselves with other countries in a comparable position to 
Finland while bearing in mind at the same time the importance of preserving re-
lations with Japan. Although Finland did vote against Japan, unofficial efforts 
were still made to ensure that relations were not endangered. The Japanese 
representatives in these discussions assured the Finns of their country's unshak-
able friendship and avowed that they understood very well the duty Finland felt 
to vote in support of the Lytton report which condemned Japanese action. The 
Finnish Foreign Minister Antti Hackzell expressed his regret to the Japanese 
representative for the way in which Finland had been obliged to vote. Finnish 
feelings were ones of friendship towards Japan, but because the League of Na-
tions existed, Finland was unable to follow the dictates of her feelings. Hackzell 
also communicated to him the regrets of President Svinhufvud at having to re-
solve his country's stance towards Japan in this concrete manner.24 
A critical report drawn up in his own name by Ensio Hiitonen, head of the 
League of Nations office at the Finnish Foreign Ministry, regarding Finland's 
attitudes towards Japan and the League of Nations in the light of her policies 
towards the Soviet Union reveals very clearly what was really going on. He be-
lieved that the favourable attitude of the Finnish press towards Japan was a legacy 
from the Russo-Japanese War, from which time onwards Japan had been regarded 
J2 Kari Selén, Genevestä Tukholmaan. Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikan painopisteen siir-
tyminen Kansainliitosta pohjoismaiseen yhteistyöhön 1931-1936 [From Geneva to Stock-
holm. The shift in the focus of Finnish security poliey from the League of Nations to Nor-
dic cooperation in 1931-19361, Historiallisia tutkimuksia 94. Publications of the Finnish 
Historical Society (Helsinki, 1974). pp. 31-43. 
23 Fält 1982, pp. 108, 140. 
24 Fält 1982, pp. 146-147. 
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as a supporter of the notion of Finnish independence and the most successful 
opponent of Russia, and in this way as virtually an ally. He went on to claim, 
however, that Finland should not resolve the question of her attitude to Japan 
on the grounds of any immediate benefit to be gained vis å vis the Soviet Union, 
for it was scarcely possible for Japan to contemplate any new confrontation, be-
ing more than occupied for the present with the Chinese question. He was of 
the opinion that the League of Nations had taken an important preventive mea-
sure on behalf of peace, at least in Europe, and that this was of greater significance 
for Finland than any conflict which the Soviet Union might be drawn into in 
the Far East.'S  
In spite of Hiitonen's critical report, it may be said with some justification 
that Japan was indeed regarded in the early years of Svinhufvud's presidency 
(1931-1937) as a potential source of support for Finland against the Soviet Union. 
Correspondingly, there were evidently some circles in Japan that believed that 
Finland would join the battle against the Soviet Union should war break out be-
tween that country and Japan. They even maintained that the Japanese and Finns 
together would destroy Russia, after which the Finns would be assigned exten-
sive territories west of Siberia in which to create their ideal of Greater Finland.26 
The Japanese Military Attaché in Latvia, Kawamata, even sent back informa-
tion, admittedly of a somewhat dubious kind, that the government and presi-
dent of Finland were in favour of invading Karelia should war break out between 
the Soviet Union and Japan.27 
The Soviet Union was highly suspicious of the close relations that existed be-
tween Finland and Japan. It was claimed that the former had rejected the Soviet 
Union's offers of friendship and was instead accepting a hand proffered over 
their heads from the Far East. The Journal de Moscou avowed that reactionary 
circles in Finland were proposing the Altai Mountains as the future border be-
tween Finland and Japan.28 
Soviet suspicions cannot have been allayed in any way by the discovery in 1934 
of an organization set up by Lt. Col. Lennartti Pohjanheimo to train activists 
to fight on behalf of a kindred nation to free the people of Ingermanland. The 
intention was to create unrest in Eastern Karelia and Ingermanland as soon as 
war broke out between the Soviet Union and Japan and to promote hostilities 
between Finland and the Soviet Union.29 Such suspicions were in all probabili- 
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ty  strengthened still further by the founding of a Finnish-Japanese Society in May 
1935, the participation in the inaugural meeting, where one third of those pres-
ent were active military officers, being a clear indication of those circles in Fin-
land that were particularly interested in Japan.3°  
Suspicions regarding Finnish-Japanese collaboration were not confined to the 
Soviet Union, however, for they were also common in countries such as Great 
Britain and China, and Foreign Minister Hackzell was obliged twice, in 1934 and 
1935, to deny in Parliament the truth of any such rumours.31  
The suspicions were not entirely without justification, however, for President 
Svinhufvud was known to be planning an anti-Bolshevist front in 1934, when 
it became apparent that the Soviet Union was soon to join the League of Na-
tions. The leading roles in this front were to be reserved for Great Britain and 
Japan. Svinhufvud regarded Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim as a suitable person 
to discuss this matter unofficially in various capitals of the world, but the latter 
had doubts about the venture and declined to accept the role of promoter for 
an anti-Bolshevist front. His reluctance was quite understandable in view of the 
utopistic nature of the venture.32 
The sympathy felt in Finland for the Japanese is also shown by the assurance 
of a friendly attitude on the part of Finland given to the charge d'affaires Ichikawa 
Hikotaro by the First Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Eero Järnefelt, early in 
193433, and also by the same assurance given to the Japanese Principal Secre-
tary for European and American Affairs, Togo Shigenori, by the new Finnish 
Ambassador in Tokyo. Hugo Valvanne34. 
Further evidence of the rapport which existed between the two peoples is provid-
ed by a conversation which Valvanne had with Prince Chichibu early in 1935, 
in which the Prince enquired about Finnish relations with the Soviet Union. Val-
vanne replied that these were formally correct as far as Finland was concerned, 
but by no means cordial. There was little that the two countries had in common 
and a great deal that came between them. As long as the Communists remained 
in power in Russia, Finland, like Japan, would have to protect herself from that 
country's influence. Valvanne also described how the sympathy for Japan that 
had grown up during the Russo-Japanese War had been gaining in strength all 
the time.35 
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Around the middle of the decade Finland followed a line of strict support for 
the League of Nations. Although Japan had resigned from the League in 1933, 
a decision which took effect as from spring 1935, Finland maintained friendly 
relations as a kind of safeguard against the threat which the Soviet Union was 
still felt to present, and this continued to be reflected in fairly widespread specu-
lation on collaboration between Finland and Japan against the Soviet Union. 
Signs of Estrangement 
A certain cooling of relations between Finland and Japan is detectable from 1936 
onwards, evidently due to Finland's new policy of Nordic non-alignment, an-
nounced towards the end of 1935. Japan began to lose the position which she 
had once occupied in the eyes of the leaders of Finnish foreign policy, although 
the basic excellence of relations between the two countries still could not be de-
nied, as witnessed by the opening of the Japanese legation in Helsinki on 1st 
November 1936.36 In terms of international politics this event coincided rather 
too well with the Anti-Comintern Pact signed between Japan and Germany on 
25th November of the same year, which may well have once more aroused em-
barrassing suspicions abroad regarding Finland's motives. This led the German 
Consul in Shanghai to remark to the local Finnish Consul, Ville Niskanen, that 
Finland was a supporter of the same form of joint action, a subscriber to the 
same ideological movement but without a membership card, even though for tac-
tical reasons she made declarations of neutrality.37 Once more it fell to the Finn-
ish Foreign Minister, this time Rudolf Holsti, to allay all speculations regarding 
his country's foreign policy and to insist that Finland would remain loyal to all 
causes that prevailed upon her to preserve peace.38 
The Japanese themselves did not found any very great hopes on the depth of 
Finnish sympathies. In their view Finland had settled for Nordic non-alignment, 
and the Japanese Foreign Ministry and General Staff never made any attempt 
to persuade her to enter the Anti-Comintern Pact. It was the opinion of the General 
Staff that Finland was being cautious and that she would not readily ally herself 
with Japan in any war between that country and the Soviet Union. This was quite 
the contrary assumption to that made in 1933, which in itself indicates, although 
admittedly indirectly, that Finland had rejected Japan as a guarantor of her secu-
rity. On the other hand, it must be said that the Japanese army did not have 
a very high opinion of Finland's military power until the Winter War.39 
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Finland's bid for non-alignment was emphasized in Japanese eyes by Foreign 
Minister Holsti's visit to Moscow in February 1937, an event which even caused 
some measure of disappointment among the Japanese, who may have entertained 
hopes of closer cooperation against the Soviet Union in view of the implications 
contained in the simultaneous opening of the Helsinki legation and signing of 
the Anti-Comintern Pact. Japanese diplomatic reports described Holsti's visit 
as an expression of Finland's aspirations with regard to Nordic neutrality, while 
Ichikawa saw the journey largely as a passive gesture aimed at normalizing the 
strained relations between Finland and the Soviet Union.40 
Holsti had assured Ichikawa that he had no intention of discussing any new 
political matters in Moscow, but that he was making purely a courtesy visit. The 
Soviet Union had invited the foreign ministers of neighbouring countries to an 
exchange of ideas, and Finland had accepted this invitation. The timing of the 
visit, he claimed, was the outcome of suspicions regarding Finnish attitudes to-
wards the Soviet Union aroused in the United States and other countries by false 
Soviet propaganda. Holsti emphasized to Ichikawa that his journey did not im-
ply any underhand dealing in opposition to Japan or Germany (only a month 
or so having elapsed since the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact), nor did it 
mark any change in Finnish foreign policy.41  
Although, in the words of the assurances given, this journey did not mark 
any change in Finnish-Japanese relations, it did demonstrate to the Japanese 
the strength of Finland's alignment with the other Nordic countries. The Swed-
ish Minister in Moscow took the opportunity to inform the Japanese Ambas-
sador, Shigemitsu Mamoru, of the Scandinavia countries' view of this visit, ex-
plaining that in his opinion it was intended to reduce friction between Finland 
and the Soviet Union in every way following the tightening of relations between 
Japan and Germany. Sweden, Denmark and Norway had advised the Finnish 
Foreign Minister to go to the Soviet Union because it was in their own interests 
to avoid involvement in any crises in Eastern Europe, and it was after all the 
case that Finland was situated geographically between Scandinavia and the Sovi-
et Union.42 
Holsti's visit was of considerable significance as far as speculations concern-
ing possible Finnish-Japanese collaboration were concerned, since the Soviet Com-
missar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim M. Litvinov, was able to say to the Swedish 
Foreign Minister Richard Sandler when he had visited Moscow in July that the 
Soviet Union now believed that Finland would not constitute any threat even 
if war should break out with Germany and Japan.43  
4° 
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The parallel impressions of Finnish foreign policy obtained by the Japanese, 
by Litvinov and also by the Germans44 strengthen the assumption it was the new 
policy of Nordic non-alignment, a safe harbour in the storms of international 
politics45, that led to the cooling in her relations with Japan. Even so these re-
lations could not be said to have been bad at any stage, as shown by an internal 
memorandum from the Japanese Foreign Ministry in February 1937, which re-
ferred to them as such especially in the light of Finnish-Soviet relations and the 
position of Japan in the world.46 
The heightened international tension at the end of the decade led Finland to 
pursue a still more reserved foreign policy, which meant that relations with Japan, 
which had been engaged in its war with China since July 1937, became even more 
distant. This became evident when Finland was required to define her own posi-
tion with regard to the events in China when the latter brought up the question 
of the Japanese invasion in the League of Nations shortly after the outbreak of 
war. This time the directives approved by President Kyösti Kallio for the Finnish 
delegation made no mention at all of the importance of preserving good rela-
tions with Japan as had still been the case in connection with the Manchurian 
Incident in 1933. Five years earlier Japan had been viewed as a distant power which 
could serve as a guarantor of Finland's security in the face of a possible Soviet 
threat, but now the country's security was seen as residing in the League of Na-
tions itself, in the western powers which acted as its leaders and in the pursuance 
of a common policy along with the Scandinavian countries.47 
The Japanese question was not regarded in Finland as posing any particular 
problems, since Foreign Minister Holsti did not mention it at all in his report 
on the general assembly sent out to all Finnish ambassadors and envoys, concen-
trating instead on the question of Spain's candidature for membership of the 
council of the League of Nations.48 
ulkopolitiikassa 1937-1939 1. Holstista Erkkoon [Background to the Winter War. The 
Soyiet Union in Finnish foreign policy 1937-1939 I. From Holsti to Erkko] (Helsinki, 
1973), p. 84. 
44 Brita Hiedanniemi, Kulttuuriin verhottua politiikkaa. Kansallissosialistisen Saksan 
kulttuuripropaganda Suomessa 1933-1940 [Politics in a cultural guise. Nazi-Germany's 
cultural propaganda in Finland in 1933-1940] (Keuruu, 1980), p. 109. 
45 Korhonen 1971, p. 131. 
46 pakyokudaiikka Gaimusho 13.2.1937. Kakukoku kokujö kankai zakkan. Fuinran-
dokoku no bu. A.6.0.0.6.-10. GS.  
47 (Confidential) minutes of the Finnish Council of State, question raised by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 3.9.1937.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confidential minutes of the Council 
of State 1934 — Aug. 1939. Ca 8. VA.  
48 Ministeri Holstin kertomus ulkoasiainministerien konferenssista Tukholmassa 
syyskuun alussa, suomalaisen valtuuskunnan toiminnasta Kansainliiton yleiskokouksessa, 
Ruotsin ja Suomen ulkoasiainministerien matkasta Tornionlaaksoon sekä yirallisesta käyn-
nistään Berliinissä ja Riiassa [Report by R. Holsti on the Stockholm conference of foreign 
ministers held at the beginning of September, the actions of the Finnish delegation to the 
League of Nations general assembly, the visit of the Swedish and Finnish foreign ministers  
188 
On the other hand there were evidently some circles in Japan which believed 
that Finland was only waiting for war to break out between the Soviet Union 
and Japan to commence an attack of their own,49 and the official Japanese view 
was obviously that it was desirable to maintain friendly relations, since note was 
taken in discussions between Valvanne and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Ko-
noe Fumimaro, in autumn 1938 of the interest felt by the peoples of Finland and 
Japan towards each other from the time of the Russo-Japanese War onwards. 
Konoe had expressed the hope that even under the conditions that prevailed at 
that time everything possible would still be done to maintain friendly relations.' 
One obvious sign of Finland estrangement from Japan was the lack of interest 
shown by the Foreign Ministry in concluding a cultural agreement with that coun-
try in May 1939, this reluctance being motivated by purely political considera-
tions. It was not wished under any conditions to create an impression of close 
political cooperation with Japan, especially in view of the latter's recent cultural 
agreements with Germany and Italy.51 This view confirms that Japan no longer 
carried any weight as a guarantor of Finnish security as far as the Finns were 
concerned. On the contrary, it was consistent with Finnish foreign policy for the 
country to keep its distance with regard to Japan. 
The Finnish armed forces similarly did not regard Japan as playing any role 
in Finland's security, the review of military policy issued by the General Staff 
in 1938 simply noting that: "From our point of view this war [the Sino-Japanese 
War] means in terms of military policy largely that Russia, by supporting China, 
has an opportunity to relieve the pressure previously exerted by Japan on her 
eastern border. ''52 
The cooling in relations is symbolized in concrete form by the emergence dur-
ing the 1930's of the first actual cause of friction between the two countries. This 
arose because of a very rapid shift in the trade balance to Finland's disadvantage 
on account of the reduction in Japanese imports of Finnish wood pulp dictated 
the foreign exchange crisis precipitated in that country by her war with China. 
Negotiations lasting almost a year ended with an agreement in spring 1939 which 
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guaranteed the Finnish woodprocessing industry a reasonable share in the Japa-
nese market.53  
In spite of this internal cooling in relations, Finland's neutral attitude towards 
the Japanese hostilities in China differed markedly from the general condemna-
tion of the operation expressed by the western nations. Japan had no other sup-
porters at that time apart from Germany and Italy. It may be that the neutral 
attitude of the Finns was motivated to some extent by suspicion of the Soviet 
Union, strengthened perhaps by the traditional favourable image enjoyed by Japan 
as a consequence of the Russo-Japanese War.54 
The Second World War — a Conflict of Interests 
When the Winter War broke out at the end of November 1939 with the Soviet 
attack on Finland, the Japanese government remained silent on the subject of 
the Finnish resistance. From the beginning of World War II onwards Japan had 
tried to preserve her neutrality and concentrate on her own war with China. The 
non-aggression pact signed between the Soviet Union and Germany had come 
as a complete surprise to Japan, especially in view of the Anti-Comintern Pact 
against the Soviet Union which Germany had concluded with Japan in 1936. Japan 
found it extremely difficult to adapt to the rapid, unexpected fluctuations in the 
European situation, in addition to which it was now necessary for her to avoid 
any future conflict with the Soviet Union, having just suffered one military de-
feat in connection with the Nomonhan affair on the Mongolian-Manchurian bord-
er which lasted a couple of months and led to the signing of an armistice only 
in the middle of September.55 
Much sympathy was nevertheless felt in Japan for the Finnish cause, as emerges 
very clearly from the newspapers, even though few hopes were entertained for 
Finland's chances in the war.56 The government had strictly forbidden any offi-
cial statements of support for Finland, however, just as the General Staff pro-
hibited all sales of arms to Finland.57 Even so, the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
had expressed its moral support before the outbreak of the Winter War, and once 
this had happened the eldest of the Emperor's brothers, Prince Chichibu, wished 
Finland success and assured her that everyone in Japan would follow the course 
of the war in a sympathetic spirit. The Foreign Minister, Nomura Kichisaburö, 
and his deputy, Tani Masayuki, both stressed that the Japanese government hoped 
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for a Finnish victory, although their statements, like all other expressions of sup-
port, were quite unofficial.58 
As far as official opinion in Japan was concerned, the end of the Winter War 
meant above all a suspicion that having secured its western boundary, the Soviet 
Union would turn its attention more to the situation in the Far East. The Finnish 
question was touched upon in discussions between Japanese diplomatic represen-
tatives and representatives of the Soviet Union and Germany. In August 1940, 
V.M.Molotov noted that the solution to the Finnish question depended on Soviet 
— German relations, and by October the Germans let it be understood that they 
regarded Finland as belonging to their sphere of influence, being particularly in-
terested in the ore reserves of Northern Finland.59 
When the Japanese concluded a Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union in April 
1941 their own interpretation of the situation was that Finland did not approve 
of this move.60 From the Finnish point of view, the agreement meant that Japan 
could no longer serve as a potential source of support against the Soviet Union 
under any conditions, although in practice Finland had long ago ceased to place 
any reliance on such support. Admittedly President Risto Ryti still reminded the 
Minister to Finland, Sakaya Tadashi, in November 1940 of the respect and in-
terest felt by the Finns for the Japanese, dating back to the times of the Russo-
Japanese War61, which could be interpreted as an indirect hint, at least, that Fin-
land might be interested in Japan's political support in her current position. 
Finland did have some military contacts with Japan during the period of peace 
which followed the Winter War, however. Col. Auno A. Kaila and Capt. Lauri 
Laine went to Manchukuo to direct training in winter warfare,62 and a further 
sign of a continuation of earlier relations was the opening of the Far East Line 
to Japan, the first vessel, the SS. Tornator, managing to arrive in Japan just 
before the outbreak of the Continuation War with the Soviet Union in June 
1941.63 Col. Kaila spent the reminder of the war as Military Attaché in Japan, 
with Capt. Laine as his adjutant, as it was impossible to arrange for them to 
return to Finland." Another person in a similar predicament was the Japanese 
professor Kuwaki Tsutomu, who taught Japanese and the history of Japanese 
ideas as a visiting professor at the University of Helsinki.65 
On the resumption of hostilities in June 1941 the Intelligence Officer attached 
to the Finnish General Staff (which served as the Operational Headquarters dur- 
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ing  the war) told the Japanese Military Attaché, Onouchi Hiroshi, that this was 
a "war of revenge". Onouchi remembered later that the officers he had met from 
the General Staff (presumably the Operational Headquarters) had been optimis-
tic about the course of the war throughout 1942. The first doubts regarding the 
possibility of a German victory had been expressed in January 1943, and by May 
of that year a General Staff officer admitted that Finland had lost the war. Jap-
anese information reports that Väinö Tanner had stated in February or March 
1944 that Finland had entered the war on the assumption that Germany would 
emerge victorious, and since she had obviously been mistaken in this, steps would 
be taken towards disengagement. 
At the early stages of the Continuation War, Finland even moved closer to 
Japan politically to some extent by recognizing on 18th July 1941 the de jure 
independence of the puppet state of Manchukuo created by Japan in Manchuria 
in 1932.67 In September of the same year the Finnish Minister in Tokyo, Karl 
Idman, took part in the celebrations to mark the anniversary of the Tripartite 
Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan,68 and from spring 1942 onwards he was 
engaged in maintaining unofficial relations with the Ambassador of the Nanjing 
puppet government set up by the Japanese in China69 
In the course of 1942 the Finns were interested in the possibility of a war be-
tween Japan and the Soviet Union, naturally on account of their own war, but 
information received from Japan convinced them that that country, at least, would 
not begin any such war, since future good relations with the Soviet Union were 
important and because Japan was geographically vulnerable to air attacks from 
the continent of Asia.70 
In spite of this, there were some signs of a warming in Finnish-Japanese rela-
tions in 1942, primarily in the form of an exchange of major decorations. The 
Emperor Hirohito was awarded the Grand Cross of the White Rose in July, and 
the Grand Cross of the Order of the Chrysanthemum was conferred on Presi-
dent Risto Ryti in December. Marshal Mannerheim, Prime Minister J.W.Ran-
gell and Foreign Minister Rolf Witting also received high honours from the Jap-
anese.71  
The real initiative for closer cooperation, admittedly a very tentative one, came 
from the Japanese side, when the Chief of the General Staff, General Arisue Seizo, 
approached Idman and indicated that he regarded joint action by those engaged 
66 Momose 1973, pp. 32-34. 
Confidential telegram J 47. Helsinki 19.7.1941  Finlandia Tokyo. J. to Tokyo 1941. 
UM. 
68 Confidential telegram J 70. Helsinki 26.9.1941  Finlandia Tokyo. J. to Tokyo 1941. 
UM. 
69 Telegram no. 44. Tokyo 19.3.1942 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1942. 
UM. 
70 Telegram no. 155. Tokyo 30.10.1942 Foreign Affairs Helsinki. J. from Tokyo 1942. 
UM. 
71 Fält 1985, p. 42. 
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in war as a desirable thing.'Z  In addition to this, the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
showed interest in the 25th anniversary of Finnish independence on 6th Decem-
ber 1942, which received unusual attention, including radio coverage of the 
anniversary celebrations. The Foreign Ministry also helped to sponsor the even-
ing reception arranged by the Japanese-Finnish Society, reports on which ap-
peared in the newspapers.73  The bare facts of reality, reflecting the tension in 
the atmosphere, were still to be seen even here, however, for the police were in 
the kitchen during the reception enquiring the names of those attending.74 
Exceptional note was also taken of Japan in public circles in Finland during 
1942, in the sense that the magazine Itsenäinen Suomi [Independent Finland] pub-
lished an issue devoted to Japan in February of that year. 
The special interest shown by Japan in Finland, a movement towards some 
form of united front towards the end of 1942, may have been due to the worsen-
ing of that country's own position in the war. Her period of aggression had come 
to an end with the Battle of Midway in June, in which she had sustained her 
first substantial losses. This was followed by a long period of equilibrium in which 
neither side could claim complete mastery of the Pacific Ocean. The critical turn 
of events took place in 1943, however, when the United States obtained major 
reinforcements for her fleet. 
The Finns had evidently not been sufficiently receptive to the Japanese ap-
proaches, however, for the Military Attaché, Onouchi, felt obliged to point out 
that while Japan made advances Finland was remaining cool.75 The greatest ob-
stacle to a united front was the incompatibility between the countries' interests. 
Finland was waging her own war with the Soviet Union, whereas Japan, trusting 
in her Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union, was at war with the United States 
and Great Britain, powers whose interests Finland was anxious not to infringe. 
One manifestation of this conflict of interests was that the Japanese were led 
to criticize the Finnish press for the support it expressed for the United States 
and Great Britain in their war against Japan.76 The Finns in turn, in pursuit of 
their own interests, were still trying to impress upon the Japanese in 1943 how 
important it was to gain victory over the Soviet Union before it would be possi-
ble for Japan to conclude any peace treaty with the United States and Great Brit-
ain." 
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Upon the capitulation of Italy in July 1943 Finland became still more impor-
tant to the Japanese than ever. For she was now left with only one ally, Germa-
ny, and a potential ally in Finland, with which she had traditionally had a trou-
ble-free relationship and which at least stood in the same anti-communist front. 
This awakened interest was manifested most clearly in the readiness of the for-
eign minister to enter negotiations with Finnish representatives.78 
In contradistinction to the above, Finland began to detach herself from her 
earlier close collaboration with the Axis powers by the beginning of 1944. Idman 
did not take part in the dinner held early in January 1944 for envoys of the Axis 
powers to mark their coming victory even though he had been invited.79 By 
February it was evident that the Finns' opinion had not been shaken by the Jap-
anese conviction that they were "in the same boat",80 and when Finland seemed 
to be withdrawing from the war in May of that year, the Japanese Foreign Min-
ister, Shigemitsu Mamoru, noted that it was very difficult for one nation to make 
peace in the midst of a major war. On the same occasion Idman, as if referring 
to the conflict of interests obtaining between Finland and Japan, mentioned that 
it might have been appropriate for Japan to join in the war against the Soviet 
Union, for he suspected that the latter might yet declare war on Japan, which 
would then have to pay dearly for her earlier victories over Russia.81 The situa-
tion could no longer be altered by the Japanese avowal of great admiration and 
sympathy for Finland at the time of the major Soviet offensive in June.82 
In spite of the fact that when Finland had signed a separate peace treaty with 
the Soviet Union in September 1944 the Japanese Foreign Ministry expressed the 
hope that this would not force her to break off her good relations with Japan,83 
Finland did sever diplomatic relations on 22nd September 1944, evidently at the 
instigation of Great Britain, an ally of the Soviet Union.84 Thus one era in Finn-
ish-Japanese relations was brought to an end. 
In summary, it may be said that Finnish-Japanese collaboration during the 
Russo-Japanese War provided an excellent springboard for good relations be-
tween the two countries, and a suitable memory to fall back on when the threat 
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posed by the Soviet Union in the 1930's became a common denominator in the 
foreign policies of both. 
The situation during the Second World War was complicated, however, by 
the diametrically opposed roles played by the Soviet Union in their foreign poli-
cy planning. The Soviet Union was an enemy for Finland, but for Japan its was 
a friendly nation with which a Neutrality Pact had been signed which served the 
interests of both parties at that time. The unofficial contacts and dealings be-
tween the two nations nevertheless testify to the underlying mutual understand 
which dominated relations between the two countries. Without doubt the cooper-
ation during the Russo-Japanese War and the favourable impact which the Jap-
anese victory had on conditions in Finland at that time undoubtedly lay behind 
these sentiments as well, not forgetting the later common threat to both coun-
tries, communism. 
The existence of this underlying stream of friendship and understanding was 
clearly expressed in the collaboration between the intelligence services of the two 
countries, to the extent that data on this are available at the present time, which 
evidently resembled in some ways the cooperation that had been established dur-
ing the Russo-Japanese War. Jukka Rislakki claims that official relations exist-
ed between the Finnish Central Investigation Police and Japanese intelligence in 
the 1930's.85 A good example of collaboration in the interception of radio com-
munications was the pile of Russian messages about a metre high, all in 5-digit 
code, which had been intercepted by Japanese intelligence between Vladivostok 
and Khabarovsk and were handed over to the Finnish radio intelligence division 
in summer 1940 in exchange for material of theirs. The Finns were gradually able 
to break the code used in these messages, an exercise which proved extremely 
•valuable, since the Russians used the same code on the Finnish front in summer 
1941. This enabled the Finns to decode about 70 % of the enemy's messages, 
giving the advancing Finnish troops a considerable advantage.86 
In order to ensure its lines of communication with Europe, the Finnish Intelli-
gence Department set up secret radio stations in Rome, Madrid, Bern, Berlin 
and Ankara, the last-mentioned being of particular importance since contact was 
had there with Japanese intelligence agents in the city, enabling reviews of the 
situation to be exchanged on both sides.87 
Collaboration between the intelligence services of the two countries continued 
even after Finland had withdrawn from the war, at least to the extent that the 
Finns sold secret material concerned with the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion to the Japanese in Sweden.88 In addition, one Finnish agent, Otto Kumenius, 
85 Jukka Rislakki, Erittäin salainen. Vakoilu Suomessa [Highly confidential. Espionage 
in Finland] (Vaasa, 1982), p. 125. 
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collaborated with the Japanese in Sweden for some time, although admittedly 
with the knowledge of both the Americans and Swedes.89 
89 Otto Kumenius, Tiedustelu — tehtävä yli rajojen. Viiden rintaman vastavakoilija 
muistelee ja kertoo [Intelligence — an assignment that knows no bounds. A counter-agent 
on five fronts recounts his memories]  (Alea-Kirja Oy, s.a.), pp. 177-185. 
196 
Abbreviations 
ACGG Archive of the Chancellery of the Goyernor-General 
ACH 	 Archief Camille Huysmans, Antwerp 
BT 	 Böeikenkyüjo toshokan [Library of the National Institute for Defence Studies, 
Defence Agency], Tokyo 
GS 	 Gaikö shiryökan [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Tokyo 
HI 	 Hoover Institution, Stanford 
IISG 	 International Instituut voor Soeiale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam 
KS 	 Kensei shiryöshitsu [Archiyes of Constitutional and Political Papers], Kokkai 
toshokan [National Diet Library], Tokyo 
PPS 
	
Polish Socialist Party 
PSR 	 Arkhiv Partii S(otsialistov)-R(evoliutsionerov) 
PSS 	 Polnoe sobranie sochinenii 
RSDWP Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party 
SA 	 Sarvlaks arkiv, Pernå 
SDKPiL Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania 
StA 	 Sota-arkisto [War Archives], Helsinki 
UM 	 Ulkoasiainministeriön arkisto [Archives of the Foreign Ministry], Helsinki 
VA 	 Valtionarkisto [National Archives], Helsinki 
ÅAB 	 Åbo Akademis Bibliotek, Turku/Åbo 
I97 
Photograph sources 
In Akashi Motoaki's possession 
Cover photograph, p. 19, 36, 56, 61, 79, 181 
 
Helsingin yliopisto, kuvalaitos 
 
p. 30, 33, 95, 113, 124, 143, 153, 160, 162 
Museovirasto, Historian kuva-arkisto 
p. 43, 51, 89 (photograph D. Nyblin), 117, 172 (drawing by A. Federley), 179  
Työväen Arkisto 
p. 136 
Yhtyneet Kuvalehdet Oy, Kuva-arkisto 
p. 73 
198 
Index of names 
Adler, Victor 135, 151 
Akashi Motoaki 12, 21, 198 
Akashi Motojira 5-7, 11-23, 27, 29, 32, 
35, 47-48, 52, 55-58, 60-62, 65-67, 
69-83, 92, 99-103, 106, 119, 128-129, 
138-139, 155, 159, 161-164, 169-175, 
181 
Akashi Motoyoshi 15 
Akizuki Sachio 34-35, 37, 58-64, 76-78, 
80, 138 
Alexander II, Tsar 13, 28, 31 
Alexander Ill, Tsar 13, 28 
 
Aminoff, Iwan 37  
Anda Girya 15 
Anzai Kazuo 21 
Arisue Seiza 192 
Arnold-Forster, H.O. 173 
Axelrod, P.B. 111-112, 119, 132-133, 142 
Azef, E.F. 29-30, 45-46, 86-87, 91, 125, 
139, 149, 163-164 
Balicki, Zygmunt 31, 40, 105, 125 
Balogh de Galåntha, M. (N.) 21, 34-35, 
169-170 
Baud, Eugene 32, 45-47 
Bauman 32, 49 
Bebel, August 132, 135 
Becker Bey, see Becker-Reuterskiöld, 
E.G.W. 
Becker-Reuterskiöld, E.G.W. 21, 32 
Berendsen, Ivar 37 
Bergen 37 
Berry, Michael 7 
Biaudet, Henry 163 
Birilev, A.A. 34 
Bobrikov, N.I. 46, 88, 174 
Bogdanov, A.A. 147, 150-151, 167 
Bogucharskii, V. la. 125 
Bonch-Bruevich, V.D. 121-122  
Branting, Hjalmar 152 
Braun 34 
Breshko-Breshkovskaia, E.K. 29, 39, 44, 66, 
150, 152-153, 155 
Breshkovskaia, see Breshko-Breshkoyskaia, 
E.K. 
Buckley, Roger 7 
Buyno, Adam 150 
Castrén, Jonas 32, 35-38, 94, 101-104, 
169-175 
Chaikoyskii, N.V. 13, 28-29, 37-38, 
44-46, 49, 52, 91, 93, 98, 100-101, 124, 
139, 161, 163-164 
Cherkezoy, Varlaam 29, 45-46 
Chernov, V.M. 86-87, 94, 116, 122-125, 
133, 144, 150, 158, 161 
Chichibu, Prince 185, 190 
Clemenceau, Georges 42 
Copeland, William 70, 91 
Dan, F.I. 119-122, 165 
Deich, L.G., see Deutsch, L.G. 
Dekanozi, Georgii 32, 37-39, 45-46, 48, 
96, 101, 125, 150, 163 
Dekanozishvili, G., see Dekanozi, G. 
Deutsch, L.G. 142-143 
Dickenson, R.R. 32, 49 
Dikanskii, see Azef, E.F. 
Dmowski, Roman 31, 38, 71-72, 74, 86, 
101, 125 
Dolgorukii, lurii 30 
Dolgorukoy, Petr D. 25, 30, 41, 45, 105, 
125-126 
Dzieduszycki, Wojciech 45  
Edlund, N.D. 170-171 
Edmondson, Linda 7 
Federley, A. 198 
Feldmann, Konstantin 46 
Filipowicz, Tytus 56 
199 
Fountain, Alvin 70, 72 
France, Anatole 42 
Franck 48 
Frederick (VIII), Prince, King of Denmark 
36-37 
Freycinet, Charles de 28  
Furuhjelm, Victor 31, 50, 66, 150, 153, 155, 
158 
Futrell, Michael 5, 15, 20, 70, 80 
Gåo Pian 15 
Gapon, G.A. 24, 28, 31, 43-44, 46-47, 
52-53, 64-66, 86, 137-138, 140-141, 
144-150, 153-156, 158-159, 163-164 
Gapuniia 125 
Gartman, L., see Hartman, L. 
Q2rmanis, Uldis 32 
Goldman, M., see Liber, M. 
Gorky, Maxim 8, 31  
Gots, M.R. 29, 116, 163  
Gripenberg, Lennart 33-34 
Gripenberg, Oskar 34 
Guesde, Jules 94, 112 
Gummerus, Johannes 150-151, 153, 158 
Hackzell, Antti 183, 185 
 
Hallamaa, Reino 84 
Hamaguchi Manabu 21 
Hartman, Ley 28, 32 
Hasegawa Yoshimichi 20 
Hayashi Tadasu 38, 55-56, 72, 93, 173- 
174 
Heftye, Thomas 21, 35 
Herring, Peter 7 
Hicks, Malcolm 7  
Hiitonen, Ensio 183-184 
Hirohito, Emperor 192 
Hirose Eiichi 84 
Holsti, Rudolf 186-188 
Homén, Theodor 81 
Hovhannisian, M., see Varandian, M. 
Hukushima Yasumasa 38, 71 
Ichikawa Hikotarö 185, 187  
Idman, Karl 192, 194 
Ignatius, Hannes 32 
Iguchi Shago 55 
Inaba Chiharu 6-7, 11-12, 17, 21, 23, 55, 
69, 99,102, 161 
Inaba Masao 15 
Inoue Junnosuke 65, 81 
Isakoy, see Liber, M. 
Izenshtat, Isaiah 150 
Järnefelt, Eero 185 
Jaures, Jean 42, 132-133, 147 
Jodko-Narkiewicz, Witold 31, 40, 50, 56, 
101, 106, 109-110, 119, 125, 150 
Jogiches, Leo 114 
Jöhaji Gorö 65 
Kaila, Auno 191 
Kallio, Kyösti 188 
Karski, see Filipowicz, T. 
Katsura Tara 81 
Kautsky, Karl 111, 133, 135, 148 
Kawamata 184 
Kelles-Krauz, Kazimierz 125 
Khilkov, D.A. 34 
Khil'kov, M.I. 34 
Klingenstierna, Klas 37, 171 
Kodama Gentarb 38, 57, 71-72, 81 
Koike Akemi 184 
Komura Jutarö 55-56, 58-65, 72, 76-79, 
81-82, 138 
Konoe Fumimaro 189 
Kovajevskis, Ji kabs 151 
Kropotkin, P.A. 28-29, 91 
Kruuslan, J., see Strautmanis, J.  
Kumenius, Otto 195 
Kurino Shin'ichirö 13, 34, 36 
Kuwaki Tsutomu 191 
Lafargue, Paul 94, 112 
Laine, Lauri 191 
Landy, Friedrich 65 
Lazarev, E.E. 124 
Lebedev 64-65 
Lenin, V.I. 5, 24, 30, 85-86, 108, 111-113, 
115, 121-122, 140-141, 146-147, 
150-152, 154, 159-160, 165-167 
Leont'eva, Tat'iana 45 
Lerski, Jerzy 70 
Leyden, von 33 
Libaridian, Gerard 151  
Liber, Mark 39, 119 
Lindberg, Syen 37 
Litvinov, Maxim 187-188 
Loris-Melikian, H., see Loris-Melikov, J.  
Loris-Melikov, Jean 31, 38-39, 101, 150 
Loris-Melikov, M.T. 31, 101 
Luxemburg, Rosa 86, 109, 114-115, 119- 
120, 132, 135-136, 166 
Makino Nobuaki 63-65, 77, 81, 178 
200 
Malinovskii, A.A., see Bogdanov, A.A. 
Malinowski, Aleksander 31, 125 
Manaki Yoshinobu 16 
Manasevich-Manuiloy, I.F. 48  
Mannerheim, Carl 34, 173  
Mannerheim, C.G.E. 34, 185, 192 
Maria Fedoroyna (Dagmar), Dowager Em- 
press 37 
Markarian, Mardiros 150-151 
Marmiloy 31, 39 
Marmiyan 31, 39 
Martov, Iu. 0. 86, 108, 111-113, 119-122, 
142, 165 
Maruge 34 
Mechelin, Leo 41-42, 90, 98, 104-108, 
114, 125 
Medem, Vladimir 150, 167 
Meiji, Emperor 36, 62 
Miliukov, P.N. 25, 30, 41, 86-87, 125 
Minke, Ernests 32 
Mishchenko 34 
Molotov, V.M. 191 
Momose Hiroshi 21 
Morisaijo 67 
Morton 32, 49, 52 
Motono Ichira 41, 49, 62, 77-78, 80 
Murai Makoto 21 
Nagao Tsunekichi 18, 35, 50, 169, 171, 
174-175 
Nagaoka Gaishi 38, 55, 57 
Natanson, M.A. 115-116, 120, 125, 141- 
145 
Nemiroyich-Danchenko, V.I. 67 
Neovius, Arvid 103, 125-126 
Nicholas II, Tsar 13, 29, 36-37, 43, 45-46, 
66, 88, 97, 107, 129  
Niskanen, Ville 186 
Nomura Kichisabura 190 
Noskov, V.A. 111, 119 
Nyblin, D. 198 
Omon 150 
Onodera Makoto 84 
Onodera Yuriko 84 
Onouchi Hiroshi 192-193 
Ozols, Jänis 125  
Paasikivi, J.K. 180 
Pale, Erkki 84 
Paul 31 
Paul (Pavel Aleksandrovich), Grand Duke  
52 
Perovskaia, Sofiia 28 
Peshkov, A.M., see Gorky, M. 
Pilsudski, Jozef 56, 72-73, 101  
Pipes, Richard 98 
Plehwe, V.K. von 29, 100, 104, 116-118 
Plekhanov, G.V. 29, 39, 41, 85-86, 95-96, 
108, 111-113, 115-116, 118-122, 127, 
140-144, 146, 165 
Pohjanheimo, Lennartti 184 
Potresov, A.N. 115 
Pressensé, Francis de 42 
Quillard, Pierre 32, 39 
Ramstedt, G.J. 178-180 
Rangell, J.W. 192 
Rappoport, S.A. 150 
Reuter, J.N. 32, 94, 101-103, 173-174 
Rislakki; Jukka 195 
Roland de la Platiere, Jeanne 48 
Roland, Madame 21, 48 
Rolavs, Ernests 150-151 
Roosevelt, Theodore 83 
Rossum, Leo van 100 
Rozins', Fricis 147, 150-152, 167 
Rubanovich, I.A. (E.) 29, 53, 91, 94 
Rusten 150 
Rutenberg, P.139 
Rybikowski, Michael 84 
Ryti, Risto 191-192 
Safo, see Markarian, M. 
Sakaya Tadashi 191  
Sandler, Rickard 187 
Sata Eiichi 21 
Savinkov, B.V. 161-162 
Schauman, Eugen 46 
Schauman, F.M. 46 
Schmidt, Susan 7 
Scott 47, 50 
Seignobos, Charles 44 
Semenov, E. 31 
Sergei Aleksandroyich, Grand Duke 29, 44, 
52 
Shakhovskoi, D.I. 45 
Shervashidze, G.D. 37 
Shigemitsu Mamoru 187, 194 
Shipov, D.N. 25 
Shishko, L.E. 94, 99-100, 124 
Simon 44 
Sone Arasuke 81 
201 
Soskis, D.V. 29, 46 
Springer 48 
Stalin, I.V. 5 
Stolypin, P.A. 87 
Strautman, J., see Strautmanis, J. 
Strautmanis, Janis 32, 49 
Struye, P.B. 25, 30, 41, 86-87, 96, 98-99, 
104-105, 125, 133 
Suny, Ronald 96 
Suwa Hidesaburö 49 
 
Svinhufvud, P.E. 183, 185 
Takase Jirö 15-16 
Tanaka Giichi 18, 70-71 
Tanaka Hirotarö 38 
Tani Masayuki 190 
Tani Toshio 69 
Tanner, Väinö 180, 192 
Terauchi Masatake 11, 20, 57, 80 
Ter-Ghazarian, Ghazar 150-151 
Theslöf, Gösta 14, 32, 172, 175 
Togo Heihachiro 181 
Togo Shigenori 185 
Tolstoy, Leo 28  
Törngren, Adolf 86, 98, 105, 107, 153, 
163-164 
Trepov, F.F. 34 
Trotsky, L.D. 87 
Tunagusuko 66 
Uchida 101 
Ueda Sentarö 34, 45  
Ul'ianov, V.I., see Lenin, V.I.  
Utsunomiya Tarö 18, 38, 40, 47, 56-57, 60, 
65, 72, 75, 81, 93, 102, 174 
Vaillant, Edouard 94, 147 
Vakulinchuk, Grigorii 46 
Valvanne, Hugo 185, 189 
Varandian, Mikayel 21, 31, 39, 125 
Vernam Hull 46 
Virgin, Otto 171 
Volkhoyskii, F.V. 21, 29, 44, 91-93, 98, 
100, 106, 124, 139 
Walecki, Henryk 150 
Wanhovusukii, see Volkhovskii, F.V. 
Warszawski, Adolf 119 
Watt 47, 49 
Winckelmann, George 183  
Witting, Rolf 192 
Wolff, Eugen 31 
Yamagata Aritomo 61, 65-66, 79 
Yamamoto Toshirö 21 
Yanagidani Minokichi 47, 50 
Zasulich, M.I. 34 
Zasulich, Vera 33-34 
Zetterberg, Seppo 32 
Zheliabov, A.I. 28 
Zilliacus, Konni 13, 27, 31, 33, 36-50, 61, 
65-67, 70-71, 74-75, 80-82, 86- 
134, 138-140, 149-150, 153, 159, 161- 
166, 174 
202 

. 
^ 
' 
` 
" 
4 
.43 

